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POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS AND THE
POLITICS OF SCIENCE

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POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS
AND THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE

by

BADER OTHMAN SALEH

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty
of Claremont Graduate School in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate Faculty of Government

Claremont

1986


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



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We, the undersigned, certify tht we have read this
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1986

Claremont Graduate School

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM:
THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS
AND THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE

BY

BADER O. SALEH
CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL

1986

ABSTRACT

This dissertation exposes, analyses, and criticizes one of the most important academic and theoretical issues that not only influenced American political theory but, also all western political thought. It deals in a detailed manner with the way in which the methodological issues and assumptions of the natural science have been transferred and employed for the study of politics.

For undertaking such an enterprise the research will focus on the "behavioral movement in political science" as it emerged and was influenced by the peculiar social and philosophical grounds of the American society. It will start by addressing the general framework of "American

Political Science" and the place that political behavioralism occupied in it and the stages through which its thought has proceeded in its search for a theoretical orientation and identity that by which it reaches a solution for the many theoretical complications that the study of politics suffers. The point of departure of this assertion is the premise that political behavioralism didn't emerge in isolation from American political thought and its dynamics, but was a reflection of a particular trend in this thought that manifested in an abstract intellectual enterprise.

This research is a theoretical, philosophical discourse that treats, analyzes, and critiques some basic philosophical doctrines of "social sciences" in general and in behavioral political theory in particular. It will try to accomplish this by employing "political behavioralism" as exemplar of the concept of "science" in political science.

The first chapter is an introductory chapter in which political behavioralism will be addressed as one among many manifestations of the American "science" of politics whose growth and changes were in harmony with both the infrastructure and the super-structure of the American Society. The second chapter will try to stand on the points of contact between political behavioralism and its philosophic orientation.

Chapter three will address the technical aspect of political behavioralism. It will try to show how its view of science is related to that part of methodological studies concerned with the technical part of research; from the step of facts gathering to the technique of analysis.

The fourth chapter will address the connection between the ideological and the scientific abstract of political behaviorism. This will be done by disclosing the mutual epistemological characteristic of the "scientific" knowledge and of the political vision of behavioralism.

The fifth chapter, however, will show the possible theoretical conclusions that can come out of the examination of some aspects of political behavioralism.

To the three pivots of my life:

To Kuwait, the people;

To Sawsan, the love;

To Hessah, the hope of the future

To these I dedicate this work.

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There is nothing in the academic enterprise that can be accomplished without the help, support, and cooperation of committed academic scientists. For being such men (scientists), I thank my committee members--Professor T. Lindsay Moore, Jr.; Professor George S. Blair; and Professor Lee C. McDonald--for their support and encouragement. Professor Moore's expertise in public policy helped me obtain a realistic understanding of the place of "science" in a world of politics. Professor Blair's commitment to the "grass roots" signifies the human aspect of democracy. And Professor McDonald's concern and knowledge were major factors behind the development of this work.

I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my family and especially to my wife Sawsan for her patience, understanding, and encouragement and to my brother Emad Abu Rashed.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines, analyzes, and critiques one of the most important academic and theoretical issues that has influenced not only American political theory but also all western political thought. It deals in a detailed manner with the way in which the methodological issues and assumptions of natural science have been transferred to and employed for the study of man. It should be mentioned from the very beginning that this process is not an easy one since it requires the student of politics to be acquainted with the doctrines of the philosophy of science and its applicability within the framework of social science and even within its most sensitive form, politics. This process of adoption seems, for those who do not go to the roots of social reality, a forward step that has been accomplished on the basis of the "unity of method" doctrine which presupposes that the "scientific method" is valid for the study of both social and natural phenomena. Despite the many points of weakness from which this thesis may suffer, its philosophical vision and theoretical formulations can show us the form in which the process of scientific knowledge is constituted and connected to the operating social conditions in both

political and economic dimensions. In other words, the ideological roots of political science can be exposed.

To understand the premises mentioned above, this research will focus on the "behavioral movement in political science" as they emerged from the peculiar social and philosophical grounds of American society. We will begin by addressing the general framework of "American Political Science," the place that political behavioralism occupied in it, and the stages through which its thought has proceeded in its search for a theoretical orientation and identity. Behavioralism was offered as a solution to the many theoretical complications which the study of politics suffers. The point of this assertion is that political behavioralism did not emerge in isolation from American political thought and its dynamics; it is but a reflection of a particular trend in this thought. The direction of the behavioral movement and its epistemology were formulated within the liberal circles that flourished in the thirties, forties, and fifties of this century and which were active forces in American political thought. The essence of political behavioralism is connected to a liberal ideological understanding of society and the nature of social knowledge. And if it is connected to a liberal vision of society, it is also connected to the liberal vision of nature that manifests itself in the

sensual empirical nature of logical empiricism as the dominant approach in the philosophy of science. One can also see in its tendency toward liberal doctrines another aspect that resembles an irrational orthodoxy as a manifestation of an ideological commitment. The thought of the behavioral movement authoritatively imposes its philosophical and theoretical issues under the name of the so-called "scientific method" and regards them as the "criteria of adequacy" for our knowledge. Through this, the movement sought to make the ideals of the positivist outlook the standards upon which the validity of knowledge is to be judged. This means that, to control the direction that political knowledge might take, behavioralism held the theory of knowledge by its "neck" by formulating a theory of "epistemology" that makes knowledge technical and procedural in order to maintain such a control. Why was this undertaken? The answer is to meet that desire to ensure the prevalence of one's beliefs even if they are cast in an invalid theory. And from this one can see the ideological connection between the formulation of a "theory of knowledge" and the desire to frame the products of knowledge within a political, partisan paradigm.

To understand the connections mentioned above, this research deals with the "political behavioral

movement" as one of the most important extensions of the "movement of modern science." In other words, the movement is a manifestation of the concept of "science" in social science, in general, and in the discipline of politics, in particular. By showing the manner in which the concept of science was applied to the study of politics, the research intends to show the philosophical grounds that political behavioralism took for granted and comprehended intuitively.

The point to be emphasized in this regard is that, despite the fact that the "social science" movement accomplished something at a certain level of its studies, it was unable to put the study of politics within a framework relevant to the ideals of science as conceived by the dominant approach in the philosophy of science. The complication, comprehension, change and capacity to transcend the rational and moral frameworks make the "political" the most complex form of "conventional objects," and since these attributes provide for a good deal of difference concerning the conception of politics and the formulation of its theory, it makes the discipline of politics tolerate all the analytical frameworks and methods, because there is no one approach that is able to cope with the theoretical problems associated with those attributes. This comprehensiveness is, thus, a consequence of the

view of science as a "democratic enterprise" especially in the study of politics where the validity of its theories does not depend on pre-assumed criteria to determine what is true and what is false in a theory but on the extent to which this theory can provide for a meaning of reality and understanding by the mind. This democratic view of knowledge is the only ground that can provide for solutions to the theoretical and political crises of our time. It can do so by eliminating the inappropriate criterion of truthfulness which perpetuates the conflicts between claims and which, moreover, over-rationalizes them.

Despite the liberal orientation of political behavioralism, the doctrine of "democratic knowledge" is absent from its beliefs since this school of thought authoritatively imposes its method thus eliminating the other possible angles of viewing the political phenomenon. The reason for the imposition of this doctrine is due, among other reasons, to the fact that this school of thought was engaged in "an unholy war" against its strongest enemy, classical political philosophy. The political behavior movement is, to some extent, a reaction to the decline of political philosophy in the beginning of this century and its inability to keep pace with the other disciplines of social science. The aim of political behavioralism was

to stop this decline by shifting its emphasis from the traditional to an instrumental, technical conception of epistemology. This shift took it in the direction of orthodoxy and eliminated the intellectual variety which had enriched the framework of traditional philosophy. The pioneering behavioral scientists expressed their admiration of modern technology by emphasizing the technicality of knowledge and by emphasizing that the method of natural sciences is applicable to the social study of man, with no need for reflection on the difference between them.

The research will also attempt to treat the connection between practical political views and the concept of the political, and the way in which this connection relates to the vision of theory and epistemology. The view of the instrumental nature of epistemology is connected, on pragmatic grounds, to that instrumental view of politics on the basis of which the "art of government" is conceived to establish a state of balance by balancing the process of wealth and value distribution in society. This research deals with this instrumentalism and shows the connections between the behavioral instrumental conception of epistemology and that of politics.

And if one must be more specific or must specify the precise guiding hypothesis which the research treats

when dealing with the general framework (or hypothesis), it is essential to indicate the set of theoretical relations which, when articulated, will show that general framework. It is necessary at this point to state that the specification of these relations and its form depend totally on the nature of the research problem and on the best approach to its treatment. Therefore, our specification of the hypothesis will be in the same form and nature as the problem of this research. This research is a theoretical, philosophical discourse that treats, analyzes, and critiques some basic philosophical doctrines of "social science," in general, and in behavioral political theory, in particular. It will attempt to accomplish this end by examining "political behavioralism" as the exemplar of the concept of "science" in political science.

The first chapter addresses political behavioralism as one of many manifestations of the American "science" of politics. The chapter traces three stages through which the movement has proceeded: political science (Charles E. Merriam), political psychology (Harold Lasswell), and political theory (David Easton).

The second chapter examines the points of contact between political behavioralism and its philosophic orientation. This chapter shows that political

behavioralism has employed logical empiricism to defend itself whenever its philosophic foundation was questioned.

Chapter III addresses the technical aspect of political behavioralism, showing how its view of science is related to that part of methodological studies concerned with the technical part of research from fact-gathering to the technique of analysis. This chapter explains that, although the ideals of the natural scientific methods are helpful in natural science, they cannot be regarded as the major element of political understanding.

The fourth chapter addresses the connection between the ideological and scientific qualities of political behavioralism by disclosing the natural epistemological characteristic of "scientific" knowledge and of the political vision of behavioralism. This chapter is based on the premise that the most abstract ideas are connected in their emergence and structure to politico- and socio-economic factors. However, this does not mean that political behavioral theory is substantive in terms of relevance to social problems, but that the ideals of their process of theory formation has been directed to a vision of the "political" relevant to the social interest of certain social forces. Those ideals operate as boundaries that limit

the theoretical outcomes within the behavioral enterprise of thought.

The fifth chapter shows the possible theoretical conclusions that may be drawn from the preceding chapters. While not dealing with any theoretical relations in particular, this chapter attempts to show how some theoretical concepts are able to aid our understanding of political behavioralism and the concept of the "political" and its ramifications. These are considered auxiliary concepts that assist political researchers in understanding political behavioralism and similar intellectual movements.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the last chapter is not expected to settle the crisis of political theory once and for all, since the confrontation of epistemological problems embedded in it is a very difficult task especially in an age of radical change. The emergence of a new stage of intellectual capabilities that can confront such traditional problems is a process that has a strong sociological dimension. The limits to which the prevailing social forces tolerate change in the paradigm in order to allow the emergence of new theoretical capacities will be considered. Transformation to a different stage of thought in which men adopt new ways of understanding things is not a personal, individualistic decision and

is not a pure personal outcome but, rather, is a social process in which all substructures, either economic or social, operate.

This issue is closely related to the question of the originality of knowledge. What we call "originality" in the most basic sense of the term is not a question of whether the theoretical formulations of any knowledge are affected by other formulations that preceded them, because this effect is inevitable and can in no way be escaped, especially at this stage of communications. Originality depends on the extent to which formulations respond to the political and socio-economic conditions. Thus, the originality of a given intellectual enterprise depends on the extent to which this enterprise reflects the state of social conflict and alliance and expresses its relations to those modes of social action. From this point of departure, one can emphasize that the originality of knowledge is connected in this form to reality and, when the originality appears in the form of contribution to the existing state of knowledge, it means that the paradigm of the society is undergoing changes that make this contribution absorbable. This does not mean, however, that we are here escaping complex theoretical and historical problems. It means, rather, that we assign these problems their proper place in history.

At this point, it is necessary to deal with the following questions: Why are we going to treat this topic? What is its significance to a student from Kuwait? How is this topic related to the academic, intellectual setting in the Kuwaiti society? In trying to answer these questions, the appendix to this study will attempt to establish grounds upon which a critique of the representation of the behavioral paradigm in Kuwait can be conducted. In the remaining pages of this introduction, however, we will attempt to show how the requirements for political progress and development cannot be satisfied by the mere adaptation of behavioral political theory but, rather, only by the careful study of Kuwaiti political thought and its social conditioning factors.

Kuwaiti political thought reflects in its various manifestations the continuing conflict between modernizing forces and conservative, established authority. This conflict did not evolve in a vacuum but as a result of the conflict of social and economic interests between those who see the change of the system toward "institutionalism" as a necessary condition for political development and those who see in this change a danger to their conservative foundation and, consequently, to their established interests in society. The first forces are represented by the "democratic

movement" which sees itself (and is also regarded by the people) as a representative of the political aspirations of the middle and lower classes in Kuwaiti society. The existence of these classes and their participation in the process of acquiring wealth in the system depends in the first place on the extent to which the political system is directed toward "institutionalism." What this means is that the social forces appropriate to change in society can only restrict and limit traditional, tribal political authority by instituting legal constitutional channels in the system to help solve social problems in a peaceful, rational manner. The significance of the political convictions of the "democratic movement" is due to its realistic understanding of Kuwaiti society and of the best approach to modernize it in a peaceful, rational manner.

The turn toward institutionalism is an essential step in the development of Kuwait's political system because Kuwaiti society suffers from a very dangerous form of segregation--tribalism, sectarianism, racism, and other forms--that threatens the national unity of the society. These divisions have contributed to the inability of the modernizers to mobilize the people toward the required institutional patterns. Moreover, they have contributed to the perpetuation of the existing traditional powers and interests.

In the face of such segregation and national disunity, the trend toward institutionalism is a possible cure. Its most important aspects are manifested in population policies and in the distribution of wealth which the existing political authority employs to maintain segregation and by which a balance between the various groups of the society can be established. This balance, however, makes the ruling group the supreme authority and other groups see alliance with it as the major means of accumulating larger shares of wealth and power.

This kind of politics is regarded among Kuwaitis as a form of political corruption under which the fundamentals of politics are not directed toward the development of the system by the increase of political participation within it, but rather are used to suppress such development and decrease political participation. This means that political authority, instead of mobilizing the people into the system and maintaining a united internal front, pushes them more in the direction of segregation in order to maintain the domination of the ruling group.

The way out of this form of politics, in the opinion of the researcher, can only be found within the limits set by the political vision of the "democratic block." That is, the realistic solution set forth by

this block must be accepted by all political forces. This acceptance can be regarded the only solution by which a small country like Kuwait can reach a reasonable level of political and economic development and balanced social progress. The elements of such a solution are simply (1) an emphasis on political liberties by the removal of all restrictions in the face of the development of parliament, mass media, and unions and (2) tolerance of all opinions within the system allowing people to express their political interests in a peaceful manner, as well as an emphasis on law as the basic instrument for the solution of conflicts arising from different views. Those two doctrines are among the most important upon which a concept of national unity can be formulated.

As for the other aspects of modernization, especially with regard to higher education, the "democratic" movement considers the "academic social science movement" its extension at Kuwait University. It regards the advocates of the "scientific method" as the modernizing force in the higher educational system, a force that might shake the conservative epistemological foundation of the society. But, while this recognition is valid to a certain extent, the advocates of the "scientific method" at Kuwait University have failed to meet the necessary theoretical

and ideological requirements for the development and modernization of society. What is required is an understanding of epistemology based on the understanding of the past and present society that takes into account that part of the cultural heritage and tradition that is to be embodied within any new epistemological formulation.

The methodological movement at Kuwait University was first unable to satisfy the "institutional" requirements. It regarded "institutional" theory as an outdate form of political theory therefore inapplicable to the development of the institutional system. The resentment of this form of political theory was due in the first place to the fact that those scholars applied the developmental stages of American political science to the Kuwaiti political setting. That is, when the American behavioral movement presented the institutional approach, the literature of this approach dealt with almost every aspect of institutional theory. In other words, behavioral theorists were convinced that this form of theory had to be supplemented by other forms of analysis. This means that while American political thought absorbed the useful aspects of institutional theory, the methodologists of Kuwait University sought to eliminate them. The irony was that, because of its usefulness in a political apparatus, it was needed so

badly.

Second, the trend of adopting whole-heartedly newer scientific methodology is dangerous because it shifts the attention of Kuwaiti students of politics from substantive knowledge of theoretical questions in their society to those procedural aspects to which the students are exposed in other disciplines, such as logic, psychology, computer science, and statistics. That is, instead of addressing questions of political participation, parliamentary development, constitutional arrangements, and the solution to underdeveloped conservative politics limited to a small segment in society, political methodologists preoccupied their students with procedural methodological issues that could hardly result in an adequate understanding of those issues.

The third aspect is the fact that the behavioral trend at Kuwait University lacks originality and therefore is unable to produce substantive knowledge relevant to the Kuwaiti political culture and tradition. Its members, as will be seen later, have been influenced by liberal western thought and were unable to adapt the theoretical premises of this thought to the existing conservative foundation of the society in a manner that contributes to its development. As a consequence of this influence, they perceived this foundation and its

philosophic and theoretical tradition as the enemy that must be eliminated.

Among the advocates of the "scientific" trend is Dr. Foud Zakareyya, a professor of philosophy at Kuwait University. He can be considered the "godfather" of this trend, but despite this and despite the fact that his book, Scientific Thinking, was and still is the major reference for the required course of "Philosophy of Science," Zakareyya was unable to distinguish the "scientific" enterprise from other forms of knowledge and the manner in which its epistemological characteristics can be fit within the framework of a conservative Islamic society like Kuwait.

The attraction to foreign ideas and theoretical doctrines, combined with the inability to adopt them in a relevant manner to the social apparatus in which they are introduced, was among the major reasons why the social science enterprise has spent its life wholly within the walls of the university. The confusion and shortcomings from which many of those social thinkers who followed the tracks of Zakareyya¹ suffer were

¹See Salah Al-Fawwal, Manahaj Al-Bahth Fe Alulom Al-Eitema'evah [Methods of research in social sciences] (Cairo: Dar Ghareeb Press, 1982). See also, Fakir Akil, Osos Al-Bahth Al-Elmy Fe Al-Ulom Al-Solokeyyah [The fundamentals of scientific research in the behavioral sciences] (Beirut: Dar Alelm Lelmalayeen Press, 1979).

inevitable consequences of the search for solutions to the social and epistemological problems of Arab Islamic society in what has been produced in foreign eastern or western institutions and the attempt to apply these solutions inconsistently so that it clashes radically and violently with the traditional structure of this society. This process must be avoided by the secular modern political currents which seek to develop the institutional arrangements of the society. This evasion must begin with an historic critique of the "science" movement in the study of social phenomena through the disclosure of the points of weakness and shortcomings from which it suffers. For a detailed discussion of the problems with regard to the Kuwaiti situation, see the Appendix.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM: A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

This chapter seeks to demonstrate some basic aspects necessary for the understanding of political "behavioralism." It will try to show that it is a school of thought in American political science that influenced and has been influenced by its general framework as a learned discipline and its major intellectual issues. The significance of showing this is manifest in the view of this movement as a political epistemological current that was connected, ideologically, to the aspirations of a certain "community of practitioners." The view of political "behavioralism" as a school of thought leads us to assert that its thought, like all other social thought enterprises, has been shaped by political and socio-economic conditions. In other words, the pioneering behavioral thinkers like Charles E. Merriam, Harold Lasswell, George Catlin, and David Easton, to mention a few, did not develop their political outlook in a vacuum. But they were conscious of the developments surrounding them at various intellectual levels. Their thought was shaped by two intellectual processes that shaped their epistemological and

political views: positivism and liberalism, respectively.

At this point, it should be acknowledged that the role played by this school of thought and the new epistemological directions it asserted have been affected by the Great Depression and the response of the American political system to it in the form of the New Deal. And while the impact of these aspects is beyond the scope of this chapter, one can point out that their effects were in line with changing behavioral theory of the formulation of government and its philosophy. And while this chapter does not take a decisive stand on the relation between these events and the emergence of political behavioralism, it will try to touch the impact of the forces of social change, as perceived by behavioralists, on the various stages of development of their thought.

As a prelude to the different stages through which political behavioralism proceeded, it is necessary to see the general characteristics of American political science and the way it influenced political behavioral theory. The significance of this is manifest in the picture that can make us see the points of contact between "political behavioralism" as a school of thought and the general framework of American political science that reflects the characteristics of the grand paradigm

of American political thought.

Among many others, one can specify four characteristics of the general framework of the study of politics: moderation, duality (in the structure of issues), variety, and openness to criticism.

Moderation is one of the most important characteristics of American political science and was a major criterion for the popularity of its political ideas. This characteristic appears in the tendency of the popular schools of thought that regard moderation as a desirable quality and a necessary condition for a stable, democratic society where social change must not interrupt the traditional criteria of justice and of equality in the society. This quality manifests itself in some popular schools of political thought like pluralism, institutionalism, and behavioralism whose acceptance of social change depends on the recognition of the capacity of the political system to cope with the impact and effects of changing social forces and its ability, legally and constitutionally, to meet the reform requirements that these forces stipulate. This means that they all accept the constitutional limits set up to meet the necessities of change with no concerns about or attempt to change the overall democratic form of the system. And despite the fact that those schools differ in their conception of the role of government,

they all accept its general outline.

In social sciences, in general, and in politics, in particular, the characteristic of moderation can be regarded as a political stand on the question of change. The question of change is regarded as a major area of study in which the various levels of changes introduced in the society and their consequences can be determined. The views of political scientists on this question revolve around changes which occur in revolutions and violent military coups were major areas of study. American political scientists viewed such forms of political change as undesirable. The conception of change has, thus, been connected to moderation.

With the turn of this century, there occurred a degree of consensus on the fact that the American democratic political system is the best form of government and represents the ultimate goal that the human political experience can attain. This consensus led to the view of necessary social changes on the basis of moderate reform in a manner that transforms the necessary political aspects of the system gradually without shocking its stability. In this sense, moderation becomes a necessary condition for proposals of change to be popular.

What political scientists have called a "behavioral revolution" was, in essence, a form of

moderate reform proposals. And if the liberal philosophic orientation had some radical premises, the context and goals of such premises were consistent with the essence of the element of moderation. The point of departure of the "behavioral thrust" was to keep to a minimum the effects of changing social forces by means of adapting the system to their requirements. David Easton, a pioneering behavioral political scientist, asserts three basic phenomena that political theory must deal with: "persistence through change" which starts from the assumptions of "system maintenance" and "system preservation." This view of the changing phenomena of the political system was a central principle that the various behavioral approaches and concepts revolved around.

The thesis of "persistence through change" indicates the desire for change which is necessarily connected to the interest of the social forces interested in this change. The extent of this change, according to these forces, must not extend to the point at which it shakes the fundamental aspects of the system on which there is a substantial consensus. But it must be directed toward the adaptation of the political institutions to the social changes. The term "persistence," thus, indicates the acceptance of the existing political apparatus despite the advocacy of

change. The form of political theory that can be obtained from this thesis is, therefore, concerned with the reform and maintenance of the system.

The moderate quality of the behavioral political theory contributed to its popularity and wide reception. Extreme and radical proposals for social reform are limited within unpopular circles. This is due to the fact that American political scientists have specified a moderate intellectual and ideological basis for their concepts that, without being moderate, their failure is potential.

The second characteristic is manifest in the "dually-structured" approach to addressing political issues. By this we mean the tendency to address political issues in a "liberal vs. conservative" context. One finds political issues center around these two pivots. This form of "duality" does not only manifest itself in American political science, but also in the philosophic outlook that molds it. The peak of the debate of the fifties appeared as a liberal-conservative controversy where almost all the treatments and the issues debated did not go beyond the limits of these outlooks. It is perhaps the dual structure of American politics that makes this character obvious. One finds that, from the very beginning, when the American founding fathers accepted the rights of

"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as "unalienable rights," American political thought reflected two tendencies: one manifest in the recognition of those rights on a liberal basis where their forms differ in accordance with social changes, and the other takes these rights as transcendental ideas that must not be subject to change.

The behavioral movement in politics took a position very close to one pivot of this dual form. In accordance with its philosophic basis and ideological connection, the thought of the movement revolved around the element of the philosophy of liberalism and molded its goals accordingly. The treatment of political issues in accordance with the mentioned dual pivots is connected directly to the dual structure of the political system where, in this regard, it maintains a strong reflection of the "two-party" system. Political theory in such a system is, therefore, a reflection of the political practice in this system. The behavioral movement, however, can be regarded as the academic extension of one of the major philosophic pivots of the two-party system. The introduction of the concept of "science" to the study of politics expresses a certain philosophical commitment to the doctrine of liberal philosophy and, as will be seen later, this concept is consistent with the nature and direction of behavioral

democratic theory which was a major party in the political intellectual debate of the 1950s. The methodological assumptions introduced under the name of "science" were emphasized as substitutes for the assumptions of traditional political philosophy which were regarded, by behavioralists, as a conservative force. The concept of social "science" has never been neutral, as some social thinkers have imagined, but was an active actor in the ideological and political conflict.

This dual structure, however, must not be understood as the only source of American political knowledge since this discipline is also characterized by a variety of political theories that have never been witnessed in any single system. The democratic form on whose basis the legal and constitutional institutions were built permits the flow of a variety of the views of politics. The democratic arrangement of the system forbids the repression of thought and channels its various conflicts to be solved on a rational basis. This leads to another characteristic to emerge--that is, variety.

It should be asserted, however, that the characteristic of variety is not in conflict with the characteristic of "duality." Although there are a variety of approaches in the study of politics, the

popular ones tend to remain within the orbit of the two above-mentioned pivots especially when they are introduced in relation to practical political questions since the dual nature of the two-party system influences the view of such issues and makes their relevance to one of its pivots a necessary condition for their popularity. But it should be noted here that American political thought should not be understood on the basis of liberal vs. conservative context, but on the basis that they are basic orientations necessitated by political practice.

One of the most important advantages of the existing system is manifest in the available consensus on its fundamentals and general boundaries. The two above-mentioned pivots contribute significantly to this consensus since any attempt at change that goes beyond its limits and imposes drastic, radical changes will not be popular but restrained within very limited circles. A good example of this is the vulgar Marxism-Leninism which is a completely inactive force in the political and cultural systems despite its claim of popular appeal.

The characteristic of variety was also reflected in the behavioral school of thought. It can be seen that this school, as will be seen later, used its methodological issues as a "weapon" in the determination

of the validity of theories and, simultaneously, tolerated the variety of approaches and concepts within the range of these issues. In spite of the fact that the "individual" is the ultimate "theoretical and empirical" unit of behavioral analysis, one finds this analysis also accepts many other levels and units. The group framework, for example, has been employed in behavioral theory to account for political actors other than the individual. The system framework is, however, another example of the behavioral tolerance of the variety of concepts that are found in accordance with the epistemological direction of the behavioral enterprise. The behavioral movement in its efforts to formulate a general theory of politics used almost all available concepts that do not contradict the assumption of its paradigm. This implies that the paradigm of behavioral science embodied a belief in certain ideological assumptions from which a variety of concepts might emanate and which always make room for those who believe in the same assumptions but with different concepts.

The fourth characteristic is openness to critique. This characteristic is considered to be an essential prerequisite for the flourishing of any form of political thought and any type of socially learned discipline. It can be viewed as a mechanism by which political scientists detect their points of error and,

hence, make adjustments. This openness to criticism is also a required quality for the dialectical development of thought. At both levels, political and academic, the mechanism of "criticism" is the essence of a democratic political system.

The behavioral movement evolved and developed within a political system that deals with the question of criticism of its highest levels. The flow of intellectual and cultural differences among the various groups in the American political system contributed to the various forms of critiques. This characteristic is directly reflected in the behavioral movement. Despite its orthodox attributes, as will be seen in its conception of "science," the thought of the movement responded to the various criticisms directed to it either from behavioral scientists or from other critics.

It will be seen, however, that the three stages of the behavioral intellectual enterprise, with which we will be dealing in the next part of this chapter, are associated with a criticism of what has been accomplished and with a tendency to find alternative theoretical contents that help solve the confronted theoretical problems. Charles Merriam represented a thrust toward the assumptions of science with a failure to specify its contents in relation to human theories. And if Merriam was unable to specify the nature of

social science, Catlin and Lasswell attempted to find a specific direction for the "scientific" study of politics. While Catlin directed political theory to sociology, Lasswell directed it to psychology. Despite the fact that both were students of Merriam, they were not satisfied with Merriam's general directions of science and sought to provide for more specific alternatives. Easton's attempt to return political theory within the framework of the "political" also implies a criticism of what has been done in behavioral political theory.

These four characteristics dealt with in the preceding pages must not be understood as the only major characteristics of American political thought, which has many other characteristics, but as an introduction to an understanding of the relationship between political behavioralism and the general outline of the American discipline of politics. Through their examination, it was meant to show that the behavioral enterprise reflects some qualities of American political science in general to the extent that its boundaries can hardly be specified without the determination of its political and ideological aspects.

The Meaning of Political Behavioralism

Like most concepts in the study of politics, political behavioralism can hardly obtain one single

definition that scholars agree upon. The disagreement on the meaning of behavioralism in politics does not only include scholars outside the behavioral camp but also political behavioralists themselves. One might agree with political scientist Robert Dahl that ". . . the most striking characteristic of the 'behavioral approach' in political science is the ambiguity of the term itself, and of its synonym 'political behavior'."¹ This ambiguity makes the task of establishing a definition a very difficult one. The difficulty stems from the large amount of literature and the variety of approaches devoted to the term "political behavioralism." Further difficulties stem from the various attempts made by behavioral scholars to furnish an agreed upon definition.

In his essay "The Current Meaning of 'behavioralism'," David Easton, a behavioral political scientist, asserts that

political behavioral stands for both an intellectual tendency and a concrete academic movement. As a tendency, it is an intellectual current that may be found among many students of politics, in some minor degree at least; as a movement, it has many fewer

¹Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review 55 (December 1961): 753.

outright adherents and advocates.²

Easton's assertion signifies two aspects of behavioralism: "intellectual tendency" and "intellectual movement." Easton, however, realizes the difficulty in specifying a focal point to which the behavioral research be directed. This specification would contribute, for him, to more confusion and ambiguity in the meaning of behavioralism.

In order to distinguish it as an "intellectual tendency," Easton provides for a list of the major characteristics of the "behavioral credo." They appear to be general assumptions of the behavioral research and which were molded in a manner similar to the assumptions of other social disciplines such as psychology and sociology. Those, according to Easton, are "Regularity, Verification, Techniques, Quantification, Values, Systematization, Pure Science, Integration." Each characteristic refers to a particular reference in social research. The first refers, in Easton's words, to "discoverable uniformities in political behavior." The second relates to the principle that the "validity" of any "generalization" "must be testable." The third

²David Easton, "The Current Meaning of Behavioralism," in The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science, ed. James C. Charlesworth (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1962), p. 4.

refers to the "means for acquiring and interpreting data" which, for Easton, "cannot be taken for granted." The fourth refers to the quantitative method in data description "where possible, relevant, and meaningful." The fifth refers to the distinction that Easton draws between "ethical evaluation" and "empirical explanation." The sixth means, in Easton's words, that "research ought to be systematic" by being relevant to theoretical guidelines. The seventh signifies the behavioral assumption that "the application of knowledge is as much a part of scientific enterprise as theoretical understanding." The eighth refers to the assumption that interdisciplinary relation is of great importance for the understanding of political behavior.³ Those eight tenets described by Easton do not introduce a specific meaning of political behavioralism; they rather make it loose and difficult to distinguish between political behavioralists and other schools of thought of positivist orientation in political theory.

Perhaps one would agree with Dennis Kavanagh that most behaviouralists have avoided a precise and limiting definition of behaviouralism [since] . . . they have variously spoken of an "approach," "tendency," "mood," "stance," "orientation," and

³Ibid., p. 7.

"persuasion."⁴

In an attempt to define the behavioral approach in the study of politics, Robert Dahl outlines three conceptions of it. The first conception, according to Dahl, stands on the premise that "political behavior is said to refer to the study of individuals rather than larger political units."⁵ This conception, as he continues, "is clear in the 1944-45 SSRC report . . . that foreshadowed the creation of the Political Behavior Committee."⁶ The second is the one that totally rejects attaching any meaning to the term. Vernon Van Dyke and Alfred de Grazia are good representatives of this concept according to Dahl. The third conception which Professor Dahl himself adheres to, regards the behavioral approach as

. . . an attempt to improve our understanding of politics by seeking to explain the empirical aspects of political life by means of methods, theories, and criteria of proof that are acceptable according to the canons, conventions and assumptions of modern empirical science.⁷

At the same time that Dahl sees the inability to specify clear boundaries for political behavioralism, he

⁴Dennis Kavanagh, Political Science and Political Behaviour (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 9.

⁵Dahl, p. 766.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 767.

asserts that its theoretical pillars and tenets are the same as those of "modern empirical science." And while this assertion shows its philosophic foundation, it does not show its boundaries in relation to other empirical but non-behavioral approaches. For Dahl, the understanding of politics can only be obtained by the demonstration of the "empirical aspect" of politics and this cannot be accomplished, according to him, unless political theorists turn to logical empiricism which dominates what Dahl calls "modern empirical science" which strives to adopt the assumptions of the philosophy of natural sciences in its own disposal. And while these latter assumptions will be dealt with later, it should be pointed out that the transition of some assumptions from natural science to social science can never be considered the sole angle through which political behavioralism can be viewed.

What is important for the understanding of this school of thought is the ideological consensus on the assumptions and direction of its political theory which gives it the character of a "school of thought" rather than an approach of "pure science." Dahl's statement, however, does not show that political dimension and its ideological quality. The view of political behavioralism as an extension of modern science is definitely a one-sided and incomplete conception since

it disregards the fact that the thought of the movement was an outcome of a certain "community of practitioners" that evolved within a given society and was shaped by its various factors. The movement, as will be seen, in spite of its emphasis on "methods," "techniques," and "pragmatism," is an enterprise of thought that has ideological assumptions of nature and society. Therefore, to consider it as merely the explanation of the empirical aspects of politics is inadequate.

In his essay entitled "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in Behavioral Sciences," David B. Truman combines the premises of the first and the third conceptions mentioned by Dahl. For him,

the term "Behavioral Sciences" . . . refers to those bodies of knowledge, in whatever academic department they may be found, that provide or aspire to provide verified principles of human behavior through the use of methods of inquiry similar to those of the natural sciences.⁸

While Dahl does not indicate directly natural sciences but uses the term "modern empirical science," David Truman asserts directly that the behavioral approach is an understanding of society under the light of nature.

⁸David B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Science," in Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, ed. S. Sidney Ulmer (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), p. 11. The assertion of "in whatever academic department" suggests its inclusion of the behavioral approach in politics.

In other words, this approach aims "to provide verified principles of human behavioral through the use of inquiry similar to those of natural sciences." Truman, however, emphasizes an inadequate conception of behavioralism and shows a misunderstanding of the difference between the epistemological character of social things and of natural things. It was strange that behavioral scientists always emphasize the unity of method of both sciences while, in the 1950s, political scientists were able to distinguish between two different bodies of knowledge--one relating to nature with its peculiar assumptions and another to society with its peculiar assumptions, also.

Accepting the first conception mentioned by Dahl, Heinz Eulau, in his The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, tries to provide for a more elaborate definition. He first asserts that members of the behavioral "enterprise" ". . . have in common a commitment to the study of man as the root of things political."⁹ But, taking into account the need for more relevant criteria to define the behavioral approach, Eulau outlines four aspects, the combination of which would demarcate for him the lines of the behavioral

⁹Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 13.

approach. In his definition of the term "political behavior" in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Professor Eulau delineates four characteristics that he thinks relevant to describe what political behavior analysis is. As he describes,

political behavioral analysis takes the individual person's behavior . . . as the empirical unit of analysis . . . chooses a frame of reference that is shared by the behavioral sciences . . . chooses theoretical propositions about politics that lend themselves . . . to operational formulation for the purposes of empirical research . . . chooses methods and techniques of inquiry that permit as rigorous treatment as possible.¹⁰

For many political behavioral analysts, those four characteristics are acceptable since they signify the major elements of the behavioral "credo." The individual's behavior is the ultimate unit of analysis in behavioral research. This emphasis, however, resides in the heart of the behavioral philosophical outlook which mainly seeks to provide a theory of individual behavior. David Easton describes this theoretical commitment to the individual's behavior as a focal point in social science research. In his words,

It is clear that this term [political behavior] indicates that the research worker wishes to look at

¹⁰International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), p. 203. Emphasis was also repeated by Heinz Eulau. See, Austin Ranney, Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 12.

participants in the political system as individuals who have the emotions, prejudices, and predispositions of human beings as we know them in our daily lives.¹¹

Easton maintains a better understanding of the behavioral enterprise than those who came before. At least he can touch the political dimension of the movement but with some tendency to adapt the premises of natural science at his disposal--the view of the individual as an "atom" in a "system." This view reveals the liberal dimension of the behavioral thought--the dimension in which the distinguished character of the individual disappears. This dimension distinguishes the behavioral approach from many other positivistic approaches. The emphasis on the individual and the understanding of his role revolved, according to Easton's theory, around the possibility of predicting changes in the individual in order to adapt the system to these changes. The basic function of this view is to predict the expected changes and then control their direction.

Political behavioralism, in theory, considers the individual the cornerstone and ultimate unit of analysis. It will be seen that, in the formation of its

¹¹David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 201.

concepts of government, politics, groups, and systems, the individual's political behavior is an important focus. Yet, despite his significance in behavioral theory, it can be seen that there was an orthodox attribute, especially in the use of the assumptions of the "scientific" method in the determination of the validity and significance of theories. By this attribute, the behavioral movement set up boundaries that human imagination cannot transcend. As a consequence, the individual's thought becomes merely a technical process through which the individual abolishes himself. Despite that, a substantial number of behavioral doctrines correspond to those of liberal philosophy, especially with regard to the importance of the individual in objective knowledge. They both eliminate its political and theoretical importance. As an object of study, the individual loses his distinction and becomes an "atom" in a "system," and, as a political actor, has merely to follow the techniques of his paradigm.

The use of the conceptual frameworks, metatheoretical outlooks, and models of other social sciences is desirable, by behaviorists, in order to facilitate the measurement and prediction of human behavior. Disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology, according to the behaviorists, supply

political researchers with frames of reference, concepts, and empirical data that enrich it and make it fruitful. In Eulau's words,

The interdisciplinary focus of political behavior inquiry sensitizes the observer to the level of analysis on which research may be conducted most appropriately and fruitfully.¹²

Eulau's statement reflects the behavioral tendency to utilize data and conceptual approaches of these sciences. The behavioral urge to do this, to some extent, is acceptable. What is not acceptable is making the study of politics determined by the conceptual approaches of other social sciences that were peculiar to their problems of study. Eulau's views denote an established behavioral doctrine as manifest in the thesis of the "unity of the scientific method." The implication of this thesis is that the so-called "scientific method" is capable of treating the various subjects of knowledge regardless of the difference of its nature. It is thus another face of the token of misconceiving the distinction between the objects and methodology of social knowledge and those of natural science. Yet the distinction between the various disciplines in social science is also disregarded. As a consequence of this, behavioral scientists like Catlin,

¹²International Encyclopedia of Social Science, vol. 12, p. 203.

Lasswell, Truman, Eulau, and Easton turned to disciplines like sociology, psychology, and economics and tried to use their methodology and techniques to their own end regardless of the peculiarity of the "political." Catlin, for example, adopted a sociological approach to political problems and Lasswell a psychological approach. These examples show how political phenomena become epiphenomena subordinate to another form of phenomena.

This view of politics makes us unable to appreciate the wide, comprehensive range of the "political" and its peculiar processes and actors. The advantage of the variety of analytical levels must not make us forget that the political phenomenon has its own inner dynamics that makes it necessary to be studied on its terms.

The relationship between theory and research is vital in the behavioral "credo" since empirical research can adequately be conducted only under the light of theoretical guidelines. Theory and research maintain a mutually developing relation. This relation directs empirical research to the points that should be examined by empirical research which, in its turn, helps in the elaboration and modification of the guiding proposition. Heinz Eulau asserts this point. In his words,

Theory and research are necessarily interdependent, that theoretical questions must be stated in

operational terms for the purpose of fruitful empirical research, and that, in turn, empirical findings should be brought to bear on the theoretical formulation of political problems.¹³

The importance and vitality of methodology and technicality are manifest in almost all political behavioralists. Moreover, some political behavioralists sometimes identify themselves with methodology. For political behavior researchers, methodological application for the gathering of data and its interpretation is a basic distinction between the behavioral and non-behavioral political inquiries. This importance, however, led an eminent political behavioralist, Harold Lasswell, to assert that "the advances of our time have been in the technique of relating them [definitions] to reality."¹⁴

While Eulau recognizes the overlapping between theory and empirical research, he assigns the former an inferior position if it is not substantiated by empirical evidence. Theory, in this sense, is not a human perspective on factual reality, but an operational arrangement of it. This form of operationalism

¹³Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 26.

¹⁴Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour, An Empirical Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 1. (Emphasis added.)

restricts the horizon of the theorist and makes it instrumental. Eulau does not say what theory is but, instead, talks about a process of "theorizing" as a transition from the findings from one empirical research to another. This conception, as will be seen in its treatment in the second chapter, reflects a narrow limitation that disregards the rational aspect of the process which explains "empirical aspects" and connects their details.

Eulau's conception is inadequate since one cannot talk about theory without answering the questions of how this theory is made and by whom and what are the conceptual assumptions that were used in connecting the disconnected empirical "facts." His conception of theory cannot provide for answers for those questions essential to understanding what theory is. The answer to these questions reveals the rational, human aspect in theory even if its assumptions raise a claim for the "empirical" world.

The Three Stages of Political Behavioralism

The Science of Politics

According to Harold Lasswell, "It is possible to locate without difficulty the principal place and time in American political science at which the 'new aspects'

[behavioralism] of the subject gained momentum." The place, as he proceeds, was the University of Chicago, the time was the 1920s, and the leading figure was Charles E. Merriam."¹⁵ Perhaps all American political behavioralists accept the statement of Lasswell since Charles E. Merriam was and still is an eminent figure who originated the behavioral "credo." The leading role of Merriam in a very distinguished academic institution, the University of Chicago, was the first major contribution to the behavioralist thrust in the 1920s. Robert Dahl considers Merriam a major factor contributing to the "rapid flowering of the behavioral approach in the United States."¹⁶ He regards the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago as the "center of what would later have been called the behavioral approach."¹⁷ And this was, of course, under the chairmanship of Merriam.

Evron Kirkpatrick goes farther than Dahl. He regards Merriam as the "intellectual godfather of the

¹⁵Harold D. Lasswell, The Future of Political Science (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 37.

¹⁶Dahl, p. 763.

¹⁷Ibid.

behavioral approach."¹⁸ This recognition of Merriam, according to Kirkpatrick, is due to his role in originating, "explicating and advocating most of the characteristic goals, methods, procedures, and emphases of political behavior."¹⁹ In the introductory note, moreover, of the first chapter of the Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, seven behavioral practitioners agree that the "path of political behavior research was indeed staked out by Charles E. Merriam in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association."²⁰

Charles E. Merriam was born in Hopkinton, Iowa, in 1874.²¹ In his early academic life Merriam showed a growing interest in the study of political theory. In 1920, he celebrated the publication of his book A History of American Political Theories. This book is the first to show his dissatisfaction with the style, approach, and method of political studies of his time.

¹⁸Austin Ranney, Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 13.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰S. Sidney Ulmer, Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), p. 9.

²¹For a biography of Merriam, see Barry D. Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

In its preface, Merriam indicates his dissatisfaction with the conventional study of politics which, according to his vision, rarely leads to the formation of a "systematic" political theory, although "there has been no dearth of political theory from the days of the Puritans to the present time."²² Among many other things, this book significantly demonstrates Merriam's early vision of the history of American political thought.

In this book Merriam expressed his dissatisfaction with the conservative, traditional mode of American political thought in which he saw the origins of what he called the "reactionary movement" as dominant in the era starting immediately after the independence of the United States from Great Britain. The major doctrines of this movement, according to Merriam, can be traced in the American Constitution, in the Federalist Papers, and in the writings of John Adams and Alexander Hamilton. The Federalist, in Merriam's words, "was an advocate's plea for the constitution" written in defense of a particular system of government, and not "the dispassionate system wrought out by some

²²Charles E. Merriam, A History of American Political Theories (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. vii.

thinkers upon the general principles of politics."²³ For him, this era is characterized by three elements: (1) the distrust of unlimited democracy," (2) the "defense of aristocracy," and (3) the "system of checks and balances." These elements are connected, in his view, to the traditional foundation of government. He saw them as enemies to the form of democracy he prefers in the form of Jacksonian democracy.

The new era, or what he calls the "recent tendencies," represents the most desired state of political theory since it was dominated by

a group of political theorists differing from the earlier thinkers in respect to method and upon many important doctrines of political science. The new method was more systematic and scientific than that which preceded it.²⁴

The "recent tendencies," as summarized by Merriam, suggest a shift from the conventional way of analyzing politics to a "scientific" outlook of American political life. The credit for initiating such tendencies in American political theory, according to Merriam, can be assigned to the German scientist Francis Lieber, Theodore Woolsey, A. O. Brownson, J. A. Jameson, Elisha Mulford, John C. Hurd, and A. L. Lowell.²⁵

²³Ibid., p. 101.

²⁴Ibid., p. 305.

²⁵Ibid., p. 306.

Having examined each era separately, Merriam concludes that "there is no American political theory." Although briefly, but adequately, conducted, Merriam's examination of each period of American political history was far from finding a systematic theory that differs in its nature from the classical or modern philosophy. Neither was there development in political philosophy. The reason behind lack of theory and absence of philosophical development was due to the adaptation of English and French political philosophies for the formulation of the desired political doctrines necessary to provide for a solution to the confronted problem. It was also due, as Merriam pointed out, to the fact that

. . . in all these instances the constitutional or legal aspects of the problem have been most freely and most fully discussed, while the principles of political science have been the object of far less attention.²⁶

In his article "Present State of Study of Politics," published in the American Political Science Review in 1921, Merriam repeats his charges and his dissatisfaction with the stage that political knowledge in the United States and the world has reached. He complains that research is "ill-organized," that "there are large gaps left where there is no investigation made," and that political scholars "lack comprehensive

²⁶Ibid., p. 335.

and forward looking plans."²⁷ These major points of weakness, for him, can be treated by more emphasis on and elaboration of the suggestions he offers. As he delineates them, those suggestions are:

(1) More adequate equipment for collection and analysis of political material; (2) More adequate organization of the political prudence of our profession; (3) The broader use of the instruments of social observation in statistics, and of the analytical technique and results of psychology; and closer regard to and relations with the disciplines of geography, ethnology, biology, sociology and social psychology. (4) More adequate organization of our technical research and its coordination with other and closely allied fields of inquiry.²⁸

In New Aspects of Politics, Merriam provides for a comprehensive account of those four suggestions since he considers the basic thrust should be, roughly speaking, the elaboration and application of them in the arena of political research. The basic purpose of this work, as Merriam describes it, is "an improvement in method of political reasoning and research."²⁹ And, moreover, he suggests that, without this, the study of politics might not be "scientific." First is the suggestion of "science." Despite the fact that Merriam

²⁷Charles E. Merriam, "Present State of Study of Politics," American Political Science Review 15 (May 1921): 184.

²⁸Ibid., p. 184.

²⁹Charles E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. xiv.

doesn't provide for a definition of science, he seems to understand the term to be similar, to a considerable extent, to that understood in natural sciences. The imitation of methods and techniques employed in natural science can lead to a transformation of social opinion into facts. For political science to be "scientific," it must adapt its nature to what Merriam describes as the "new world."

A new world of universal leisure; . . . of universal education, a non-traditional state of mind; . . . of scientific methods and results; a race of beings master of nature's forces . . . ; the participation of the bulk of the community in its fundamental conclusions.³⁰

This image of the "new world" makes it necessary for the study of politics to absorb the essence of science and employ recent scientific discoveries of other sciences in its disposal.

The second is the urge for interdisciplinary relations which Merriam regards as a necessary step for the construction of the science of politics. For him, "inevitably the new politics will be a new synthesis, in which elements from the older and the newer disciplines will be brought together and articulated and organized."³¹ The development in scope and method of

³⁰Ibid., p. 9.

³¹Ibid., p. 16.

other social sciences was the major factor behind this interdisciplinary thrust. Psychology, sociology, psychiatry, anthropology, and ethnology, to mention some, have undergone profound changes that made most of their theoretical outcomes rest on a solid experimental basis. Among those, the most closely related to the study of politics at the beginning of this century was psychology which, for Merriam, opened a wide door for political research.

For Merriam, "the friendship between politics and psychology is an old one." He sees all political analysis, from the ancient Greek philosophers to the most contemporary, in part an engagement in psychological interpretation.³² The development of the discipline of psychology was, however, recognized by students of government and by governmental authorities themselves. Governments since the beginning of the century were in a continuing process of adapting the available psychological methods and devices for the purpose of political control. The first attempt in this regard, that Merriam recognizes, is the United States government's attempt to employ "the Army Tests designed to appraise the members of the new force of the

³²See his brief analyses of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, Hobbes, etc., in *ibid.*, pp. 67-71.

country."³³ Psychological methodological adaptation, moreover, "has been made by the courts in the conduct of cases."³⁴ Courts employ "Psychopathic Laboratories" which supply the judges or the jury with knowledge of the psychological ramifications of the cases before them.

Merriam suggests some points of contact between psychology and politics. These points of contact signify the spheres of political research in which the coordination between psychological research and political inquiry is the most fruitful. "Psychological mental measurement," for Merriam, is a promising sphere of political investigation that can be elaborated to include measurement of "other qualities" as "dispositions or temperament." The "study of political interests" is moreover another promising sphere of investigation which Merriam regards as significant. Studies of political personality, public opinion, leadership, citizenship, to mention some, are for Merriam vital topics in which psychological and political coordination in the sphere of research might bring new insights.³⁵

³³Ibid., p 76.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 96.

The next major suggestion that the New Aspects of Politics implies is greater use of numbers in the study of political processes wherever possible. One of the major points of weakness in the conventional political analysis, for Merriam, is its tendency to verify hypotheses through observation and without reference to statistical measurements.³⁶ The absence of statistical application, according to him, has contributed to the subjective character of political analysis that can be found in almost every stage in the development of political theory. According to Merriam, most credit must be given to Adolphe Quetelet whose efforts relate to heavily to the introduction of "statistical measurement" in the study of social phenomena. Quetelet "laid the foundations of modern quantitative measurement in the social field,"³⁷ and since then the role and the application of numbers have conquered all social sciences. The study of politics, however, was no exception but it was slower than other social disciplines.

The last suggestion that can be traced in the New Aspects of Politics is that, regardless of the evolutionary and environmental conception of politics,

³⁶Ibid., p. 103.

³⁷Ibid., p. 108.

the study of political institutions and behavior will face many theoretical difficulties. The evolution and development of institutions are, for Merriam, major factors that must be taken into account for the understanding of existing ones. The environment or the social context is, for Merriam, the only frame that enables social scientists to understand social reality.

Those four major suggestions, however, formulate the general theoretical framework within which almost all behavioral elements might fall. Merriam's political writings were almost the first thrust toward more reform in the study of politics. His major work, New Aspects of Politics, was original in terms of its initiation of the principles of political behavioralism and was regarded by behaviorist scholars as an alternative strategy for the study of political theory different, significantly, from that of the philosophic conventional orientation. The place of "science" is highly significant in the study of politics and it became the theme of most behaviorist scholars since the claim of "scienticism" is eminent in the history of political behavioralism.

Interdisciplinary data and analysis are also a major theoretical thrust that Merriam has emphasized and which gained momentum after him in the behaviorist camp. The disciplines of psychology, sociology,

physiology, and biology were regarded, among behavioralists, as unending sources of data and information that make political inquiry most fruitful. The emphasis on "statistical measurement" and numerical supplementation to political analysis is, for Merriam, a major step that makes political generalization more precise. This emphasis almost shaped the behavioralist movement since statistics became a necessary training for political behavioralists. The social environment or what most behavioralists call the "social context" and its role in shaping individuals' behavior and attitude is a core element that has been emphasized by Merriam and became a cornerstone in the behavioralist philosophy. In summarizing Merriam's thought it can be said that its basic thesis was that the development in "science" and "technology" was a response to social changes resulting from three emerging forces in American society: "industrialization, education, and feminism"--that is, the introduction of "science" to politics is a necessary epistemological condition in order to pave the way for those factors to shape the society.

Merriam's intellectual thrust was continuously emphasized throughout the history of the behavioralist movement and gained momentum. In the first, second, and third Conferences on the Science of Politics in 1923,

1924, and 1925, Merriam's theoretical line was enlarged and his suggestions regarding the development of political inquiry were heavily emphasized.³⁸ The participants in these conferences recognized that the "great need of the hour was the development of a scientific technique and methodology for political science."³⁹ It was hoped that the introduction of scientific methodology to politics and the establishment of "scientific" knowledge would reduce everyday, governmental error to a minimum. It was also hoped in those conferences that the relation between psychology and politics would become of great importance for the formation of theories of political behavior. As a basis of the emphasis on this relation,

it is believed that significant advances were made toward more scientific study of traits of human nature underlying political action, and of the processes that in reality constitute government.⁴⁰

The participants also recognized the importance of the science of statistics in political inquiry, to the extent that the report of the first conference asserted "that every round table needed the presence of both a

³⁸It should be noted that Charles E. Merriam was an active participant in those conferences.

³⁹"Reports of the National Conference on the Science of Politics," American Political Science Review 18 (February 1924): 119.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 125.

psychologist and a statistician."⁴¹

The reception of those elements initiated by Merriam and emphasized by others was slowed by the events emerging in the 1930s and 1940s. Political scientists turned their attention to the problems that threatened not only the United States but the whole world. Immediately after the First World War, political scientists were preoccupied with finding solutions for the problems resulting from the Great Depression, then later those of the New Deal, and then the Second World War. The problems and drastic changes caused by these events turned the attention of scientists from method and theory construction to urgent day-to-day issues and thence contributed to the slow spread of the idea of constructing a "science of politics." This shows, however, that the behavioral movement through these events proved to be unable to cope with substantive problems of the size of those mentioned above.

Political Psychology

Although many scholars within the behavioral camp contributed to its literature, the figure whose thought best represents the behavioral "mood" of the fifties is

⁴¹Report of the Second National Conference on the Science of Politics," held at Chicago, 8-12 September 1924, American Political Science Review 19 (1925): 107.

Harold D. Lasswell. In many of his political writings of the late forties and early fifties he reintroduced to scholars of that time the elements of the 1920s, mainly those established by Merriam. Perhaps it is possible to note that Lasswell played a significant role in the formation of major behavioralist concepts and in the method of their analysis and examination. This was his role in understanding some insights of the theoretical character of the behavioralist thrust of the 1950s.⁴²

For many behavioral scholars, Psychopathology and Politics was a significant attempt by Lasswell to introduce a new mode of political thinking associated with a psychological level of analysis to fill the vacuum left by Merriam. In this book, Lasswell draws the attention of political researchers to the importance of understanding the psychological manifestations of the political personality in understanding political behavior and attitude. Relying heavily on Freudian interpretations, Lasswell considers parental conflict relations in childhood the most important factors that should be dealt with in a comprehensive account if political researchers seek to obtain a good

⁴²For a biography of Lasswell, see Arnold A. Rogow, Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

understanding of the individual's personality in the adult epoch. But Lasswell, however, does not ignore psychological effects in other periods of personality development. He developed a sort of formula which was necessary to understand, for him, if one seeks to understand why people behave politically as they do. Lasswell developed the formula " $P\}d\}r=P$ ", where P equals private motives, d equals displacement onto a public object; r equals rationalization in terms of public interest; P equals the political man."⁴³ Hence, political personality is, for him, the outcome of three types of factors. The private type, however, refers to the instinctive demands that the individual places on the family in the childhood period. The "displacement onto a public object" of private motives is a process carried out by the family which elaborates the private motives through an emotional process. The "rationalization in terms of public interest" is a complex process that represents all factors operating in the social environment that have access to the individual's personality. The political personality, thus, is the total sum of those collaborated factors. It should be mentioned that Lasswell's formula of

⁴³Harold Lasswell, "Psychopathology and Politics," in The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 75.

personality was developed from theories of "personality development" in the field of psychology and its introduction to the study of politics, for many political behavioralists, was a major contribution from psychology to political science.

In his Analysis of Political Behavior, Lasswell suggests an approach to the study of political events and behavior that derives most of its theoretical premises from psychological outlooks. In this book, Lasswell asserts that the "science" of politics is a major goal for political inquiry and can only be reached with a better understanding of behavior through observation. "Science, morals and politics" are for him to be integrated through a psychological understanding of the personality of the individual since the source of each is a part of this personality. Politics, for him, is the "influence" of the "influential" in society in the distribution of values. Morals are, however, the justification of the exercise of influence; and "science" is the understanding of it. One of the most significant aspects of this book is the employment of technical observations, mainly derived from psychology, for the construction of political generalizations. Lasswell assigns the significance of the science of politics to the development of procedures for such observations.

In the Analysis, however, Lasswell develops four types of techniques of observation: "participant-observer, self-observation, prolonged insight interview, world attention survey," and defends their use in obtaining knowledge of political behavior. Lasswell, with the assistance of Gabriel Almond, employed the "participant observer" technique for the study of administrative "rules and actions" and recommended this technique for more adequate knowledge of the administrative environment. Self-observation, which for Lasswell is "a means of describing those with whom one comes in contact and the content of what they say,"⁴⁴ must follow a systematic theme for the gathering of data and its classification in order to bring personal error to a minimum. The "prolonged insight interview" refers to Freud's "special standpoint for the observation of interpersonal events"⁴⁵ that is usually termed psychoanalysis. This technique, for Lasswell, can bring a comprehensive account of the personality through the knowledge of every stage of its development and observation of the words and behavior of the interviewee. The "world attention survey" refers to the effort of surveying the attitudes across nations by

⁴⁴Lasswell, Analysis of Political Behaviour, p. 286.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 287.

examining the cultural and media institutions that shape the people's image of other nations. By tracing cultural "symbols" it is possible, for Lasswell, that they "be objectively described and their changes can be presented in convenient graphical form."⁴⁶ It should be pointed out that Lasswell doesn't provide for an account of the nature and procedures of the mentioned types of observation. Rather, he employs them in a direct examination of political processes.

In The Future of Political Science, Lasswell suggests an emphasis on and elaboration of Merriam's theme. In this book, Lasswell emphasizes his dissatisfaction with the conventional status of political science and suggests that the employment of the ideas of the 1920s would put political science on the scientific track. To accomplish this, the establishment of the "Basic Data Survey" is a necessary step for an insightful political inquiry. The availability of such surveys would eliminate time-consuming efforts of gathering "basic" data and would further provide for a stable and precise mechanism for the collection of data and its verification. A good example of such a mechanism is the American Political

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 299. On pages 296, 297, and 298, Lasswell offers some illustrations.

Science Association through which, according to Lasswell, "basic data surveys might be fostered and coordinated."⁴⁷

But these kinds of data are not enough for Lasswell. The most important thing for him is the style and method by which the researcher interprets his data. For him,

a satisfactory design would seem to be an experimental program conducted under circumstances that provide the widest variety of opportunities for the controlled investigation of factor combinations.⁴⁸

An experimental approach designed on the standards of psychology, psychiatry, and physics would seem to provide the ability to control the variables in order to facilitate the measurement of others. The limitations of the experimental approaches in dealing with a variety of factors led Lasswell to introduce the "Prototype" concept as an extended step toward the construction of models that enable the researcher to deal with political events and processes similar to those from which a prototype was developed.

The interdisciplinary collaboration is, however, another major thrust of Lasswell for the advancement of political science. For him, "many aims of political

⁴⁷Lasswell, The Future of Political Science, p. 44.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 95.

science can be most effectively achieved if collaboration between political scientists and individuals of closely allied skills is successfully maintained."⁴⁹ But the collaboration must not overshadow the boundaries of political science which, for him, can be secured by the establishment of "centres" for political "scientists" that deal with the relevant political aspects of politics.

The ideas presented by Harold Lasswell shaped almost the entire behavioralist "upswing" of the 1950s. Lasswell's theoretical account of personality, attitude, and behavior and his methodological style affected almost all the behavioral scholars of his time. His role in the establishment of the theoretical basis of political behavioralism was among the major factors behind the new directions to which students of politics, in the behavioral camp, sought to direct the discipline of political science.

Political Theory

The decade of the 1950s suggested a return to Merriam's initial conception of the nature of political theory with more emphasis and elaboration added. Students of Merriam such as Gabriel Almond, V. O. Key,

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 189.

Harold Lasswell, Herman Pritchett, and David Truman have contributed, to a considerable extent, to what they sometimes called "behavioral upswing," "behavioral revolution," or "behavioral protest." Most of those writers reached the decade of the fifties with the belief that traditional political science was unable to confront the problems resulting from the events of the thirties and forties. The best alternative for them was to express their dissatisfaction and protest of the manner in which conventional political inquiry conceived political realities. The expression, however, was displayed by the emphasis on the theoretical elements of Merriam. Harold Lasswell celebrated his Psychopathology and Politics in 1951, reintroducing the important and significant relationship between psychology and politics. In 1954, V. O. Key published his A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists, emphasizing the role of statistical measurement in the construction and verification of political generalizations. David Truman reiterated the emphasis on behavior. In an article in 1951, entitled "The Implications of Political Behavior Research," he placed more emphasis on the study of "political behavior." This thrust toward behavioralism affected students of politics other than those trained by Merriam. David Easton, Heinz Eulau, and Robert Dahl, to mention some, have contributed, to a considerable

extent, to the theoretical elements of behavioralism and its philosophy. They expressed their need for a "systematic" theory of politics based on a precise examination and a "scientific method." In 1953, David Easton published his The Political System introducing the concept of "system" as an alternative strategy for the study of politics. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, in 1956, celebrated their Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research which provided for a general framework and specified lines for political behavioral inquiry. In 1961, Robert Dahl published "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest" in which he displayed his dissatisfaction with the state of the discipline of politics and emphasized the tenets of behavioralism as significantly basing the discipline on a "scientific" basis.

In this stage of development the behavioral movement was exposed to various literature applied within its framework. But the major characteristic of this stage is the return to political theory within the framework of political phenomena. By using concepts such as group, elite, and system in this stage, the movement realized the importance of dealing with politics in its peculiar tool. Yet, what persisted in

this period is the analysis of those concepts of the same four fundamental assumptions of the "scientific" method. The pioneering writings of David Easton dominated this stage. The political theory that Easton described in various places in The Political System or Systems Analysis of Political Life represents the peak of behavioral theory in which Easton tried to account for a general theory of politics. But even though this theory suggests a return to politics, it was accompanied by the same tendency toward the assumption of "science." The idea of a system as such, as will be seen later, is an established assumption in the philosophy of science but Easton exploits it to the maximum in political analysis.

Many characteristics appear in Easton's political theory such as operationalism and pragmatism which characterized the thought of the movement in general. Easton, for example, regards theory as merely an arrangement for "empirical data" where they say nothing more than those data can say. This operational conception of political knowledge is also manifest in the view of "system" as a general framework for the arrangement of empirical political facts. The idea has, however, a pragmatic use since it facilitates control of change by the constant response of the system to new emerging factors. (See the treatment of political

systems in Chapter IV, below.)

For Easton, "recent developments in the overall orientation of political science, largely characterized by its reception of more rigorous methods of research and analysis, led to a radical transformation in conceptions of the tasks and functions of theory."⁵⁰ This means that changes which emerged in the study of politics as a consequence of the introduction of "science" to politics led to a new conception of theory. This conception aims, Easton asserts, at the "injection of a new and stronger emphasis on concerns that have always found some place in traditional theory but that out of neglect and untimeliness have been allowed to be unattained."⁵¹

This view means that the new conception of theory, even if it emerged as an antithesis to the traditional political philosophy, cannot escape an important aspect inherent in any school of thought; that is, the connection of the research problem to the values and ideological orientation of its conductor. Easton tries to provide for a conception of theory relevant to the changes which emerged as a result of the introduction of the concept of science to politics. The

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 49.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 5.

new political theory, for him, must be "empirically-oriented, behavioral, operational, or causal."⁵²

This means that the new theory, for him, is to be based on the epistemological and political assumptions of the behavioral enterprise regardless of the objective epistemological goals sought by it.

Despite the fact that Easton objects to the epistemological nature of traditional philosophic system, we find his general political theory has qualities similar to those of these systems and it perhaps differs from them only in reference to the assumptions of their paradigm and ideology. Easton regards those systems as inevitably normative since they start from the assumptions of value goals. This goal, according to him, is the guiding principle in their analysis and explanation. In this regard, Easton fails to notice that, whatever the extent to which a general theory of politics can be value-free, it embodies ideological roots and orthodox commitments.

For Easton, there are three types of theoretical generalizations: "singular generalization, partial theories, and general theories."⁵³ His work, however,

⁵²Ibid., p. 5.

⁵³Ibid., p. 8.

shows his great interest in the last form which, for him, is the most significant since it

constitutes a deductive system of thought so that from a limited number of postulates, assumptions and axioms a whole body of empirically valid generalizations might be deduced in descending order of specificity.⁵⁴

The formation of political theory on this basis is connected to the theoretical assumptions and concepts that the researcher uses in relating his empirical details to each other. Easton's general theory, in its most general quality, is thus not different, from an epistemological angle, from the general "system of philosophic thought."

The problem of political theory, for Easton, is evident in the following question: "How does it come about that any type of system can persist at all, even under the pressures of frequent or constant crises."⁵⁵

The specification of the problem of political theory in this manner reveals an ideological basis and political vision as well as a problem of inquiry. Easton, however, agrees with Merriam and Lasswell that there are radical social forces (industrialization, education, feminism) that push society to change. The function of government and politics is, therefore, to

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. vii.

respond to the requirements of these forces in order to prevent radical change and thus sustain the system. The thesis of "persistence through change" reflects the behavioral vision of this function as a necessary condition to sustain the system. What is required for Easton is a peaceful transition in the system to a point that responds to the changing forces but with the sustenance of its general democratic character.

In concluding this chapter, one can say that the "movement of science" in the American discipline of politics is one school among many that were related to the general qualities of this discipline. It was seen that the thought of the movement proceeded into three stages, each characterized by a certain direction to answer the question of what is "political science." It was seen that the first stage as represented by Merriam attempted to establish a clear conception of the "science" of politics which he could not. The second was an attempt to solve the problems of politics on the basis of psychology in order to make the study of politics scientific. The third and final stage was characterized by Easton's turn to political theory. In the next chapter, we will try to examine the philosophic grounds upon which this school of thought founded its epistemological and political dimensions.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHIC ORIENTATION

This chapter seeks to identify the philosophic foundation of behavioral political thought. It aims to show the behavioral movement in its search for a theoretical content for the social use of the term "science." And, moreover, it aims to show that this foundation was furnished by logical empiricism which is, in essence, a school of thought with ideological commitments and with a particular outlook of existence and of society. The significance of demonstrating this is manifest in the insights that one gains which show that the behavioral school of thought is not a technical, abstract "scientific" procedure but a philosophic, theoretical enterprise. The thought of its members employed, in an ideological form, the tenets of the so-called "neutral" conception of knowledge and tried to cover by this "neutrality" the values that behavioral scientists have been trying to inject into American political knowledge. It will be seen that the behavioral stand on the issues of value-fact dichotomy, nature of theory, and value-free science, seemed to be neutral, despite the fact that most of the behavioral arguments indicate, either explicitly or implicitly, the

impossibility of such neutrality.

In an attempt to uncover the ideological dimensions of the behavioral stand on the above-mentioned issues, we will employ a paradigmatic comparison between the theoretical stand of the movement and the most enthusiastic advocates of philosophy--namely, the Straussian philosophy. The importance of this comparison is evident, in addition to its demonstration of the two extremes in viewing these issues, in the fact that the two extremes departed from different paradigms; therefore, they were both unable to make a decisive stand to help solve the problems arising from the overlap between the values and the assumed beliefs of the researcher and the "objective" reality under study.

The Behavioral Empirical Outlook

The political behavior movement, as one political scientist rightly said, did not develop in a vacuum. It evolved and developed within a rich theoretical and social setting. Its very insistence upon "scienticism" and its continuing effort to separate the discipline of politics from early speculative moral political philosophy was never isolated from the dominant trends that characterized the discipline in the beginning of this century. In its early evolution, behavioralism was, more or less, a part of a general trend which

appealed to "scientificism" in the study of politics. Charles Merriam's thought has contributed to the movement of "political science" as have other scientists disassociated from behavioralism such as James Bryce, Arthur Bentley, and William Munro, to mention a few.¹

The term "empirical" is a characteristic supplement of any treatment of political theory in the writings of political behavioralists. It is rarely absent from any one statement that deals with the status of theoretical knowledge. Emphasis on the superiority of empirical knowledge over theoretical knowledge is perhaps another major characteristic feature of the behavioral literature from Charles Merriam to its most recent associates. The use of the term "empirical" and its implications are best understood if the behavioral vision of knowledge is clarified. This necessitates the explanation of their conception of "science" as a medium concept that coordinates theoretical knowledge on the basis of empirical facts.

"By far," wrote Merriam, "the most significant of the intellectual developments of the time is that which goes under the somewhat unsatisfactory name of

¹See Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, n.d.), parts II and III.

'science'."² Impressed by the development of natural sciences and mainly its products, Merriam asserts the desirability for social sciences to emulate their style, methods, and philosophic doctrine. Merriam, however, fails to recognize the distinction between the "products" (discoveries) of natural sciences and the style by which those discoveries were obtained. Confusing those two dimensions, Merriam suggests that natural sciences could be taken as an exemplar that social sciences ought to pursue if social scientists seek to obtain scientific knowledge. It should be mentioned, however, that despite "scienticism" being the battle cry of the New Aspects of Politics, there can hardly be one single coherent conception of what science is. What was recommended was only the urge to gather data and classify them for the substantiation of generalizations. Yet, the battle cry was never justified.

To account for Merriam's failure to conceive science in a single coherent image and to follow the behavioral image of science, it is necessary, however, to stand on the most recent behavioral conception of science. This most recent conception would (1) provide

²Charles E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 7.

for an account of its philosophic source, and (2) help to explain Merriam's inability (or unwillingness) to answer the question of what science is.

Evron Kirkpatrick, in an introductory essay to one of the most influential behavioral textbooks, Foundation of Political Science, seems to accept both "normative theory" and "empirical theory" as "important and legitimate modes of rational inquiry."³ Yet, the latter for him was superior since "it does not give us wisdom. It gives us only knowledge." Why was it so? Kirkpatrick's answer would be because empirical theory is oriented to the existential world, to the "world we touch, taste, feel, hear, and smell. It is related to the out there."⁴ Meanwhile, "the subject matter of normative theory is not the actual hopes, aspirations, values of men; [since] empirical science can study these,"⁵ but what ought to be hoped, aspired, and valued by men.

Despite the many problems that Kirkpatrick's normative-empirical dichotomy suffers, it can adequately

³Evron Kirkpatrick, "From Past to Present," in Foundation of Political Science: Research, Methods, and Scope, ed. D. M. Freeman (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 15.

⁴Ibid., p. 10.

⁵Ibid., p. 12.

demonstrate the admiration of political behavioralists for "empiricism" and the extent to which it shaped their empirical outlook.

Between the time of Merriam and the time of Kirkpatrick, there emerged a line of thought that shaped almost all social sciences. Political science was no exception. But the influence on the discipline of politics was mainly exercised through the medium of political behavioralism. This line of thought is represented by the logical empiricism of the "Vienna Circle." However the relation between logical empiricism and behavioralism was understood, the most crucial point is that behavioralism took for granted the doctrines of logical empiricism and started its point of departure from them.

Kirkpatrick's statements may help to illustrate some major points of contact between the behavioral doctrines and those of logical empiricism. The ingredients of Kirkpatrick's conception of empirical science facilitate the illustration of those points of contact. But before any further interpretation, it is necessary to point out, at this level, that the failure of Merriam to provide for a coherent image of "science" is due to the fact that early in the thirties, "Americans had been stimulated by Morris and Nagel as well as by the men from Europe, among whom were Carnap,

Reichenbach, Frank, Von Mises, Feigl, Kaufmann, and Hempel."⁶ It was this development that caused the United States to be the center of logical empiricists. Since then the development of its doctrines was parallel to the development of the doctrine of social sciences whose image of science was almost the product of logical empirical conception. Let us examine the development of logical empiricism and its doctrines in order to illustrate the points of contact between them and the ingredients of Kirkpatrick's behavioral vision of empirical theory.

Logical Empiricism

In an essay entitled "Logical Empiricism," Herbert Feigl, one of the eminent spokesmen of logical empiricism, describes its evolution in the so-called "Vienna Circle" as follows:

The Vienna Circle evolved in 1923 out of a seminar led by Professor Moritz Schlick and attended, among other students, by F. Waismann and H. Feigl. Schlick's teaching period in Vienna had begun in 1922, and by 1925 out of this nucleus a Thursday evening discussion group was formed.⁷

The participants in this group represented various academic disciplines. As Feigl notes, Schlick was a

⁶Joergen Joergensen, The Development of Logical Empiricism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 47.

⁷Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 2.

physicist, Hans Hahn and Kurt Reidemeister
 mathematicians, Otto Neurath a sociologist, Victor Kraft
 an historian, and Felix Kaufmann was a lawyer.

In 1927 and again in 1932 the brilliant Finnish psychologist and philosopher, E. Kaila, was present as an active and critical member of the group. Another visitor from Scandinavia was A. Petzael (Goteborg). Among the younger participants were K. Goedel, T. Radakovic, G. Bergmann, M. Natkin, J. Schaechter, W. Hollistscher, and Rose Rand; and, among the visitors, C. G. Hempel, Berlin; A. E. Blumberg, Baltimore; and A. J. Ayer, Oxford. Among those more loosely affiliated with the group were K. Menger, E. Zilsel, K. Popper, H. Kelsen, L. V. Bertalanffy, Heinrich Gomperz, B. Von Juhos.⁸

The major goal of this group, wrote Joergensen, is to form an Einheitswissenschaft, i.e., a unified science comprising all knowledge of reality accessible to man without dividing it into separate, unconnected special disciplines such as physics and psychology, natural science and letters, philosophy and the special sciences. The way to attain this is by the use of the logical method of analysis, worked out by Peano, Frege, Whitehead, and Russell, which serves to eliminate metaphysical problems and assertions as meaningless as well as to clarify the meaning of concepts and sentences of empirical science by showing immediately observable content.⁹

Although there is a general agreement, in the logical empirical camp, on the three aspects embodied in Joergensen's statement--logical method of analysis, elimination of metaphysics, and immediately observable content--the details of each aspect were dealt with in a variety of philosophic treatments. The result, however,

⁸Ibid.

⁹Joergensen, p. 4. (Emphasis added.)

was the emergence of three trends within the movement of logical empiricism:

(1) The first "combines informal logical analyses of the sciences with a vivid awareness of psychological and social-cultural factors."

(2) The second is "characterized variously as 'analytic philosophy', 'therapeutic positivism' or 'causistic logical analysis'."

(3) The third is the "Socratic method applied with extreme subtlety to the peculiarities . . . of natural languages."¹⁰

Ernst Mach, rightly noted Feigl, is the best representative of the first trend. For Mach, however,

every scientific statement is a statement about complexes of sensations, and beyond or behind these there are no realities to be looked for, because the word "reality" itself is merely a name for the sum total of the complexes of observable sensations.¹¹

What is obvious in this view is the presupposition that there is a given reality known only through observable sensations. However might be the nature of this presupposition, it is unable to account for the too many

¹⁰Quoted from Herbert Feigl, "Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy of Science of Logical Empiricism," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, vol. I (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 5.

¹¹Joergensen, p. 9.

different perceptions of "reality." Mach reduces reality to sensations since

physical and psychical phenomena are not essentially different, and all statements concerning them are of exactly equal rank, since they can all be reduced to statements about complexes of sensations which are all that is given or immediately observable.¹²

This Machean belief paved the way for all sense-data theories that rely heavily on such a conceptual enterprise. The doctrine commonly shared is, however, the idea of a "given reality."

The idea of "givenness" was subjected to hot criticism. Wilfrid Sellars is one of those who rejected the idea of "givenness" upon which sense-data theorists base their philosophy. For him,

the phrase "the given" as a piece of professional-epistemological-shoptalk carries a substantial theoretical commitment, and one can deny that there are "data" or that anything is, in this sense, "given" without flying in the face of reason.¹³

Sellars, in fact, raises an important question which contributed and will contribute significantly to the growing literature of the critics of logical empiricism. The idea of "givenness" supports the presumption that "empirical knowledge rests on a 'foundation' of non-inferential knowledge," that is, reliance on given

¹²Ibid., p. 10.

¹³Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Feigl and Scriven, p. 253.

facts obtained through sensation. Sellars, however, objects to this supposition. For him, sense-data are concerned with the covering up of particulars while "what is known, even in non-inferential knowledge, is facts rather than particulars."¹⁴

The second trend is characterized variously as "analytic philosophy," "therapeutic positivism," or "causistic logical analysis," according to Feigl, originated by G. E. Moore and elaborated and adjusted by Ludwig Wittgenstein. In order to avoid the shortcomings of the above-mentioned account of the relation between facts and thought about them, Wittgenstein developed his theory of "probability and logical inference." One of the shortcomings in the first mentioned trend was that it was only recommended to apply "vivid awareness of political factors." Therefore, Wittgenstein regarded as essential the establishment of a logical mode that guarantees the distinction between false and true propositions about reality. "The symbolizing fact must be a picture of what is symbolized in the sense that it must be of the same form or structure as that which is symbolized."¹⁵ This means that any picture of reality or any proposition about it must obtain within it a form

¹⁴Ibid., p. 255.

¹⁵Joergensen, p. 19.

of relation between its particulars that represent the actual form in reality. "The picture," wrote Wittgenstein, "has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures." It "agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false"; and since "what the picture represents is its sense," "in the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality, its truth or falsity consists."

The basis on which the relation between reality and its picture was built is an ideal type of relating reality to the logical processes in language. However, the difference between them which Wittgenstein disregards is that, while the nature of the former is mechanical, the latter is subject to arbitrary logical analysis. Although this conception is disregarded in his analysis, Wittgenstein insists on the assertion that "elementary propositions" are the actual names of the variables of reality. Therefore, "logical propositions" inferred from the premises of "elementary propositions" are logically truths. Yet, the relationship between the variables of reality is far from being logical as in any sense inferential.

The third trend is what Feigl characterized as the "Socratic method applied with extreme subtlety to the peculiarities of natural languages." The best representative of this trend is Rudolf Carnap. To avoid

the vagueness in Wittgenstein's symbolic logic, Carnap introduced his theory of "constitution," but in reference to linguistic logic. The theory of "constitution" runs as follows: every object either epistemologically or ontologically can be reduced to another object whose quality enters the mind through sensation by reducibility, any object can be constituted. Carnap, however, introduced two criteria of "reducibility." Ontologically,

we call an object a reducible to objects b, c, . . ., if for the existence of every state of affairs with regard to a, b, c . . . a necessary and sufficient condition may be given which depends only on objects b, c . . .

and epistemologically, an

object is called epistemologically prior with respect to another if the second is known by means of the first and, therefore, knowing the first object is a precondition of the knowing of the second object.¹⁶

Those two statements constitute the cornerstones of Carnap's theory. The major difference here from Mach and Wittgenstein's treatment is the fact that, while the relation between knowledge and reality was established through sensation which tolerates, in one way or another, rational inference, in Carnap's theory of constitution, the relation is mediated by experience accompanied by standards for explanation. Yet, whatever

¹⁶Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

the extent to which experience can bring data for the mind, the mental process is involved from the very beginning of experiencing.

In light of that mentioned above, let us now turn to examine the doctrines of empirical theory advocated by Evron Kirkpatrick and those epistemological goals of logical empiricism stated by Joergensen. The ingredients of Kirkpatrick's conception of "empirical theory" were:

(A) "is not a collection of facts . . . ; it offers interpretation, explanation, prediction"

(B) "does not give us wisdom"

(C) "gives us only knowledge"

The ingredients of Joergensen are:

(A) "logical method of analysis"

(B) "eliminate metaphysical problems and assertions as meaningless"

(C) "clarify the meaning of concepts and sentences of empirical science by showing immediately observable content"

Each item in the first set corresponds, epistemologically, with its counterpart in the second set. First, the conception of empirical theory as an instrument that "offers interpretation, explanation, prediction" flies hand in hand with the establishment of "logical method of analysis." For the introduction of

the epistemological foundation upon which the processes of interpretation, explanation, and prediction, behavioralists turned to the logical methods of logical empiricists. The model through which this transition took place was the "hypothetico-deductive" or "covering-law" model. This model, according to John Gunnell,

argued that an event or phenomenon that is to be explained, or strictly speaking, the statement describing the phenomenon or event (the explanandum), must be deducible from premises (the explanans) which are assumed to be true and contain, in addition to certain statements of facts or initial or antecedent conditions, at least one general law expressing empirical regularities.¹⁷

This epistemological relationship between an hypothesis, empirical evidence, and thence general laws is the general outline of the "logical method of analysis" that the behavioralists adopted and applied in their empirical interpretation, explanation, and prediction. However strongly accepted by those scientists, this model fails to abandon human prejudgments and bias since their significance appears from the very beginning of making an assumption about reality. Despite this major deficit, behavioral scientists, like other social

¹⁷John Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Science Inquiry," American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969): 1236. See also his Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry (Morristown: Silver Burdett, 1975), Chapter 3.

scientists, adopted this model without adequate examination of its philosophic doctrines.

The second correlation is between empirical theory's "doesn't give us wisdom" and it "eliminates metaphysical problems and assertions as meaningless." The premise shared in both statements is antagonistic to philosophy and to its method. For behaviorists, the theory of epistemology is only concerned with concrete knowledge, knowledge obtained in reference to empirical facts; meanwhile, wisdom is the subject of philosophy. This conception of knowledge is based on the belief that philosophic approaches and methods are inappropriate to account for the contemporary complex social life. This age, for them, is characterized by a kind of knowledge secured and confirmed by the development of techniques and methods of social sciences. "The present epoch," wrote one of their eminent representatives, "may well be the beginning of a long period of the decline of men's faith in reason."¹⁸ The rationality of "reasoning" in philosophy is not constructed in accordance with accepted procedures and methods. For them, it is of a speculative-subjective nature, the intellectual outcome of which is wisdom. Therefore, for behavioral thinkers,

¹⁸David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 7.

each transition from philosophy to natural and moral philosophy, to natural and moral sciences, then to the social sciences, and now to behavioral sciences, signals a stage in a truly linear movement in the nature and assumptions about our understanding of man in society.¹⁹

In other words, the departure from philosophy means, for them, an articulation of the methodology and modes of analysis associated with science in general.

To depart from the philosophic mode of analysis to the scientific mode necessitated the adoption of a theoretical basis that facilitates this departure. This theory, however, must "eliminate metaphysical problems and assertions as meaningless." It must formulate rules and procedures to ensure objectivity and to eliminate speculation. For the attainment of such a theory, political behaviorists drew on the line of logical empiricists as a philosophic basis upon which methods of "objective" inquiry to be constructed.

As for the relation between the statements "it gives us only knowledge" and it "clarifies the meaning of concepts and sentences of empirical science by showing immediately observable content," the examination of other aspects of the behavioral epistemological theory is a necessary step. It is commonly held, among political behavior scientists, that a generalization

¹⁹David Easton, Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 12.

about reality can only be confirmed or falsified by empirical evidence since empirical evidence, as this conception continues, consists of the facts of reality that give the generalization its legitimacy.

An "empirical political scientist," wrote Robert Dahl, "is concerned with what is,"²⁰ that is, with the "world we touch, taste, feel, hear and smell." Accordingly, "what is" refers to the facts of reality as obtained through sensation. Yet they were conceived as "givens" through whose collection and organization the truth and falsity of a generalization can be easily determined. The many problems that this conception suffers, which will be dealt with in the next part of this chapter, mainly stem from the total reliance on the doctrine established by logical empiricists that stipulates for the clarification of "the meaning of concepts and sentences," the support of its "immediately observable content."

The three mentioned points of contact between Kirkpatrick and Joergensen are but one example of the relation between the behavioral image of knowledge and that of logical empiricism. The literature of both

²⁰Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 771.

contains many examples. But in all cases the reliance of behavioralism on logical empiricism is within three grounds. They are, according to John Gunnell, "(1) the deductive model of explanation, (2) the operationalist-instrumentalist interpretation of scientific concepts and theories, and (3) the fact-value distinction."²¹

The deductive model was basically employed in the philosophy of science. It is, however, applied in natural sciences in many different approaches. In general, it refers to the logic advanced for the interpretation of generalizations by reference to facts of reality. In whatever case, the logic advanced is of an inferential nature that leads from one theoretical premise to another by a deductive procedure. On this ground, political behavioralists and perhaps most social scientists took the natural "philosopher's deductive model as a standard."²² The "conceptual framework" in behavioral research, asserts Gunnell, relies heavily on the philosophic premises of the deductive model. A conceptual framework is, for behavioralists, a necessary step without which it is difficult to manipulate data.

²¹Gunnell, Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry, p. 20.

²²Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry," p. 1969.

It operates as an organizer of data that facilitates their correlation in the way for the formation of generalization. Because of this, a conceptual framework is an active part in the process of theory formation. Yet, it can never be accepted that a theoretical outcome of this process is a pure fact, one purely objective. This is due to the fact that the formulation of any conceptual framework at any level cannot be undertaken without the intervention of the researcher's attitude, values, and choices. At any given level of this formulation, since it is merely an epistemological undertaking, the researcher's rationality is involved and thus his bias and prejudice. A conceptual framework, in Gunnell's words, is

thus intelligible only as it attempts to create preliminary versions of what political scientists see as the eventual shape of a general and formal deductive theory that would approximate the philosopher's representation of natural science.²³

The two other grounds will be dealt with in the remaining part of this chapter.

Theory-Fact Dichotomy

Perhaps this dichotomy is considered among the most paradoxical epistemological issues that divide human thought into many different, and sometimes

²³Gunnell, Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry, p. 23.

conflicting, treatments. Through its history, human thought was, more or less, intellectual interpretations that take different positions on the status of any of the components of this dichotomy (and) or its ramificatory aspects, i.e., "form and matter," "essence and substance," "normative and empirical," that is, the relation of reality to our conception of it. The "traditional behavioral" debate of the fifties is mainly characterized by two strong orthodox commitments to each one of the components of the "theory-fact" dichotomy.²⁴ The commitment of the behavioral orthodoxy to "facts" was one of the most important features of its empirical orientation, while the Straussian orthodox commitment to "reason" (as it has a theorizing function) signifies its classical political orientation.²⁵ The radical distinction between the political orientation of both did not enable any one of them to solve the problem of value-fact dichotomy once and for all. On the surface, the behavioral conception seems to emphasize the assumption that facts are superior to theory in the

²⁴For an outline of issues of that debate, see Mary G. Kweit and Robert W. Kweit, Concepts and Methods for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, n.d.), p. 34. See also, Dennis Kavanagh, Political Science and Political Behaviour (London: George Allen & Unwin, n.d.), Chapter 1.

²⁵See, for example, Leo Strauss, The City and Man.

sense that theoretical statements gain their truth or falsity from the "hard-facts" available. But despite this assumption being the cornerstone, political behavioralists were unable to do away with rational validity of theory as a source of knowledge.

What the two approaches shared was the notion of "orthodoxy"²⁶ that they both share a non-arbitrary commitment to one aspect (of the theory-fact dichotomy) and regard the other as subordinate or of a non-autonomous validity. This "orthodoxy" is inherent in the paradigm through which they viewed reality. It is the nature of the paradigm to specify "the meaning of science." The meaning of "science" (knowledge), wrote Gunnell,

is determined by the "Paradigm" which informs scientific activity and reasoning and which specifies the conception of reality and the phenomena to be investigated, designates problems for investigation, and determines the criteria of acceptable explanation and inference.²⁷

Being of this nature, orthodoxy is a characteristic

²⁶Orthodoxy here refers to two senses. In one sense, it refers to "authoritative citations and statements." See T. L. Moore, "Between Sunlight and Shadow: The Vision of Science and the Drama of Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1981), p. 286. In another sense, it refers to ideological commitment. See Lee C. McDonald, Western Political Theory: The Modern Age (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), Chapter 19.

²⁷Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry," p. 1244.

element of any paradigm.

But despite the fact that the concept of a paradigm²⁸ was able to account for the difference between the two conflicting realms of thought, it is unable to settle the theory-fact question or its implied one, a value-free science. Those questions, as was mentioned, held deep roots in human thought. To settle the question once and for all is not possible in the foreseeable future. Yet the relation between them can be accounted for by the concept of complementarity. This can be seen through the examination of the two mentioned approaches.

The Nature of Theory

One of the most obvious characteristics of the behavioral conception of theory is what Gunnell calls "operationalism or instrumentalism." Political theory, for Easton, "is but a symbolic system useful for understanding concrete or empirical political systems."²⁹ It, accordingly, has an operational function in the sense that it does not contain

²⁸The "paradigmatic" approach is gaining momentum. It relies heavily on the premises of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolution in which he established the basis of the concept of "paradigm" that first demonstrated, as one political scientist once noted, "the politics of science."

²⁹Easton, "Varieties of Political Theory," p. 5.

knowledge, it only directs the researcher by providing him with guidelines that operationally transform the theoretical premises of an assumption or an hypothesis on the basis of the available empirical facts into "knowledge." In this sense, theory is nothing but the way in which the researcher organizes and arranges facts. It is, thus, of no meaning if it is not substantiated by facts. In The Political System, Easton brings theory down to the status of a "conceptual framework." As he sees it, the conceptual framework is a "theoretical model"--"A system of working hypotheses, adopted and used only as long as it helps to orient empirical research."³⁰ It thus supplies the researcher with the necessary guidelines under the light of which empirical data are presented in a coherent image. Easton's appreciation of this device is manifest in his recognition of it as a "systematic theory" "at the highest level." As a theoretical model, the conceptual framework, wrote Easton,

is designed to help select the specific variables that are vital to an understanding of the problems confronting a discipline, the more developed the framework, the more precisely will these variables be identified and related.³¹

Theory, in the operational sense, must consist of

³⁰Easton, The Political System, p. 57.

³¹Ibid., p. 58.

elements that are testable by reference to the variables operating in the reality under investigation. This means that the confirmation or rejection of a premise in a theoretical generalization depends, in the first place, on the ability of this premise to become subject to test. The test is a process in which the researcher determines whether or not a theoretical premise is of a similar position of its counterpart real variable. And if this understanding was done, the theoretical premise is identified as true. Theory in the behavioral sense is a tool or method that relates reality to our conception of it. It is not knowledge but the way in which the researcher organizes reality and then explains it. It is no wonder, therefore, that methodology (which will be dealt with in the next chapter) is the cornerstone of the study of political theory in the behavioral enterprise.

With a certain degree of variation, Easton's operationist concept of theory has influenced most of the eminent behavioral scientists. Among these are David B. Truman,³² Ithiel de Sola Pool,³³

³²David B. Truman, "Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline," American Political Science Review LIX (December 1965).

³³See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

Robert Dahl,³⁴ and Heinz Eulau. Eulau is perhaps the least influenced by this conception. He was the most cautious of the dangers and the shortcomings of the theory-fact dichotomy. In his conception of this dichotomy, Eulau seems to approximate the complementary description by viewing the relation between theory and empirical facts as interdependent.

For Eulau, theory and empirical facts are "interdependent." As he describes this relationship, theoretical questions must be stated in operational terms for the purpose of fruitful empirical research, and that, in turn, empirical findings should be brought to bear on the theoretical formulation of political problems.³⁵

Eulau, however, refrains from defining theory in analytical terms. He conceives it in operational terms and considers it an "activity." Theory, for him, is "theorizing," that is, an activity exercised through the whole process of deductive explanation based on the

³⁴See Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

³⁵Heinz Eulau, The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 26.

interrelatedness between the "theoretical premises," i.e., assumptions, hypotheses, etc., and the "empirical premises," i.e., facts.

Eulau's insistence upon the interdependent relation between theory and fact is due to the realization of the shortcomings of Easton's strict "operationist" conception of theory. This conception can never be completely objective, argues Eulau, because "there are many methods of explanation," "they [all] require theorizing activity." This activity is not knowledge but a "tool" by which facts are molded. All this, however, depends on the "theoretician's responsibility" in determining that his propositions "can be tested" and in showing "how they can be tested."³⁶ But despite the fact that Eulau's treatment implies the danger of subjective intervention in theorizing, he continues to assert that the only way to confirm or disprove any level of theoretical knowledge is by "empirical testing."

On the other side, political philosophers in the Straussian camp object to the very notion of theory and question its ability to provide for knowledge. Political theory, according to Leo Strauss, has the form of ideology. It is the "comprehensive reflections on the political situation which lead up to the suggestions

³⁶Quoted from *ibid.*, p. 26-27.

of a broad policy."³⁷ Therefore, it is bound by the problems that any policy seeks to solve and the political scientist's perception of these problems. In this sense, theory as an intellectual device is unable to produce objective knowledge of reality. Instead, it "appeals to the principles accepted by public opinion" in order to confirm its intellectual products. Hence, it is the sum of the scientist's opinion and public opinion.

Knowledge, in the Straussian vision, differs significantly from opinion. It cannot be attained by only opining on the available facts. It can be produced through a "reasoning" process by which opinion about reality can be transformed into a knowledge of it. This process cannot be secured by thought, theory, or theology in which opinions are always manifest. The transformation of opinion into knowledge is a process that can only be carried out by philosophy.

Philosophy, wrote Strauss, "is a quest for universal knowledge, for knowledge of the whole." The knowledge of the "whole" or "universal," as he continues, replaces what opinions had to say about the whole. "It is, therefore, the attempt to replace

³⁷Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1959), p. 13.

opinions about the whole by knowledge of the whole"³⁸--the knowledge of it is a prerequisite of knowledge of the particulars that constitute the whole. The knowledge of particulars is an intermediate step between the opinion of the whole and knowledge of it. The escalation from one step to another is accomplished by a series of "reasoning" processes that assist in formulating a coherent image of the whole. Accordingly, political philosophy is "the attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political things by knowledge of the nature of political things,"³⁹ in accordance with "reason."

Modern theoretical knowledge, in the Straussian vision, is of a lower rank when compared with that of classical philosophy. While the subject matter of theoretical science is "spatio-temporal," philosophy is concerned with eternal truth about things since it attains knowledge through examining the nature of these things. Ideas of theories are concerned with the "here-now" questions while philosophic ideas have a transcendental nature because they say something directly related to the nature of things.

³⁸Ibid., p. 11.

³⁹Ibid., p. 12.

The ideas of "good" and "justice" are good examples of such transcendental ideas. Political things, wrote Strauss, are

by their nature subject to approval and disapproval; to choice and rejection, to praise and blame. It is their essence not to be neutral but to raise a claim to men's obedience, allegiance, decision or judgment. One does not understand them as what they are, as political things, if one does not take seriously their explicit or implicit claim to be judged in terms of goodness or badness, of justice or injustice, i.e., if one doesn't measure them by some standard of goodness or justice.⁴⁰

The most crucial issue in this measurement is the determination of what goodness is and what badness is. To support this thesis, the Straussians turned to the literature of classical political philosophy, especially the Greeks (Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato).⁴¹ Upon the philosophic foundation and method of such a literature, Leo Strauss and those following his line constructed their philosophic understanding of reality. This understanding is, philosophically, based on the assumption that "all human action is decided in the light of goodness or badness." Therefore, the understanding of political society necessitates the knowledge of the common good of that society.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹See Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963).

Leo Strauss, however, rarely shows the standards by which it can be determined what goodness is and what badness is. Instead, he suggests a whole history of "natural-law" thought that, for him, can assist in the attainment of these philosophic standards. In this thought the most important aspect related to the issue of the transcendental nature of ideas runs as follows: truths are to be found in the nature of things. Ideas are representatives of those truths in the mind. The nature of things does not change to follow the ideas. Ideas, thus, obtain a nature that transcends the "spatio-temporal" articulations.

"Value-Free" Science

The premise of a "value-free" science, wrote McDonald, was initiated by Max Weber's "insistence on a hard distinction between 'value judgments' and empirical fact."⁴² The separation of value statements from factual statements has been the theme of social scientists in general and behavioralists in particular. But despite the fact that some behavioral political scientists, such as Eulau, seem to deny the possibility of a value-free political science, they seem to insist on Weber's "hard distinction." They insist upon the

⁴²McDonald, pp. 471-2.

distinction between value judgments and scientific judgments based on empirical facts. Yet, they cannot deny that scientific judgments are also "value-laden."

The behavioral approach, wrote Easton, is "the symbol of scientific method."⁴³ It mainly seeks to establish a social science and to minimize speculative political reasoning. The behavioral thrust of "scienticism" is inherited from the early movement of science to which Charles Merriam was a significant contributor. The confusion in stating what "science" is was terminated by the logical empirical philosophy in which the basic thrust was toward the association of science with facts obtained by experience. This resolution was the basis on which the behavioral assumption of "value-free" political science was built--that by experiencing and observing political reality and by the methods that limit human interference in their organization the possibility of founding a value-free science of politics resides.

The conception of political science as "lay in the collection of objective data, the hard facts about political facts," wrote Easton, "arose in revulsion against the speculative kind of system-building

⁴³Easton, A Framework of Political Analysis, p. 17.

prevalent in the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ Through this revulsion against moral philosophy, the goals that guide political action in the philosophic outlook were substituted by facts that obtain causal relations. Drawing on this positivistic distinction, Easton seems to accept the distinction between facts and values rendering the former a unique position in contemporary political research. He summarizes the relations between them as follows:

The factual aspect of a proposition refers to a part of reality: hence it can be tested by reference to the facts. In this way we check its truth. The moral aspect of a proposition, however, expresses only the emotional response of an individual to a state of real or presumed facts.⁴⁵

The basic implication of Easton's conception is that moral judgments are not subject to confirmation or falsification and, therefore, are not in the realm of science. Value judgments are not concerned with a real state of affairs but with a desired one, i.e., concerned with what "ought to be" and with "what is." The depreciation of value judgments on the mentioned basis was along established tradition in social "science." It rests on the assumption that "values can ultimately be reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the

⁴⁴Easton, The Political System, p. 69.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 221.

individual's total life-experiences,"⁴⁶ and, on this basis, can be studied as variables.

David Easton, however, realizes the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions between moral preferences and hard-facts of research. The intervention of values in the designation and organization of facts of research was an established issue that led Easton to accept the thesis that empirical research is not always objective since, at all levels of research, the researcher's values are present. Having in mind the difficulty of eliminating such an over-lapping, Easton suggests two approaches that would help in reducing it: first, by the explicit expression of the researcher's own values, and second, by a "constructionist" theory that solves the questions of preferences. The first refers to advice that the researcher should state explicitly his values, moral goals, and prejudices so they become clear in judging his empirical work. The second refers to the "constructive approach towards moral clarification . . . illustrated by the political theory of any of the great social philosophers of the past."⁴⁷

It should be pointed out that, in his final analysis to secure the possibility of a value-free

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 231.

science, Easton resorts to philosophy as a "safety valve" for moral clarification.

Heinz Eulau seems to object to the notion of moral clarity. He asserts the impossibility of a value-free political science even with the use of the two mentioned approaches. For him, the neutrality of science is only manifest in its being a product (technology). As a practice and activity, the scientific processes are never value-free and can only be approximated to neutrality by the strong commitment to the development of precise methods and techniques of the modern social sciences (the question of methodology will be dealt with in the next chapter). But beyond the limits of methodology, Eulau leaves the question of the possibility of a value-free science unanswered.

On the other side, the classic Straussian approach regards the whole "scientific" enterprise as a system of values. Value judgments, wrote Strauss, "forbidden to enter through the front door of political science, sociology or economics, enter these disciplines through the back door."⁴⁸ This, argues Strauss, manifests itself in the continuing efforts of social scientists to "sell" their projects. For social scientists, truth is the ultimate ground upon which

⁴⁸Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, p. 47.

knowledge must be obtained. Truth, however, can be approved or disapproved and, therefore, it can be adopted or rejected. The determination of whether a certain truth is acceptable or not depends on our preferences. In this sense, truth itself is a value judgment and thus a subject of moral philosophy.

For Leo Strauss, "it is impossible to study social phenomena . . . without making value judgments." It is so because "it is impossible to understand thought or action without evaluating it."⁴⁹ Evaluation, philosophically, stipulates the formation of general conceptual references that, in the approximation of which, the goodness and badness of an act can be determined. Understanding human society, asserts Strauss, is easy to come by only through adequate evaluation of its common ends. And, therefore, the common purpose of a society "necessarily functions as a standard for judging of civil societies." A value-free science which considers moral ends meaningless is, accordingly, unable to provide for a coherent understanding of a human society in which the basic characteristic is valuation. Upon these grounds, Strauss rejects the possibility of a value-free political science.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 21.

Strauss also rejects the assumption conversely held by social scientists that value conflict cannot be solved by "human reason." This assumption, for him, is based on a narrow examination of value conflict, that social scientists did not examine the whole abstract system of which those conflicting values are small segments, but concentrated on "sketchy observations which pretend to prove that specific value conflict is insoluble."⁵⁰ Strauss does not deny that some value conflicts cannot be solved but he is mainly concerned with the general abstract systems of ideas (philosophy) that can, in general, show the difference between conflicting ideas such as good and bad which modern social science cannot do.

Both the traditional outlook and the behavioral image of science fail to introduce a value-free science. The significant difference between them, however, is manifest in the orthodox commitment of each of them to its philosophic background. While the logical empirical tradition shaped the behavioral empirical vision, moral political philosophy furnished the grounds upon which Strauss and his students directed their criticisms of the value-fact dichotomy and of the possibility of a value-free political science. But despite this

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 22.

significant difference, both of them were able to see the extent to which human values interfere in factual empirical research. It can be concluded, therefore, that values and facts run hand-in-hand and the determination of the superiority of each over the other, as far as the traditional-behavioral debate is concerned, depends on the nature of our philosophic background.

Since the interaction between values and facts is sufficiently acceptable, the relation between them seems to be very problematic. If we do away with the orthodox commitment, the relation between them becomes of "complementary descriptions." Generally speaking, the principle of "complementarity" can bring some useful insights when it is employed to account for such a relationship.

"Western languages," wrote T. Lindsay Moore, are structured in terms of a distinction between subject and object. Thus conjunctions of this dualistic language with a multistable existence yields complementary description.⁵¹

This dual structure manifests itself in all intellectual treatments which usually treat two aspects of reality--one related to the realm of thought and the other to "what is out there," i.e., "form and matter,"

⁵¹Moore, p. 268.

"essence and substance," "value and fact," . . . etc. Through its history, human thought has never yielded one acceptable account of the relation between these two aspects of reality. Perhaps only the concept of "complementarity" implications was implied in that history. The behavioralist-traditionalist debate is but another version of the long disagreement in history on this matter.

And the result is that neither part of the mentioned dichotomies is able to do away with the other. Both behaviorists and traditionalists agree that values and facts are there, but the relation between them cannot be determined in one single sense. The relation between them thus is complementary and the superiority of one over the other depends on the adopted paradigm.

In complementary descriptions, "each description co-dependently originates with its complement, and would be meaningless without it"⁵² (being and non-being imply each other and democracy and dictatorship imply each other). The determination of whether a thing is superior to its complement or not depends on the way that a given paradigm makes the arrangement. The complementary description can only be used as a neutral

⁵²Ibid.

concept that stipulates the two mentioned aspects as a necessary condition of reality.

It was seen, however, that the relation between values and facts, in general, is of a complementary nature since each orthodoxy was unable to evade them as parts of knowledge. Yet, the difference in the structures of the paradigms resulted in the different evaluations of values and facts.

In conclusion, one can assert the following points. First, it was seen that there was an orthodox aspect in the assumptions of the behavioral enterprise which was manifested in the strong commitment to the assumptions of logical empiricism despite their apparent inability to meet the requirements necessary to understand human phenomena. For instance, when we treated the doctrine of a "value-free" science, we found that political behaviorists commit their treatments to the general implications of this doctrine despite the fact that their treatments show the impossibility of doing away with values when the subject of study is humans.

Second, the general outlook of the behavioral paradigm regarded the assumptions of logical empiricism as intuitive premises and took them for granted which leads the researcher to assert that the factors behind this orthodoxy are of ideological foundations which

relate to the cultural and political background and the social ambitions of its advocates.

The connection between these two points reveals an ideological aspect in the epistemological dimensions of political behavioralism through which it can be viewed as a school of thought with two dimensions: epistemological and political. And since we will deal in the fourth chapter with the "political," the next chapter will treat the epistemological dimension.

CHAPTER III

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Methodology, wrote T. Harrell Allen, is "a term much misused by current social scientists."¹ It referred, by use of different thinkers, to many different aspects of epistemology. It has become, he adds, "a phrase of synonym for 'method' or 'technique'." The precise meaning of methodology and its infant "method" is still unattainable by social scientists. Its definition sometimes is confused with the term "procedure," "model," or "way of thinking."² Neither the term "method" nor any of its mentioned substitutes has been able to cover the complex intellectual activities practiced under its name. It is because of the complexity of those issues that methodology has become today a philosophic enterprise of which reason and rational illumination are necessary elements. Thus, the word methodology "can be used in two different but overlapping ways." The first is "mainly concerned with

¹T. Harrell Allen, New Methods in Social Science Research, Policy Sciences and Future Research (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 7.

²See Justus Buchter, The Concept of Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

selecting specific technical tools and techniques for collecting data and analyzing it." The second is chiefly "concerned with philosophical fields of enquiry that can be used to conceptualize the problem under study."³ It is the thesis of this chapter that, even the most precise investigatory techniques rely on, in one way or another, philosophically oriented elements. What is then unacceptable is the insistence of modern social scientists on philosophic-free procedures that govern the human intellectual processes. As a consequence of this empirical outlook, social scientists turned to formal logical sciences and tried to adopt their method within the framework of their disciplines. Mathematics and statistics were regarded as exemplars whose quantitative techniques were conceived as the major goal of social science through which social scientists can exercise the main predicate of science--objectivity.

Objectivity

It is well known that "objective" knowledge is the major slogan for social scientists. And since an orthodox commitment cannot do away with prejudgments, social scientists were biased to the principle of

³Quoted in Allen, p. 7.

"objectivity." In their continuing efforts to secure objective knowledge, social scientists invented the most complex techniques whose undertaking can only be handled by the "community of scientists" itself. As a consequence, the theory of knowledge, as far as social scientists are concerned, is the affair of specialized scientists who determine the nature, problem, and methods of social knowledge. It is the commitment to the principle of objectivity that led to the limitation of social science within limited circles in the society.⁴ Thus, methodology, as rightly noted by Allen, "becomes first an approach toward inquiry and then later evolves into particular methods or techniques."⁵ This, at least, is what can be seen in the behavioral literature.

It was seen in the previous chapter that the behavioral image of "science" was shaped by the theoretical assumptions of "empirical" theory. And, as a consequence, the goal of social scientists became the formation of empirical theory as a more developed stage of knowledge than that of normative social philosophy. Empirical theory was stipulated as a basic orientation of scientific knowledge seeking "objectivity." The latter constitutes the essence of the relation between

⁴Allen, p. 7.

⁵Ibid.

science and empirical theory for the advocates of science. The basic thrust of "science" was to emancipate knowledge from human bias. The basic step in this direction, social scientists believe, was the formulation of "criteria of validity" by which the lines between objective and subjective forms of knowledge can be drawn. Subjective knowledge, however, was considered outside the realm of scientific knowledge because, in it, objective facts are not clearly distinguishable from subjective bias and prejudice and, therefore, scientific understanding cannot be secured.

According to social "science," the correlation between science and objectivity is almost everything that scientific thinking is all about. Objectivity refers directly to the "truths" that every "scientific" knowledge claims to have. It is maintained by some social scientists that objective knowledge is concerned with the objective "existential" reality and, therefore, gives us knowledge about it. Thus, it is argued that social scientists are concerned only with "truths"⁶ or, in other words, with the factual aspect of the value-fact dichotomy.

⁶For more detail on the status of the doctrine of objectivity in the scientific enterprise, see Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1967).

It seems clear that the assumption of objectivity developed by social scientists maintains a significant position in empirical theory; it is almost the final objective that empiricism seeks to accomplish. At the beginning of this century, social scientists were preoccupied with the formulation of the necessary "methods," "techniques," "tools," and "models" to enable them to produce objective knowledge. It was hoped that, by the development of "methodology" in social sciences, social knowledge would be reliable and gain the status of the natural sciences.

The trend toward methodological achievements in the social sciences is not new. It dates back to Max Weber in whose philosophic texture the modern sense of "method" originated. It should be mentioned that a philosophic texture is essential for the validation of any method since, as mentioned before, methodology is a philosophic enterprise whose procedure is based on theoretical assumptions subject to rational verification.

Weber's methodological analysis first signified a distinction that was confused by modern radical methodologists. This distinction is implicitly drawn between methodological issues and methodological techniques and procedures. In addition to the methodological issues of "scientific neutrality" and

"value-fact dichotomy" Weber presents another related issue--the core issue, objectivity. However, he presents his methodological analysis in a philosophic manner that implicitly contradicts the modern techniques of inquiry, especially those of a complex technical procedure, i.e., quantitative techniques. This contradiction is due to the fact that these techniques specify solid and strict procedures that control the analysis of social actions. These procedures act like "norms or ideals from which directives" are made to guide the intellectual action.

The point of departure of Weber's analysis of objectivity is the presupposition of "the existence of an unconditionally valid type of knowledge in the social sciences."⁷ This indicates the existence of ultimately valid "truths" of social reality. This presupposition is the ideal, the approximation of which would bring the principle of objectivity into existence. It is presupposed that there exists a "concrete [social] reality" the truths of which can be known. According to Weber, "only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation"⁸ and

⁷Max Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949), p. 63.

⁸Ibid., p. 72.

the criterion by which this portion is determined is the knowledge of "the regular recurrence of certain causal relationships."⁹ Reality, thus, can be expressed in "laws" in which the "regularity" of events is a precondition. These laws, as Weber's analysis continues, become objectively valid truths if they are tested repeatedly through empirical procedures.

The decisive factor for the transformation of knowledge into "unconditionally valid truths" is the application of empirical techniques and processes that facilitate the process in which the element of regularity is confirmed. At this point Weber's philosophic texture stops and leaves the matter to future students. His analysis revolves only around the general characteristics of the so-called "scientific" method and its philosophic foundations.

The claim of "objectivity" became so important in the social sciences for many reasons. Among them is the insistence on the belief that, in principle, there are truths in social reality that can be known if we know the procedures to do so. This conception of social reality is mainly derived from natural sciences and especially physics and biology since empirical procedures, and especially experimentation, in both of

⁹Ibid.

them developed the most reliable knowledge in the modern scientific enterprise. The admiration of social scientists of the procedures of those sciences has led them to base their methods on the same grounds as natural scientists. Prediction and empirical verification thus became indispensable requirements for scientific application and predicates that the scientific enterprise cannot do away with, in contrast to Elliott's words,

if we are to use the term "science" for our study of political phenomena, it will only be on the basis that prediction and experimental verification are not necessary predicates in the social sciences.¹⁰

Perhaps those two basic scientific predicates are the most irrelevant predicates to the social sciences because of the basic direction in the nature and behavior of the "objects" of study and the difference in the realm of knowledge. But since this difference was sometimes ignored or misconceived, the methodological issues of natural science have become the preoccupation of social scientists and, as a result, the thesis of "unified sciences" emerged.

The basic epistemological doctrine of this thesis

¹⁰W. Y. Elliott, "The Possibility of a Science of Politics: With Special Attention to Methods Suggested by William Munro and George E. G. Catlin," in Methods in Social Science, ed. Stuart A. Rice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 79.

is that the theory of knowledge is mainly concerned with the manner by which knowledge is to be attained. It is thus of a methodic orientation. What sciences share in common, according to this thesis, are the certain procedures and guidelines that control the process of discovering their subjects of investigation. This instrumental conception of knowledge fails to recognize the knowledge of nature and society as a social process since it merely conceives it to be a set of procedures that judge human correctness. This failure is due to the above-mentioned misconception of the difference between "facts" of natural life and "facts" of social life and the relevant methodology of each.

Social scientists have, to some extent, confused the two different aspects in reaching the aim of "objectivity," the knowledge of the "object" in reality. The objects of social reality were mistakenly given the attributes of natural objects and, hence, their existence was judged and determined by the element applicable to the latter. The idea of methodology in social science heavily resides in this assumption. It is argued that there is a "concrete" natural reality as well as a "concrete" social reality.¹¹ The element of "concreteness" is signified as a general characteristic

¹¹This is a major assumption of positivism.

of objective natural phenomena as well as that of social reality.

The Scientific Method

The essence of the so-called "scientific method," in Cohen's words, "denotes any procedure which applies some rational order or systematic pattern to diverse objects"¹² in a manner that approximates the presupposed objective truths. It revolves around certain philosophically oriented methodological questions whose answer is necessary to make our knowledge approximate the objective truths. Yet, when it comes to the behavioralist version of the scientific method, there is rarely a philosophic support to the behavioral methodological assumptions and most of the questions are unanswered. This lack of philosophic content is due to a crucial factor that shaped the behavioral "credo," that is, the empirically oriented approach in the philosophy of science and its methodological outlook, the assumptions of which were dealt with in the previous chapter.

Instead of providing for a methodological account of human issues, behaviorists took for granted the

¹²Morris Cohen, "Scientific Method," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 10, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933).

philosophic position of the "scientific" methodists and then considered themselves its extension. Easton's treatment of the behavioral credo is perhaps a good example that demonstrates the inability of the political behavior movement to go to deeper philosophic roots than those of logical empiricists. What the credo shows is an adaptive pattern of the elements of the scientific conception of method to fit in the study of social phenomena. There was no originality in doing this, as behavioral political scientists sometimes claim, neither in terms of epistemology or political reality nor in its methodology. The methodological issues in the credo are as few as Easton's statements:

Regularity: There are discoverable uniformities in political behavior. These can be expressed in generalizations or theories with explanatory and predictive value.

Verification: The validity of such generalizations must be testable, in principle, by reference to relevant behavior.

Techniques: Means for acquiring and interpreting data cannot be taken for granted. They are problematic and need to be examined self-consciously, refined, and validated so that rigorous means can be found for observing, recording, and analyzing behavior.

Quantification: Precision in the recording of data and the statement of findings requires measurement and quantification, not for its own sake, but only where possible, relevant, and meaningful in light of other objectives.

Values: Ethical evaluation and empirical explanation involves two different kinds of propositions that, for the sake of clarity, should be analytically distinct. However, a student of political behavior is not prohibited from asserting propositions of either kind separately or in combination.

Systematization: Research ought to be

systematic; that is to say, theory and research are to be seen as closely intertwined parts of a coherent and orderly body of knowledge. Research untutored by theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupported by data, futile.

Pure Science: The application of knowledge is as much a part of the scientific enterprise as theoretical understanding. But the understanding and explanation of political behavior logically precedes and provides the basis for efforts to utilize political knowledge in the solution of urgent practical problems of society.

Integration: Because the social sciences deal with the whole human situation, political research can ignore the findings of other disciplines only at the peril of weakening the validity and undermining the generality of its own results. Recognition of this interrelationship will help to bring political science back to its status of earlier centuries and return it to the main fold of the social sciences.¹³

These eight elements or concepts were presented in a manner so loose and vague that they encompass many different and sometimes conflicting approaches. Yet, when they are stated as "articles of faith," their philosophic treatment is fruitless. The reason why political behavioralism stood only at the limits of those "articles of faith" is its resentment of philosophy, since it regarded the philosophic tradition as mere history and, therefore, inadequate to account for the present state of knowledge. But for the justification of the "credo," Easton was obliged to

¹³David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' in Political Science," in The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science, ed. James C. Charlesworth (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1962), p. 7.

mention the philosophic grounds on which its philosophic assumptions reside.

Easton, however, regards the behavioral approach as one component in what he called the "dual revolution" of science. In its being a component, asserts Easton, it is not "different from the scientific method, whereas it is only this method with a shift in emphasis to the substantive problems of concept formation and theory construction."¹⁴ The meaning of the two latter processes was conceived by behaviorists in the strictest sense of the term "method." The task of theory construction, in empirical formulation, turned out to be, more or less, instructional procedures that govern the intellectual processes either on logical or mathematical grounds. This, however, explains why behavioral political scientists

have been concentrating on the difficult and time-consuming task of refashioning [their] tools of research, learning new languages of analysis, and familiarizing [them]selves with the methods, data, and findings of related disciplines.¹⁵

It is out of the amalgamation of these grounds and the techniques of other social sciences that the behavioral conception of the scientific method emerges. The major factor behind the broad growth of behavioralism is,

¹⁴Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁵Ibid.

according to Easton,

the increasing prevalence in political research of the use of carefully devised interviews, survey research, technical methods of measurement, and the formalization of analysis in logical and mathematical symbols.¹⁶

Yet, most of the techniques associated with the analysis of the political behavior approach are derived from other social sciences and especially those of a quantitative orientation. Behavioralism, therefore, is a component of the "dual revolution"; the other is the empirically oriented approach dominant in the philosophy of science. Political behavioralism was thus merely a naive adaptation of the assumptions of the philosophy of science and the tools and techniques of applied research in fields such as sociology, psychology, and psychiatry.

In order to understand the shortcomings of the behavioral methodological assumptions, it is essential, as John Gunnell always insisted, to widen the grounds on which they rest. But since the behavioral "credo" or "articles of faith" cannot withstand an elaborate philosophic criticism, it is necessary to examine their theoretical orientation which is manifest in the assumptions of the social science movement dominating the early decades of this century. This movement is the origin from which, Easton believes, political

¹⁶Ibid., p. 21.

behavioralism is an extension and whose theoretical assumptions and philosophic interpretation have been taken without any questioning.

Science, wrote M. R. Cohen, a good representative of this movement, "may be distinguished from ordinary common-sense knowledge by the rigors with which it subordinates all other considerations to the pursuit of the ideals of certainty, exactness, universality, and system."¹⁷ It is perhaps those methodological ideals that the political behavior movement is to inject in the body of the intellectual political knowledge. If they were not mentioned directly, they were at least the most important line of the so-called "dual revolution."

The uniqueness of the scientific method, according to Cohen, is manifest in its four elements that distinguish it from common sense knowledge. But even supposing that common sense yields unreliable knowledge, it aims in its intellectual processes to accomplish a form or another of the four mentioned elements.

Cohen builds up the philosophic basis of those elements in accordance with a very narrow conception, or misconception, of common sense. His treatment of common

¹⁷Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method (New York: Dover, 1931), p. 83. (Emphasis added.)

sense only reflects the understanding of its nature as merely a naive speculation or a simple questioning. For him, common sense takes the ordinary vocabulary for granted and seeks to introduce their inferences as facts. Therefore, it is never certain and its knowledge is vague.

But Cohen seems to accept the validity of philosophy in asserting his so-called scientific method for the legitimization of its knowledge despite the fact that it reduces it to a naive speculation. This is due to the fact that, whether he accepted philosophy or not, the "scientific method" itself is based on a philosophic foundation. In spite of his explicit bias toward science, Cohen accepts philosophy as a supplement of the scientific method in three ways: either as a "synthesis of the sciences," as a "critique of the presuppositions of science," or as an "extension of scientific method." In those three senses, philosophy is regarded as more than an ordinary common sense usage; rather it is an enterprise without which the scientific method is meaningless as well as the other epistemological methods that adopt another label.

A thorough examination of the ideals of the scientific methodology enterprise would first demonstrate that science and philosophy are paradigms of thought, but of different general aims of epistemology. Second,

it might enable us to acknowledge that the reason behind the differences is not only the aims of epistemology but something else--something that can be related to an orthodox commitment or, in other words, to ideology.

Ideals of the Scientific Method

Certainty

According to social "science" this claim is a ground on which the claim of truth can be founded

since [it] aims to settle doubts or debates between contending views by showing that a given proposition is better founded than its suggested alternative. A proof in pure mathematics always shows the impossibility of any significant denial of the proposition proved.¹⁸

Scientific method widens our range of vision and eliminates that logical uncertainty or inconclusiveness of common sense which leads to sectarian diversity of opinion.¹⁹

The element of certainty from the scientific point of view is philosophically oriented in a non-certain sense. For the accommodation of concrete knowledge, all existing knowledge has to be doubted, especially beliefs and values. It is not clear yet whether the scientific enterprise is able to account for the "certainty" assumption or not. What is clear is the constant skepticism used to confront the important

¹⁸Cohen, p. 84.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 88.

epistemological issues that provide a conception of reality. In its direction toward certainty, the scientific methodology leaves a number of human questions unanswered--questions of a normative and philosophic foundation. Yet, in its sphere of inquiry it was assumed that the transition from the qualitative to the quantitative mode of analysis is the only path that secures the element of certainty. By this assumption the scientific method leaves "reality" and flies in the direction of abstractness.

"Quantification" is as old as the Euclidean mathematics and its logical application was a significant part of the Greek philosophy.²⁰ The meaning and application of the concept of "quantification" since the Greeks have been in constant change in accordance with changes in the logical foundations of mathematics and statistics. In its general meaning, it refers to five general areas in which those two sciences are most developed. As Tukey explains, quantitative expression relates to

measurement in general; measurement in the subject matter field at hand; the general use of numerically expressed information; the general use of frameworks into which numbers can be introduced to gain insight, understanding, or knowledge; the particular

²⁰See Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis of Political Data (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), Chapter 1.

examples of such frameworks which have proved effective in the subject matter field at hand.²¹

While the question of measurement will be dealt with in the following section, a consideration of the role of mathematical statistics in politics and the social sciences in general is in order.

The major premise on which quantification relates to the element of certainty is the neutrality and exactness of mathematics either in specifying the ramifications of the object under consideration or in the process of inference. The formal logic of these frameworks is regarded, in Cohen's words, as the "logical grounds" upon which the correctness or error of a quantitative statement is to be judged. It was commonly held among the advocates of mathematical application that "once a new discipline has developed a mathematical discourse, it has almost immediately laid claim . . . to the significant status--science."²² Accordingly, objective science is to yield an objective knowledge determined by non-subjective criteria and standards. To accomplish this end, social scientists

²¹John W. Tukey, "Statistical and Quantitative Methodology," in Trends in Social Sciences, ed. Donald Ray (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1961), p. 85.

²²Harry Woolf, Quantification: A History of the Meaning of Measurement in the Natural and Social Sciences (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), p. 3.

emphasized, with minor modifications, the desirability of adapting the mathematical procedures to fit the study of social phenomena in order to eliminate ideological bias or, at least, to reduce it to a minimum.

Otto A. Davis delineates four advantages of the mathematical "symbolism" in the construction of rules for theoretical knowledge:

- (1) the increased ease in manipulation [of data],
 (2) all manipulations follow the accepted rules of logic, (3) the discovery of vagueness, (4) stating theories in formal terms.²³

The first advantage includes two aspects: ease and manipulation. The former is a desirable element for understanding, yet it contradicts the basic assumption of quantitative analysis that the "perceptual" world we deal with is inevitably heading in the direction of complexity. It is commonly accepted among behavioral social scientists that the essence of quantitative treatment is that it deals with as many variables as can be symbolized in a quantitative manner. Therefore, handling the data necessary for all variables can be accomplished only through complex, manifold techniques. The latter aspect of the first advantage, manipulation,

²³Otto Davis, "Notes on Strategy and Methodology for a Scientific Political Science," in Mathematical Applications in Political Science, ed. Joseph L. Bern (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1969), pp. 29-30. (Emphasis added.)

refers to the ability of the investigator to control the data of the variables either in the process of gathering them or in their classification. This advantage, however, becomes a disadvantage since it allows the investigator's bias to be introduced in a significant part of understanding--classification. It is always argued that the essence of mathematical frameworks is their absolute neutrality since they follow "rules of logic" that guide intellectual processes independently. Yet, the basic element of manipulation would demonstrate that even the most precise mathematical frameworks, when applied to the study of society, cannot escape human bias.

The second advantage, all manipulations follow the accepted rules of logic, is a characteristic of the mathematically oriented analysis since inferences made mathematically do not follow actual relations but the logic applicable to a given mathematical formulation. This presupposes that the logic of the mathematical framework controls the deductive processes. Yet the procedures followed in these processes would determine the type of conclusion to be drawn, regardless of the nature of the actual existing relations. "Mathematics per se," wrote Alker, "is logical, not empirical

analysis."²⁴ "It is concerned with content-free relationships."²⁵ In mathematical frameworks, "formulas" substitute "concepts" for the undertaking of the explanatory and interpretative intellectual processes. Whatever conclusion can be drawn "is due entirely to the interpretations which are given to these formulas and to the assumptions from which the formulas are derived."²⁶

Reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity, types of formulas, are perhaps good illustrative examples. Reflexivity: $a = a$. "Anything is equal to itself." Symmetry: if $a = b$, then $b = a$. "Things on either side of an equals sign both equal each other." Transitivity: if $a = b$ and $b = c$, then $a = c$. "Things both equal to something else equal each other."²⁷ All these three share the major characteristic of absoluteness that is never to be found in either the realm of society or of nature.

The discovery of vagueness advantage is related to the benefits of symbolism. Mathematics, argues

²⁴Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Mathematics and Politics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 10.

²⁵Ibid., p. 9.

²⁶Ibid., p. 10.

²⁷Ibid., p. 20.

Davis, specifies all conditions and assumptions required for the proof. By doing this, mathematical formulations always escape vagueness since their numerical and symbolic manifestations are always well defined and valuated. While this argument is partly true, it says only half the truth. The other half, it can be said, is manifest in the fact that the philosophic clues are the defining and valuating factor and not the mathematical formulation per se. Symbolism as such is an element of vagueness since it raises its representation of reality to the most abstract level, to the real-free level; so to speak. The relation expressed in a symbolic manner must be based within a framework of assumption. It is the task of philosophic "clues" to suggest the nature of any symbolic expression. It is no wonder, however, that as much as mathematical methodologists apply their tools to social reality, their conclusions about it require philosophic interpretation that discloses their relation to reality.

The last advantage relates to the process by which mathematical formulations substitute formal languages for "verbal theoretical languages." The advantage here, according to Davis, is manifest in the "diversity" of available formal languages since diversity itself is recognized as a desired end the mere existence of which would bring "new insights and

results." This, however, seems to be inconsistent with the goal of the "scientific method" under treatment. It was presupposed that certainty of knowledge is tenable only through the process of conflicting methodical attitudes in which only one logical method, through one logical language, can ascertain the level of certainty and thus settle any disputes for the sake of its findings.

It should be pointed out, however, that most of the intellectual efforts on the part of positivistic empiricists were directed to the formulation of one logical language whose essence is the existence of a formal logic that guides the explanation and interpretation (see the treatment of Carnap, Russell, and Wittgenstein in the second chapter, above). But, yet since this end seems to be untenable, even the most abstract formulation, viz. mathematics, cannot resist the diversity of the available angles to account for things.

Accuracy and Measurement

Exactness can be attained by two methods:

a) Enumeration, often elaborated in the form of statistics (the assignment of numerals or other symbols to a series of things) is primarily a matter of convenience of memory; it is a question of truth (and therefore of science) whether the things

symbolized do have the same order as the symbols.²⁸

b) Measurement, (by which relations are numerically expressed), introduces definiteness into our knowledge of phenomenon by enabling us to order them in series which can be universally correlated.²⁹

The high level of exactness, definiteness, and accuracy, argues Cohen, constitutes the pivot of the scientific method. Two procedures, among others, are necessary to keep the level of exactness high: enumeration and measurement. According to Cohen, statistical formulations of the two mentioned procedures significantly contribute to the elimination of vagueness in normal language. "Workers in exact sciences," says Cohen, "often assert that where there is no exact enumeration or measurement there is no science."³⁰

Enumeration is an element of measurement. It refers to the arrangement of things, or aspects of one thing, into a sequential ordering. The most used example of enumeration is numerical arrangement. The process of numerical arrangement presupposes a collection of entities in a quantitatively fixed order. Upon this presupposition, numerical sequentials are arranged. The relation of enumeration to exactness is

²⁸Quoted in Cohen, p. 90.

²⁹Quoted in Cohen, p. 92.

³⁰Ibid., p. 89.

manifest in the fixed quantities assigned to the aspects of a given numerical arrangement. While this relation is abstractly valid, the actual relations of the components of a given quantity are not so fixed in the same manner. Numerical assignments are therefore hypothetical in nature (i.e., zero degree of temperature). Because of this nature, the enumeration process is closer to the notion of approximation rather than exactness. In this sense, it becomes primarily a matter of convenience and not of truth whether or not to employ enumeration.

Enumeration is perhaps the most primitive element of measurement since the theory of the latter involves other elements such as mapping, ordering, scaling, and many others that make it a complex logical enterprise. The heart of the theory of measurement is exactness, that is, the main goal behind the emphasis on this theory is physical sciences and its reintroduction in the study of society is the formation of rules, standards, and procedures that determine the quantitative ramifications of qualitative things so statements of the latter would be more precise and exact in meaning. In other words, it was argued by behavioral scientists that the essence of measurement is the representation of relatives in an exact sense; that is, sense experience can show us vague limits of

differences, such as between cold and hot. Measurement, however, will show the degree in difference which, in turn, argue behavioral scientists, would approximate exactness.

Measurement, says Kaplan, "in most general cases, can be regarded as the assignment of numbers to objects (or events or situations) in accord with some rule." He continues that there are two major aspects to it: "a magnitude, the measurable attribute, a measure, the amount or degree of [an object's] magnitude."³¹ Despite the fact that Kaplan accepts the possibility of conducting an inquiry in both a quantitative and qualitative style, he seems to put the theory of measurement at the disposal of the former. This is due to the fact that its introduction in the study of society is mainly to catch up with the natural scientists who handled the assumptions and the conduct of measurement in their fields of study better than social scientists. The procedures of measurement that will be briefly summarized in the following pages would disclose in the first place that the theory of measurement is of great significance where it is applied to the study of natural phenomena whose existence

³¹Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 177.

satisfies the presumptions of measurement, yet it is not the major premise in the understanding of human things, and might lead the social scientist to "violate his data."

(1) Ranking. This element of measurement refers to the arrangement of objects in "order of quantity." The type of measurement involved here has two different ramifications. Instances, cases, or individuals are to be ordered in accordance with the "trait" under measurement. The process can be conducted very easily when the values of the objects to be measured are expressed numerically since numerical values, when attributed to traits such as weight, for example, are already ranked by the nature of their numerical values. Yet, in traits not susceptible to quantitative valuation, the "paired comparisons" formula is employed to satisfy the ranking procedure. "Paired comparisons" allow the researcher to assign room for a given trait by comparing it to the one it is ascending to and the one it is descending from or vice versa depending on the nature of the desired ranking.³²

(2) Rating. This procedure is a version of ordinal scale with some vagueness of the degree of

³²Roy G. Francis and Thomas C. McCormick, Methods of Research in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), Chapter 5.

variation. This process, wrote McCormick, "consists in setting up certain descriptive classes which assume an increase in amount of a certain quality, such as intelligence, and then attempting to allocate each individual of a sample to his proper class."³³ The commonly used descriptive classes are those versions of an ordinal scale, i.e., high, average, low. Thus, the qualitative differences can be demonstrated in a qualitative "index" type of measurement in which the components of the high, average, and low rates are prevalued in accordance with another preceding type of measurement.³⁴

(3) Scoring. This process is an important step either for scaling or for an "index construction." It basically seeks the establishment of a "common denominator" which may be added to arrive at a total score or sum, which may then be assumed to represent the amount of the equality in question.³⁵ In this process the scored values are mainly based on the assumptions of the denominator to be used. The scoring of traits or properties is undertaken separately from other traits to be available in a given "scoring card." Their

³³Ibid., p. 79.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 79-80.

³⁵Ibid., p. 80.

accumulation into scoring points depends on the valuations of the assumption of the denominator. The result of this dependence is a weakening in the scores given as long as the assumptions are stated in roughness and not in exactness. But, "in spite of the roughness and crudity of most scoring devices in use in the social sciences, they are still quite common."³⁶

(4) Scaling. The process of scaling, as Kaplan points out, can be roughly defined as "a designation of the logical structure of the procedure of assignment"³⁷ of a measure to a certain magnitude. Thus, scaling is not the assignment of value but a "logical structure" that justifies the assignment of such a value. In its strict sense, scaling is regarded as "an instrument which is divided into a number of equal and equivalent units, with the zero point at that point where the amount of the quality under measurement may correctly be assumed to be zero."³⁸ The former account of scaling was conceived in a wider sense that allows room for qualitative interpretation since it takes into account the arbitrariness of the assumptions of any given scale. Meanwhile, the latter stipulates the satisfaction of

³⁶Ibid., p. 82.

³⁷Kaplan, p. 189.

³⁸Francis and McCormick, p. 82.

three basic requirements for construction of a precise scale. The first is related to the zero-point, the second to the reliability of the outcome, and the third to its validity. The zero-point assumption starts in a zero point that is hypothetically correct despite the fact that correctness is not tested at all either in the step of its assignment or in the correlations that follow. It is essential for any scale to start with this assumption for the sake of two ends: (1) "to add or find an arithmetic mean of the values read from it"; and (2) to make possible the comparison between the means of the two outcomes of the scale.³⁹ It should be pointed out that the impossibility of this assumption is manifest in the fact that neither in social nor in natural things is there an actual correct zero point that can be truly assumed and upon which scaling units are to be constructed to measure a given magnitude. When it comes to the study of social things, the impossibility becomes formidable. Even the most precise scale of attitude measurement cannot determine the zero point of a particular moral trait if such a point exists.

The second requirement has to do with reliability; that is, a scale's outcome cannot be tested

³⁹Ibid., p. 83.

on the basis of the scale as such but "by comparing repeated measurements of the same object, holding the experimenter constant." For the satisfaction of this requirement, there are two other assumptions implied: the "same object" and "experimenter constant." The reliability of a given scale is to be judged on the grounds of the constant sameness of the object under measurement as well as the constant sameness of the experimenter role. It seems that these assumptions are inconsistent with the idea of change either as it occurs in physical phenomena or in social things. However, experimentation in physical science can satisfy the requirement of the "object sameness," the poor instruments of quasi-social experimentation are unable to establish two similar situations that can be exactly measured and their outcomes be compared.

The third requirement relates to the validation of a given scale outcome. The problem of the quality of a scale is manifest in the fact that it cannot be attained in accordance with the given units and assumptions of a given scale measurement but in accordance with outcomes of other measures of the "same object"; that is, when a scale is applied to measure a certain attitude, the validity of the final result is not the premise of the scale but of another measuring instrument either instrumentalized in a given technique

or crystalized in "common sense." The point to be made here is that there is an inherent inconsistency in the requirement of the validity of a scale. Every scale of measurement determines the units it measures and their ordering of descending or ascending. This, however, necessitates that, when the assumption of a scale is molded, the supposed units of measurement have to be taken into account in order to set the principles upon which a given outcome is to be made. Since the outcome is determined within the scale, its validity therefore is required in order to establish the validity of the outcome of the other scale, and so forth.⁴⁰

It should be pointed out, however, that those precise instrumental conceptions of measurements turn out to be placed on inexact assumptions. The point of departure of the theory of measurement on which the mentioned processes were formulated is "to substitute operations in the abstract system for operations on the object system."⁴¹ That means if the assumptions of the abstract operations are molded in a vague or false maner, the entire validity of a measuring device is in question since the basic articulation between the two

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 82-92.

⁴¹Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: The Dryden Press, 1953), p. 485.

systems is the assumed premise.

Universality

"In all the repetition of an event or fact, certain features or abstract elements remain the same while others change."⁴²

These more primary laws may themselves be just general happenings and it may be to some extent arbitrary; but, in any case, the logical connection between these different laws shows elements of substantial identity between different facts and this element of identity makes the connection necessary and distinguishes the laws of science from empirical conformities of succession.⁴³

Most natural scientists undertake their investigation on the basis of this premise. The first implication here is the indication of a form of "uniformity" in nature. This premise, to some extent, holds a reasonable stand in natural sciences because of experimentation and especially laboratory experimentation and scientists involved in the repetition and replication of research and investigative procedures that secure the finding out of "certain features or abstract elements." It is commonly held among scientists that those elements are "laws" that stem from a universal proposition proved to be true

⁴²Cohen, p. 102.

⁴³Ibid.

through experimental procedures. These laws, therefore, depart from the general aspect of the thing to a specified aspect that relates to property specified in it that holds true in all cases. A law, thus, for them, is the constantly existing element with the specification of the required conditions for such an existence.

Yet, only in the "logical" connection can these laws be demonstrated and distinguished, in Cohen's words, from "empirical uniformities." The uniformity is therefore a reconstruction, or in Kaplan's words, a "reconstructed logic" that might not be the actual connection between any two natural aspects under examination. The uniformity is therefore a product of the method and tool employed for such an examination.

While the premises upon which the conception of laws hold, to a limited extent, a defensible position in natural science, it is advanced in social sciences in a poor, unsatisfactory manner.

Realizing the difficulty in studying natural phenomenon and social behavior under the same investigatory rules, behavioral scientists deployed their "scientific laws" in generalizations that radically violate the objective of "universality" of the "scientific" method in being deductively formulated, of spatio-temporal limitations and of a questionable

descriptive usage.

According to Kaplan, various types of laws can be found within three categories: form, content, and use.

Form

Simple generalization "moves from a set of statements of the form XRY to a generalization of the form $A(R)B$, where X and Y are members of A and B ."

Extensional generalization "moves from the statements of the form $A(R)B$ to a generalization of the form $U(R)V$, where A and B are classes included in U and V ."

Intermediate generalizations "move from a statement of the form $A(R)C$ to two statements, $A(R')B$ and $B(R)C$ " where C plays an intermediary role in correlating A to B .

Theoretical generalizations "move from a set of statements of the form $A(R)B$ to one of the form $a(R)b$, where A and B are members of a and b ."⁴⁴

A brief examination of those four laws would demonstrate their inconsistency with the conception of scientific laws of natural phenomena and would show that they are deductively formulated in addition to their inconsistency.

⁴⁴Kaplan, pp. 106, 107, and 108, respectively.

The first generalization, for example, presupposes that members of A and B are identical in terms of the property specified; that is, for example, a gram of pure iron bears the same properties of any gram of pure iron and the property will hold infinitely if the specified conditions are there. Therefore, the generalization on the basis of such "uniformity" can possibly be extended to other members of the same class. Yet, this can never be so in generalizations of human things since human behavior cannot be limited within one specified property as long as the clause "other factors remain the same" is a priori and an inductive examination of the members of the class might reveal the inconsistency of the simple generalization.

The second generalization might be sufficient to sustain the conclusion of a simple generalization by the use of cross induction through the various classes but not its own extensional conclusions which are to be drawn by analogy. By extending a generalization to another class of a thing, but of different kinds, the characteristics of the latter kinds have to maintain some degree of identity, especially in those embodied in the generalization. But while the extensional conclusion of various kinds of nature might be true in revealing some aspects of identity within classificatory kinds of natural things, they rarely have such

applicability to human kinds whose classification is to be made on a spatio-temporal, cultural basis.

In the third form, the correlation between them, however, is not an empirical one. It depends on the degree to which they both relate to the "intermediary" C. According to Kaplan, this kind of generalization is "explanatory in the weak sense" since it accounts for an empirically "missing linkage" between two parts of the relationship of A and B by deducing such a relationship from their correlation with the intermediary.

The fourth form of generalization which is considered by Kaplan "as explanatory in the strong sense" is derived from a deductive process that formulates theoretical statements in accordance with the properties that connect generalizations of lower levels in one coherent picture. The sophistication of such a generalization is not due to the empirical basis of its subgeneralizations, but to the intellectual process that discloses their connectedness and from which its explanatory power emanates.

Content

Interval laws "state a relation between events separated by a distinct time interval."

Genetic laws are stated in terms of the "age of the event--its distance in time from an appropriate zero-point."

Pattern laws "are genetic laws referred to some zero-point in time."⁴⁵

The basic characteristic of these three types of laws is the temporal limitation of their generality. It is always asserted among natural scientists and especially those who adhere to Cohen's assertions of universal laws, that the benefits of the universalization of a piece of knowledge is in itself a goal of science since it deductively demonstrates the aspects of the same type of a thing that is unexamined empirically. To accomplish this, however, spatio-temporal limitations have to be transcended by the discovery of the pattern of a relation that repeats itself whenever the event under examination recurs. While the properties of natural things transcend spatio-temporal limitations, depending on the nature of the specified property, it is inevitable that the understanding of human things can only be advanced through those limitations. The ideas of culture and history in human understanding are first to show that human behavior and understanding stem from the particular social setting from which our knowledge of it emanates and which determines the content and limitation of our generalizations. Having this in mind, the

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 109, 110, 111.

behavioral understanding of a "generalization" is always accompanied by the statement of conditions that make it true within its spatio-temporal limits. The behavioral assertions of universal laws are therefore inconsistent and irrelevant.

Use

Descriptive generalizations "stem from fairly direct observations, and so are on a comparatively low level of abstraction.⁴⁶

This kind of generalization, as far as Kaplan's treatment is concerned, is more or less a statement of empirical uniformities, since they differ significantly from theoretical laws by being purely descriptive and not engaging in explanation. The unanswered question here is how can the descriptions of either natural or social things become laws of certain relations. The description of either one relates directly to the method and the manner of observation that determine the characteristics of the thing under description.

It should be pointed out, however, that the basic factor contributing to the behavioral adaptation of the concept of laws in natural science to the explanation of social action is a misconception of the nature of

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 114.

"laws." Repetition in natural events, however manifested, does not reflect a pattern of regularity that might be described in a law. Rather, it discloses the recurrence of certain conditions or the reassembly of certain factors which cannot be specified in one statement. However, in the cases where they can be specified within a statement, the pattern of regularity is artificial since it is attached to the terms of the observation and since the event, when repeated, is not determined by these terms but by the inner structure of the things that constitute that event. If this is somehow true in nature, it is never in society where human things are "conventional" and the type of culture determines the range and scope of their recurrence.

System

When we prove or give evidence for a proposition we connect it with other propositions according to some logical or natural order so that the various propositions support each other; when we make a statement definite or accurate, we make it fit to enter a logical system as a premise from which precise deductions can be made.⁴⁷

Before examining the application of this scientific ideal to social sciences, it is necessary to explicate its nature and relation to metaphysical assertions and to constructions of empirical basis.

⁴⁷Cohen, p. 106.

This ideal bears a considerable relevance to Kuhn's account of of a "paradigm" where a set of premises is formulated a priori. According to Cohen, the ideals of science--certainty, exactness, universality--are not of nature in themselves if they are not connected in one "logical" order. This means that the relevance and meaning of a proved proposition depends in the first place on the position it takes in a presupposed setting of theoretical relations or, in other words, in the "paradigm" that assigns to each proposition its logical status and its relation to others. Accordingly, the nature that a given proposition takes does not differ from the nature of assertions introduced within a metaphysical framework.

The other aspect which relates to Cohen's formulation is the conflict that might occur between the context of the meaning of a proposition as related to its supporting evidence and between its meaning in the context assigned by putting it into a system. When a proposition is first proved, its significance comes from the meaning that the hypothesis and the evidence give to it. Therefore, a proposition's meaning is never separate from it. Yet, when the same proposition is introduced in a complex of propositions, it is supposed that its meaning is elaborated and, from this elaboration, new meaning must emanate to cover the

certain gaps that it is supposed to cover and the deductions to be made might not follow the context proved empirically in the original proposition but those elaborated.

"Abstract universality," says Cohen, "is necessary to give us a system which can attain a certain degree of coherent completeness." This means that the completeness of a system cannot be accomplished without further elevation of its propositional premises to the status of "abstract universality" where their relation to reality might be lost and their empirical support has no role to play since the whole process of knowledge construction in its highest sophistication is placed in the logic of the employed paradigm.

Although it is not original in social sciences, Easton's attempt to introduce the idea of system in the study of politics bears a great resemblance to Cohen's ideal. Easton cast his theory of systems analysis in three books: The Political System, A Framework for Political Analysis, and A Systems Analysis of Political Life. The first, according to him, "presents the case for general theory in political science"; the second "laid out the major categories in terms of which it has seemed to me [Easton] that such a theory might be developed"; and the third put that structure of concepts

to work.⁴⁸ This means that, while the first two books account for the philosophy of the concept of system, the third shows their applicability to the study of political life.

The doctrine of "system analysis," wrote Easton, has been applied to numerous modes of analysis such as game theory, functional research, or equilibrium theory. It is one of the thunderous concepts of the century, starting in the natural sciences and quickly reverberating not only through the social sciences, but on into such apparently remote fields as education, art, and aesthetics.⁴⁹

The most amazing feature of Easton's treatment of systems theory is the continuing reluctance to investigate the nature of the concept and its peculiarities when applied to the study of societal and political phenomena. Systems analysis, according to Easton, "takes its departure from the notion of political life as a boundary-maintaining set of interactions imbedded in and surrounded by other social systems to the influence of which it is constantly exposed."⁵⁰ That whatever boundaries the research imposes between the political and non-political systems in the society is an assumption the goal of which is its

⁴⁸David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. vii.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 24.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 25.

control and the specification of relations. It is, therefore, assumed and non-existent.

To the question of whether a "system" is a natural or human construction, Easton answers in two ways: (1) Whether or not a set of interactions constitutes a system will depend upon the extent to which they naturally cohere. From this point of view, systems are given in nature and their discovery depends on the investigator. (2) Any aggregate of interactions that we choose to identify may be said to form a system.

Easton's account of a "system" becomes vague and indefensible, especially when a criticism is directed to the wider theoretical grounds upon which the concept of a system is built. The notion of a system's boundary is an irrelevant specification of the political process since it stems from the recognition of the "political" as an epiphenomenon whose boundaries are specified by other social phenomena superior to it. This inferior status of the political is due to the fact that political behavioralists themselves are not interested in the political phenomena separately but in the manner in which it emanates from other kinds of social action. This interest, however, would tolerate the notion of "political life as a boundary-maintaining set of interactions." Moreover, it makes clear that the study of politics starts from the application of a more

comprehensive field, namely, sociology. This, however, justifies why behavioral scientists who examine political behavior may understand it on the basis of other forms of behavior and a theory of it is, thus, a general theory. But this premise, however, is inconsistent with the Eastonian thesis of a "boundary-maintaining set of interactions" since the thesis implies that those boundaries are not natural because the question of the formation of a kind of system is left to the investigator himself whereas interactions, as such, are always regarded as relations that either causally or non-causally relate to other interactions that might be embodied in different reconstructed systems. This interpretation might help in justifying why Easton's answer to the former question was so confused. He asserts that a system is natural when its constituents naturally cohere and, as he continues, those "systems are given in nature." But Easton sees the preconditions surrounding his premises and concedes that "it is the task of the social scientist to discover the ones that do exist if he wishes to observe systems in operation."⁵¹ The existence of non-natural systems, according to Easton, is a matter of conceptual or theoretical convenience

⁵¹Ibid., p. 27.

that is left to the investigator to treat "any aggregate of interactions" within a system even though they might not fit in it.

In order to have a good understanding of the ideals of the "scientific method," it is necessary to take into account the following observations. First, the idea of objectivity, as was seen, was not adequate to meet the aim of behavioral political scientists of obtaining objective knowledge in complete isolation from the existence of man--his values, opinions, and beliefs. Although this was obvious in our treatment of "objectivity," behavioralism still raises it as a slogan in an attempt to cover the social roots and goals of behavioral "science." In the writer's opinion, the goal of "objectivity" is an inhuman way to understand human knowledge. Moreover, it is a limitation on the various ways of reaching human knowledge. If the impossibility of establishing this doctrine in studying social phenomena can be comprehended easily, this is only because man and his perceptions are important parts of these phenomena in all the meanings of this partnership. Therefore, we can never find social knowledge that is not related in one way or another to the social composition of the society and man's perception of it. If this proves anything, it proves that it is not necessary to make the doctrine of "objectivity" a goal

of social knowledge since a theory of this form of knowledge must be connected to the characteristics of the phenomena it studies and not to those of a different nature.

Second, behavioral political theory regarded itself an extension of a broader movement, as the term "dual revolution" has indicated. Moreover, it regarded itself the technical, instrumental extension of the study of politics. This technicality manifests itself in the movement of behavioral political scientists toward the use of methods and techniques of data gathering and analysis from other social sciences and the making of political judgments and evaluations in accordance with their "canons." This technical, instrumental characteristic is reflected in the behavioral understanding of the "political" where this last concept was treated on the basis of its ability, as an instrument, to help accomplish control of society and its mobilizing processes. The concepts of "political" and "science" used in its understanding have the same instrumental, operational character that can be regarded an epistemological ground on which they can be related.

Third, the ideals of the so-called "scientific method" represent the modern direction of epistemology as seen necessary by behavioralism. Since behavioralism adopted those ideals within the framework of its

epistemology, it turned its direction from philosophy as a general, comprehensive understanding of human things to the goals of empiricism of the control of nature. This movement occurred, however, because the ideals of certainty, exactness and measurement, universality, and system are directed to the goals of prediction and control. And since we see no major defects in the application of these ideals to nature, one can assert that the use of these ideals and their goals is directed to formulating a political theory of an ideological goal.

The goal of political theory must be oriented toward the goal of understanding political things by the use of the necessary concepts applicable to it which show the manifestation of those things on their political terms.

The ideals of the scientific method can help in the accomplishment of the two above-mentioned goals either in predicting or in controlling events of nature. Yet, social phenomena and especially political phenomena do not have the mechanistic context which makes natural phenomena predictable and, hence, controllable. They refer directly to the peculiarities of the society from which they emerge. The disregard of this fact will first signify the ambition of those who believe in those ideals to predict the course of social change and

mobility and then establish control. This means that, through these ambitions, the "scientific" enterprise has been transformed into a mechanism of social control. From this point of departure, one can conclude that behavioral political theory, instead of being an understanding of political reality, was an element of control of such reality.

Fourth, the above-mentioned methodological issues of the "scientific" method as such, in addition to their being pillars of a philosophical outlook, have a pragmatic, practical use. This practical aspect is a sufficient reason for its applicability in the study of natural objects. This means that natural science adopted these issues for the attainment of practical goals that in the first place seek to bring some use and technological benefits. Therefore, those issues were connected to this tendency and were formulated within its range. And this pragmatic tendency does not seek knowledge and understanding but prediction and control. Measurement and exactness are helpful in predicting the direction of a certain event or phenomenon in nature but the understanding of social events can only be obtained in terms of the social concepts applicable to the nature of its object that can bring the epistemological aim of understanding and not the ideological aims of prediction and control.

Finally, it was seen that the statistical and mathematical languages in which the "scientific" method advocates displayed their ideals led to a significant portion of behavioral political theory being unrealistic since it flew in the abstraction of those languages. The grounds upon which those languages are formulated are formal, logical grounds, depending primarily on the logical connectedness of their assumptions. Hence, the formal logical relations inferred on such premises are not necessarily the same actual relations. Since the knowledge of the logical relation is different from the non-logical actual relations, quantitative methodology can hardly touch the inner dynamics of human knowledge.

The next chapter will try to show the inapplicability of the ideals of the "scientific" method to the study of political phenomena and show that the alteration of epistemological goals has been accompanied by an attempt to emphasize, to some degree, alteration or change in the foundation of the traditional political outlook and replacement by a new political outlook.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

The Parallel Directions of "Science" and "Politics"

It is the aim of this chapter to suggest an account of the relation between the behavioralists' advocacy of "science" and their conception of the "political" by showing the points in which the conception of "scientific method" are inapplicable to the understanding of human things and the way they relate to the political. It, however, suggests a strong relation between the ideological position of the behavioral movement, as manifest in their conception of the "political" and the advocacy of the premises of the "scientific method."

One of the most significant critical responses to the application of the scientific method's ideals to the study of human affairs is Henry Margenau's Ethics and Science. In this book he outlines five issue areas in which the applicability of any ideal of the scientific method becomes either fruitless or meaningless. The five areas he outlines can be considered interesting grounds upon which the shortcomings of the scientific method can be discussed. His counter-arguments are (1) "the inherently destructive effect of scientific

analysis," (2) "science deals only with the quantitative aspects" of experience and leaves out qualities and values," (3) "the complexity of the living world," (4) "the difficulty of control," and (5) "sentient beings can make decisions, scientific objects cannot."¹

In relation to the first and second, wrote Margenau,

the first argument holds this conversion to be destructive, degrading, repulsive and therefore objectionable; the present one [the second] declares it insufficient as a description of reality, maintains that it leaves certain important matters out of account and thus results in a record that is incomplete.²

The meaning of this argument is that a premise of the scientific method is the rejection of prescientific knowledge and the urge to base the new modern knowledge on its ground. The destructiveness, here, directly relates to the system of values that protects that knowledge. This means a change in our epistemology requires the destruction of or at least the neutrality of the value system in intervening in the battle between the new aspects of epistemology and its classical or traditional ones, so to speak. This goal is among the major ideological doctrines for which the scientific

¹Henry Margenau, Ethics and Science (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, n.d.), pp. 62-69.

²Ibid., p. 65.

methodologists have been developing theories of values. Embodied in this doctrine is the thesis that social epistemology is only concerned with the individual man who can be studied in "large numbers," an individual that hypothetically can be given a similar role and then becomes a relevant unit for statistical analysis. This conception is what Margenau might call the destruction of man.

The argument of complexity of the living world is directed against the systematic outlook of nature and of society. The manifold, multidimensional nature of physical phenomena has never been dealt with adequately in one coherent theory through the history of man because of, as most natural scientists assert, the far-reaching ramifications of physical reality. And if this is in the world of matter, the problem of complexity becomes an obstacle in the study of society. Human behavior is an outcome of manifold events and factors and, even if the priority of their effects on the behavior is known, so-called "trigger" factors may lead to a change in the course of a predicted behavior. Consequently, the nature of the kind of human behavior can never be deterministic since decisions are usually made in a mental rational situation that may contribute to change in the situations in which they participate. At this level comes the question of difficulty of

control, where it is not only difficult but sometimes impossible, especially in terms of the infinite number of the variables that affect human behavior.

All the mentioned argumentation is based on the following important argument, according to Margenau: "Sentient beings can make decisions, scientific objects cannot," so that men by reason are always different from the subject matter of physics in their being an extension of history, of society, and of knowledge where they always interfere in their theory of epistemology.

Among the basic things that the previous chapter showed was the big gap between what has been accomplished under the name of "science" in the natural sciences and the social sciences. While the ideals sought were almost the same and resembled the same epistemological orientation, the outcome in terms of what was necessary for the understanding of social phenomenon was far away from what has been accomplished in the natural sciences. The unanswered question, however, is why did the behaviorists put all their "eggs in the same basket?" Why did they resort to the elements and assumptions of the philosophy of science to defend their political style and their social understanding?

Answers to this question varied in accordance with the "paradigm" by which the behavioral political

theory was viewed. From a conservative standpoint, the behavioral conception of politics is so radical to the limits that it motivated a change in the value system by substituting secular, "scientific" ideals for the moral collective value system, leaving the individual in a state of nihilism. A good example of this standpoint is the objections of Straussian philosophy to the radical behavioral suggestions for a change in the style of studying politics. However, from a post-behavioral point of view, behavioral political theory is an emanation of academic ideas from a liberal ideology. George Carey's essay "Beyond Parochialism in Political Science" is a good example that discloses the "receptivity" of behavioral political teachings by liberal economic and cultural institutions who didn't hesitate to pave the way for the spread of their theoretical beliefs. Yet, from the standpoint of radical political reformers such as James Petras, Shin Ya Ono, Todd Gitlin, and others, political behavioral theory resides within a conservative framework that

"fears democracy" and "avoids vital political issues."³

From the point of view of classical democratic theory, behavioral democratic theory challenges the very basis on which the individual preserves his dignity in society. The classical American democratic system, according to classical theory, receives its legitimacy from its being an ethical setting that provides the individual with the moral right to distinguish it from other beings and legitimizes its existence. To this goal, classical theory sees behavioral democratic theory as irrelevant to the contemporary system of value.

Another irrelevance manifest in the thrust is "individualism." The position of the individual in classical theory is restricted within the limits imposed by the interpretation and meaning of the "common good"; that is, the rights of the individual do not transcend the prevailing conception of the good of the society as a whole. The "society" is first, and then the individual. Behavioral theory, however, challenged this conception of the relation of the community and the

³For the first standpoint see Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy (Connecticut: Greenwood, n.d.), mainly the first chapter. For the second see, George J. Graham, Jr. and George W. Carey, The Post Behavioral Era: Perspectives on Political Science (New York: David McKay Co., 1972). For the third point of view, see Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1967).

individual. In this philosophy, society is only the composition of its individuals and, therefore, the goal of the human community is to facilitate the resources of pleasure for the individual and must not impose on him ethical restrictions, such as that of the "common good," that reduce the enjoyment of such a pleasure. In this sense, and in contrast to classical democratic theory, the behavioral view radically urges the individual to liberate himself from whatever moral restrictions are imposed on him by the society. Leo Strauss describes the behavioral political tradition as follows:

Positivistic social science is "value-free" or "ethically neutral": it is neutral in the conflict between good and evil, however good and evil may be understood. This means that the ground which is common to all social scientists, the ground on which they carry on their investigations and discussions can only be reached through a process of emancipation from moral judgements, or of abstracting from moral judgements: moral obtuseness is the necessary condition for scientific analysis, for to the extent to which we are not yet completely insensitive to moral distinctions, we are forced to make value judgements. The habit of looking at social or human phenomena without making value judgements has a corroding influence on any preferences. The more serious we are as social scientists, the more completely we develop within ourselves a state of indifference to any goal, or of aimlessness and drifting--a state which may be called nihilism.⁴

But to the extent that this description reveals the behavioral resentment of traditional values, it

⁴Strauss, p. 18.

mistakenly revolves around the conception of political behavioralism as a philosophy of nihilism, a philosophy that the writer of this research believes differs significantly from the liberal behavioral tradition despite the fact that it is heading in its direction. Although the value-fact dichotomy leads to a state of affairs in which "all opinions are equal" since they are not subjects of science, it first asserts the existence of "ultimate facts" of reality, a type of facts that can be reached and known by the procedures of the so-called "scientific method." Accordingly the commitment to "facts," although orthodoxly asserted, would show a pattern of divergence from the "state of nihilism" in which both components of the dichotomy were meaningless and non-existent. To further understand this point, it will be helpful to examine another critique of behavioralism. Close to the mentioned conservative critique is the post-behavioral view of behavioral political theory. But while the criticism is close in content, it is very different in direction.

The emergence of the political behavior movement in American political and academic scenes was part of a liberal social force whose interests and economic stability were shaken by the Great Depression to the limit that a revision of the role of government in society was necessary to justify the urges for reform in

government and society. Carey sees a significant articulation between the ideas, doctrines, and symbols of liberalism and those supported and directed by behavioral scientists. In Carey's words:

We refer here to the increasing acceptance within the profession of the doctrines, principles, and tenets of political liberalism. We can say with certainty that by 1940 a very large majority of political scientists embraced most of the tenets of the liberal ethic both in terms of specific policies and general theory. This distinct movement to the left probably was the outgrowth of the 1929 depression, though it can be argued that the depression just accelerated a movement already begun.⁵

The political and economic forces that have been affected by the Depression sought to get benefits in its aftermath. This occurred at various levels but the most significant was the attempt to inject the whole body of American politics with solutions that alter the conception of a limited government and the free market system to the extent to which the former equilibrium, economic and political, restores its framework of value distribution before the interruption of the Depression.

The big question of relating such changes to the theoretical changes in the profession of political science is a very difficult task and the accomplishment of which necessitates an overall examination of points of contact between political behavioralism and political

⁵Graham and Carey, p. 45.

liberalism. Carey, however, summarizes the point in the three following statements:

The acceptance of a doctrine as broad as liberalism manifests the extent of common belief and shared value that must have existed among political scientists concerning what has been done and what ought not be done in the realm of politics.

Hence a tendency to look beyond formal governmental pronouncements and processes for an understanding of both the failures and relative successes of announced policy goals.

The transcendent concerns of liberalism such as freedom, equality, and the dignity of man, touching as they do almost every aspect of human relationships within society, compelled political scientists of this [behavioral] persuasion to widen their concern.⁶

The first statement refers to the thrust of those affected by the interrupted equilibrium toward the formation of a state of consent among political scientists on the necessity for change in the economic, cultural, and political formula which resulted after the interruption of the Depression. That was partly undertaken by the variety of support of research in the political field to direct it to the goals of change. Liberal industrial institutions, cultural institutions, small businessmen, and farmers were among those who believed that support of "innovative," "scientific," and progressive research in the field of politics would alter the principle of a limited government to a new

⁶Ibid., p. 46.

modern conception of governmental goals that should secure the state of welfare in society. And, therefore, the government was urged to interfere to adjust the value maldistribution on the basis of equality. Closely related to this point is the behavioral insistence on looking for political facts other than the attributes of government and its processes.

Having the results of the Depression in mind, behavioralism asserted that the existing governmental and economic institutions suffered points of weakness through the 1930s. And, therefore, behavioralists believed the concept of "government" must be substituted by "system" which embraces all forces in the society and deals with them as political. What this means is a widening of the conservative "government" to be able to deal with those affected by the Depression in order to maintain and preserve the stability of the system and "allocate values" on an equal basis. Heading in this direction, liberal circles in the society, as the third statement shows, opened "doors and windows" for the behavioral current to flow into. As will be seen in the next part of the treatment of behavioral political theory, the doctrines of freedom, equality, and dignity of man become established value goals through the academic behavioral tradition which provided them "legitimate scientific status."

From the third point of view, behavioral political theory is imprisoned within the value system and was unable to transcend its limits of the pattern of conservatism that was absorbed within it by the pressures of the classical traditional value system. Petras classifies behavioral political literature into four major views:

(1) The Equiliberal: The equiliberal view of society and its functioning "balance" is underwritten by "a strong undercurrent of Burkean and conservative values. The irrational, the traditional and custom, as the bases of individual decision-making, are seen as virtues and very gradual change through established institutions and practices approved by the political elite are cited as functional to the policy."⁷

(2) Group Theorists: The major concepts of the group theorists are those of "interest" and "group conflict." "The major insight of the group theorists lies in their recognition of conflict as a legitimate and major area of political life and their stress on the role played by society's economic forces in determining the content of 'political' decision-making."⁸

⁷James Petras, "Ideology and United States Political Scientists," in McCoy and Playford.

⁸Ibid.

(3) Political Autonomist: The political autonomist is concerned with "the importance of traditional political institutions and with the role of the politician as the central figure in the political system."⁹

(4) Infrastructuralism: Infrastructuralism "focuses on parties and on their roles as directors, organizers, and decision leaders as being the crucial area for political concern."¹⁰

What Petras sees in these four major categories of behavioral literature is a conservative pattern that manifests itself in a certain way in every category relating to the same general assumptions. The first major category, according to him, views the political system as a conflict between the various elites in the distribution of values, i.e., "deference, income, and security." The conservative pattern, according to Petras, is the consent of the elite that whatever degree the conflict reaches in the mentioned distribution, its outcome must be legitimized from within the existing legal, constitutional settings and commonly shared part of the system of ethics--in other words, to "persist system through change." Thus, the three major concerns

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

for equiliberals are the stability of the system, the ability of the elites to act for that system, and widespread but low-level citizenship involvement.¹¹

The "group theorists'" conservatism manifests itself in the conception of the political process as interactions among groups in an attempt to affect the outcomes of public policy. In this conception, as explained by Petras, the government is regarded as an arbiter whose major function is to stabilize the equilibrium among groups after the enforcement of every policy outcome. The conservative tendency manifest in the desire to keep the solution of conflict among groups out of the reach of elitist politics and then look at government as an arbiter for the unsolved questions resulting from group conflict. The conservatism of the third group is evident in the attempt to reform the existing political institutions in a manner that increases their activity and influence in the system. The institutions of the presidency, Congress, and judicial system are to be reformed in a manner that increases their influence in society and reduces the chances of other alternatives. The fourth category starts from the assumption that only the existing party system is able to maintain the stability of the system.

¹¹Ibid., p. 77.

Therefore, the two-party system is necessary in order to secure the electorate from "the organized irresponsibility which is generated by diffuse organization, useless politics, and low interest."¹²

The four mentioned groups, in their direction toward conservatism, start from the same point of departure. Their conception of politics and, accordingly, their writings could not transcend the limits set by the assumptions of the "paradigm" theory which presented their critique. As Petras describes, the assumptions are

(1) all accept the social economic institutional structure and theorize on the basis of it; (2) all concern the equilibrium and preservation of the dominant institutions, elites, and interests of society; (3) there is an absence of discussion of socio-economic issues in politics; and (4) there is a fear of mass movement, large-scale change and conflict.¹³

Despite the differences among the three critiques of political behavioral theory (Straussianism, post-Behavioralism, Radicalism), and despite the variety of approaches embodied in this theory, all three agree that behavioral political theory, in spite of its continuing claim of scienticism as its academic extension, represents a school of thought or an ideology

¹²Ibid., p. 82.

¹³Ibid., pp. 90-91.

either in the form of its assumptions, the nature of its analysis, or the type of theoretical outcomes. The difference, however, in assigning different labels to the same movement is due to the difference of the "paradigm" through which the critics view the behavioral theoretical premises.

The understanding of behavioral theory and its relation to the "scientific method" theses will be shown by the concept of the "molecular man" which shows that the behavioral theory conceived man in a certain way and nature in order to make him fit within their theoretical formulations either in Merriam's conception of government, Lasswell's conception of political personality, Eulau's of roles, Truman's of groups, or Easton's of the political system.

The concept of the "molecular" man rests on the "belief in the essential unity of the universe and of the science which is gradually exhibiting it to human view."¹⁴ For the convenience of studying human behavior by the available quantitative techniques, man was assigned a statistical conception that fits any quantitative formulation. Stuart Rice summarizes the theory of the "molecular man" as follows:

¹⁴Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 21.

Individual differences are customarily disregarded even in human affairs when we deal with a large number of individuals. No two persons are alike, yet we compare Pittsburgh and St. Louis by saying that there is a certain number of people in each. On the average these people will be about the same in both cities. Similarly we give to every person having certain minimum qualifications a vote. It is evident that some citizens are more competent to exercise this privilege than others but we proceed upon the assumption that in an election one man's opinion is on the average as good as another's. This, it can be seen, is very similar to our assumption in a chemical experiment that all molecules of a certain substance may be regarded as alike. In both cases we obtain a statistical statement of a certain situation.¹⁵

Before relating this concept to the "scientific" behavioral conception of the political, let us examine the major defect from which Rice's account suffers. He asserts that in "large numbers" the differences are reduced. But, while this is partly true, the reduction does not mean a low level of diversity since, in large numbers, we tend to generalize and use suitable, available terms to express similarity and difference on a more general basis. Thus, the diversity and uniqueness of individuals in "large numbers" are not demonstrated but rather skipped on a higher level of description. The movement and direction of mass in gas theory, as Rice understands it, is an analogy of the study of the individual within the "molecular" framework. The molecules, according to him, behave in

¹⁵Ibid., p. 2.

uncontrollable movement, direction, and power; but when viewed under the classification of laws of gasses, their behavior can be understood.

In this view Rice views the political process in a very strange analogy--one that mistrues the dynamics inherent in nature and the rationale behind the political process. The molecular conception of man is thus a kind of reductionism that regards man as merely an outcome of a bigger entity, society, and his behavior is enslaved within the limits of the process of socialization in the society. Man, therefore, is a molecule in a large society and statistical laws regarding his behavior can be obtained in accordance with Rice's analogy. The point that should be noted is that this conception of man within the framework of a "large number" has paved the way for the statistical science to reside in every department of the social sciences.

Government

If Merriam's work New Aspects of Politics demonstrates his desire to attach the study of politics to the movement of social sciences by putting emphasis on the unity of social sciences, and the significant position of "numbers" (the use of numerical formulations either mathematical or statistical), his Systematic Politics is almost a comprehensive ideological

prescriptive and analysis of what government is--its nature, ends, and functions. In the former he sees a new science of politics emerging from the changes that he recognized in his time. This new science would lead to a new conception of society and a new role of government. Among the factors contributing to his so-called new world was the increase in "leisure, education, and political participation" on the part of a larger proportion of the people than formerly. This increase means that the political system is shaped by more popular controls which leads to an emphasis on democratic theory and democratic values. As a result, the conception of a science of politics is to be essentially related to those factors, the changes they make, and the effect on the theory of government and political authority. But more significant than this result is the change which Merriam predicted in the social structure in the system through that period. The change, according to him, will not only touch the superstructure but also the infrastructure and the total process of power distribution in the society. For him, "the democratic movement, the larger leisure of mankind, the broader education of humanity, the new forms of intercommunications, the larger resources available for

scientific inquiry"¹⁶ are the progressive factors and the characteristics of the "new world" that

indicate that the earlier prevalence of unreasoning habit, of brute force, of transparent rationalization of those who have or seek power, are on the decline and are likely to be supplanted by widely different kinds of knowledge of the science of government.¹⁷

The term "government" is rarely used in the literature of those writers of the "behavioral persuasion" since it always implies the traditional concept of the center of political authority. Yet, the modification that was needed in the concept of government was supplied by Merriam and entitled him to be the "godfather" of the movement. The modification, however, was made in accordance with the new changes he perceived in order to make the following additions to democratic theory fit within its framework.

The following two theses can be viewed as a prelude to understanding Merriam's conception of government: (a) "Our problem is to find the best equilibrium among swiftly moving forces which otherwise may find solutions and balances by violence and

¹⁶Charles E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

¹⁷Ibid., p. 17.

destruction."¹⁸ (b) "Observation and reflection teach us that order, justice and freedom are for all men and not for the few alone, that all men are equal in their human dignity."¹⁹ The first thesis reflects a deep concern with drastic social change that might occur through violence. This concern is an essential result of Merriam's view of the nature of the factors that will bring change. Those factors, according to his theory, will shake the interests of the two extremes in the society--radicalism and conservatism--and cause them to resort to violence in order to defend the ceaseless interests that have been shaken. Therefore, despite his manifest advocacy of change, Merriam sees dangers in the social changes that might be undertaken on either a radical or a conservative basis. Both bases are inconsistent with the factors mentioned above since both represent an extreme "few" of left and right lines of American political thought. The only basis, however, relevant to elevate the society and preserve it is, according to him, the wider popular emerging force--the middle class--that has been most exposed to the factors of leisure, education, and political participation.

¹⁸Charles E. Merriam, Systematic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. 256.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 257.

Related to this position is the conviction that "all men are equal" which leads to the emphasis on the liberal middle class value, "all opinions are equal," and the extension of its impact on the formation of the value system in the period after the Depression. This conviction suggests a tolerance of all existing values in a form of "equilibrium" that first prevents the two mentioned extremes from being the "vehicle" of the expected social changes and facilitates their co-existence by the mediation of a broad concept that converts all ideas and propositions of change into a balanced "equiliberalized" stage of social and political development.

Out of these concerns with change and its impact on the social structure, Merriam introduces a middle class, nihilistic conception of government that heavily depends on the doctrines embodied in the view of this change. Government turned out to be a "phenomenon of group cohesion and aggregation, a child of group necessity, a function of the social relations of men."²⁰ This view of government paved the way for the elitist conception of political life in which politics is "who gets what, when, how" in a society of political groupings competing for the attainment of the resource

²⁰Ibid., p. 6.

of "influence." What Merriam regarded as the basic function of government was the heart of the elitist conception of politics; that is,

government arises from the necessity of adjusting the needs and desires of human beings struggling for forms of association through which human personalities may be adjusted, aided, or advanced toward higher levels of attainment.²¹

In this view, the government is regarded as an institution that controls social change by controlling the political personality of the members of society. It accomplishes this by the continuous "reallocating of value" in the society and keeping its distribution in a state of equilibrium that allows the political system to "persist itself through change"; that is, to accept change on neither a conservative nor a radical basis but somewhere between. It will be seen, however, that this conception of the function of government will be regarded as an ideological trend by almost all the eminent members of the behavioral movement.

Personality and Role Theory

The study of political personality is among the subjects to which the political behavior movement has made significant contributions. The subject of personality and its place within the study of politics

²¹Ibid., p. 1.

reveal one of the major philosophical points in behavioral political theory that significantly imprinted the contemporary relation between man and his culture. In addition to the ideological connection to the issue of personality, there were two major factors which led to the adoption of the personality framework. The first, according to Harold Lasswell, is related to a basic doctrine of what he calls a "science of democracy"--the doctrine that "the turning to the specific is more properly understood as a stampede to complete philosophy, to reconsider every generality for the purpose of relating it to observable reality."²² This means that the concern for the problem of personality is consistent with the emphasis on the devaluation of classical generalizations that deal with value-latent principles such as the "common good." The turn to the study of personality is a concern for the "specific," that is, the individual in society who is to be given priority before such classical concepts. The individual's personality, from the specific knowledge of which emanates generality, paves the way to the before-mentioned "molecular" conception of man where the individual becomes similar to the position of particles

²²Harold D. Lasswell, Analysis of Political Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 2.

in the study of physics in the context of a "large population."

The other factor, however, deals with the tendency in social sciences in the 1930s and 1940s that emphasized the psycho-analytical approach to the study of the personal psychological phenomenon. Highly affected by Freudian psychological analysis, Lasswell attempted to introduce a theory of personality that fit within both the framework of the scientific method (measurement, interview, quantification, etc.) and the framework of the "science of democracy," i.e., behavioralism.

Lasswell saw the broad impact of psychiatry and psychopathology on the sphere of politics as supplying political scientists with new analytical tools. These tools are necessary, according to Lasswell, for understanding the types of human personalities in society in order to establish other necessary tools for social control.

In his Psychopathology and Politics, Lasswell attempted to introduce a new mode of political thinking associated with a given psychological level of analysis. In this book he draws the attention of political researchers to the importance of understanding the psychological manifestations of the political personality in understanding political behavior and

attitude. Drawing on Freud's psychological assumptions and analysis, Lasswell considers parental conflict relations in childhood as the most important factor that should be dealt with in a comprehensive account if modern political researchers seek to obtain a clear vision of the individual's personality in the adult epoch.

But the individual personality as such is not the only aspect of Lasswell's theory of personality; another is its relation to culture and society that plays a significant role in shaping the values and ideological systems of the personality. Understanding this, according to Lasswell, will help clarify certain modes of behavior within the context of personality development. The formula is " $P\}d\}r=p$, where P equals private motives; d equals displacement onto a public object; r equals rationalization in terms of public interests; p equals the political man."²³

For him, thus, political personality is the outcome of three types of factors. The private type refers to instinctive demands that the individual places on the family in the childhood period. The "displacement onto a public object" of the private

²³Harold D. Lasswell, Psycho-pathology and Politics (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1951), p. 58.

motives is a process carried out by the family which elaborates the private motives through an emotional process. To this point, the process is still not political. The "rationalization in terms of public interest" is a complex process in which all factors are in operation in the social environment that have access to the individual's personality. At this level, when the individual deals with the generality of society or its relation, so to speak, his personality exposes its political aspect.

Role theory can be, to a considerable extent, regarded as an extension of Lasswell's political personality analysis and a departure from the same theoretical assumptions. "The role of an individual," according to role theory, "is defined not only by the system of which he is a part, but also by the status which he occupies in the system structure." Thus, "a social system or subsystem is merely a network of interacting roles."²⁴ According to Eulau, an eminent role theorist, the view of social relations within the framework of "role relations" is the most fruitful in understanding why people behave as they do. Role theory, in Eulau's vision, is an elaboration of the

²⁴S. Sidney Ulmer, Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 387.

basic themes embodied in Lasswell's understanding of the relationship between society and the individual's personality. For Eulau, "a role can be used as a conceptual tool on all three levels of behavioral analysis: the social, the cultural, and the personal."²⁵ Yet, for him, the path of personality is the basic element of the conception of roles and the implication of identity of "large numbers of people" that demonstrate a certain type of consensus on the overall nature of the political system is also embodied. Yet Eulau is concerned more with the individual's personality in trying to understand the political process. Therefore, for him the individual's role includes two other levels:

on the social level it invites inquiry into the structure of the interaction, connection or bond that constitutes a relationship [while] on the cultural level, it calls attention to the norms, expectations, rights and duties that sanction the maintenance of the relationship and attendant behavioral patterns.²⁶

This means that the basis of political behavior is no longer the personality as such but also the social and cultural frames in which they occur. From this comes Eulau's contribution to behavioral political theory since "role is clearly a concept consistent with

²⁵Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (Toronto: Random House, 1963), p. 40.

²⁶Ibid.

analytic objectives of the behavioral sciences."²⁷ By this declaration, Eulau sought to elaborate the narrow personal basis of political behavior where role is thought of as "that aspect of personality that refers to an individual's social identity."²⁸

But despite the seemingly non-exclusive relation between role's theory and the analysis of political personality, Eulau describes five areas in which the "congruence" of role and individual personality seem to be the most fruitful for the study of aspects of personality within the role framework. These areas or situations include: institutionalization, deviant conduct, voluntaristic roles, conflicting situations, and ambiguous situations. The first area refers to the small segment by which the personality traits manifest themselves in an institutionalized behavior. This means that institutionalized, codified, and standardized levels of personality conduct are less likely to let the personal motivations on personal impulses flow on the surface. Here, the organizational framework has been given priority in disclosing what aspects of the personality are relevant to political or administrative processes. Second, the congruence of role and

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 100.

individual personality is likely to be of a high level, especially in "deviant conduct" whose origin is psychologically oriented in the personality. But even in this case, social and political factors have to be dealt with in order to clarify the limit to which a personality trait refers to deviant behavior. Third, the most fruitful understanding of the personality basis of political behavior is in what Eulau calls the "voluntary roles" where there are no motivations involved other than those aspects of personality that are in need of expression. Fourth, the exposition of "conflicting expectations" of personal traits may appear clearly or play (in Eulau's words) "the decisive factor in role taking and performance." Fifth, in situations where the actor confronts ambiguous roles of others, he turns to the personal value system to account for such an ambiguity since "no stable points of behavioral references are available and no directional cues are forthcoming."²⁹

Political Grouping

In the elevation of the behavioral political theory from the individual as the empirical unit of analysis and personality as the basis for his political

²⁹Ibid., p. 104.

behavior, it seemed essential to behavioral political scientists to formulate "medium range" concepts that relate certain aspects of the individual's behavior to overall general behavioral theory. David Truman's writings suggest the necessity for such a "medium range" framework. And since Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government is within the scope of this goal, Truman turns to his group framework in order to accomplish it. Drawing on Bentley, Truman defines the group as "any collection of individuals who have some characteristic in common."³⁰ Why does the group occupy such a significant position in general behavioral theory? The answer is that the group is regarded as a mold of its members whose entity is derived from the characteristic of the group. What is important for the conception of the group is not the characteristics, as such, but the manifestations of relations and interactions from which the meaning and value of that characteristic emanate. In this conception, Truman places more emphasis on the informal structure of groups as manifest in their relations or interactions. By doing this and by adherence to Bentley's "interest group," Truman presents a conception of political process depending on the equilibrium to be maintained in the system through the

³⁰Ulmer, p. 191.

diverse influence of the groups struggling to modify policy outcomes. Therefore, another form of equilibrium is required, but of a lower level--at the level of the group. "The equilibrium of the internal environment [the organism], the equilibrium of the individual in relation to others, and the equilibrium of the group are similar and related phenomena."³¹

As a result of the significant place of the thesis of equilibrium in Truman's political theory, the process of "persisting the system through change" depends on the degree to which the sub-equilibrium or each equilibrium within a group is able to cope with problems resulting from internal or external disturbances. He describes two levels at which disequilibrium occurs. When a disequilibrium emerges at the group level, a political action is an essential consequence to settle the disturbance which caused it. But if the action did not satisfy its motivation, another disequilibrium will occur on another level of the group. "The disturbed individuals," writes Truman, "may increase their activities in other groups in order to restore some sort of person."³² But this kind of disequilibrium does not disintegrate the system but,

³¹Ibid., p. 196.

³²Ibid., p. 197.

rather, contributes to a stable social mobility that does not sharply bring disunity to the political system.

Alfred De Grazia conceives "groups" as having a more vital "equilibrating" role. The participation of the group in the formation of certain public policy inevitably, for De Grazia, leads to the conception of political "grouping" as "an interested, privately organized aggregation which attempts to influence public policy."³³ The emphasis on interest, although not new, adds some meaning to the conception of a group equilibrium. This occurred on two levels. The first is by providing a reference for the occurrence of the disequilibrium. The reference is "interest" which is demonstrated through ideological beliefs of a particular group. The second is by showing, in contrast to what has been implied in Truman's theory, that "perception precedes interest." For De Grazia, the formula is the reverse since, for him, "interest precedes perception," drawing on the theme of An Economic Interpretation of the American Constitution by Charles Beard.

What constitutes a perception of an interest for Truman is the process of socialization that internalizes for the individual certain values of his culture. This means that values, norms, and beliefs which were shaped

³³Ibid., p. 199.

and considerably regarded part of the social value system constitute the element that shows the interest sought and the instrument of satisfaction. For De Grazia, however, the interest of the group determines which ideological symbols, beliefs, and values are relevant to its interest in the society.

The important aspect of Truman's theory of groups and De Grazia's additions to it is that it adds to the literature on political personality ready materials for understanding the function and role of a given group within a type of political system that will be proposed in the following pages.

Political System

The idea of studying the political process through a systematic framework was not a new idea. Usually, "it is used to organize the confusing data of everyday political life and has been thought out in response to a set of guiding questions that have interested American political theorists since the end of World War II."³⁴ Systems theorists sought to introduce a general frame that encompasses all activities of its type. This frame does not include action that is not political and deals with the socio-economic factors only

³⁴Michael A. Weinstein, Systematic Political Theory (Columbus: Abeel and Howell Co., n.d.), p. 2.


in relation to the theoretically formulated system. It can be said that systems theory is the peak of behavioral political theory since it fits the mentioned conception of government, personality, role, and group in its theme of analysis leading to liberal collective understanding of political life that presents itself as an alternative conception of political life as "regime."

Among those eminent behavioral scientists who addressed political life as a system are Talcott Parsons and David Easton. But while the former "suggests the possible uses of an economic model for political analysis," the latter adapts the social model to the political system."³⁵ For Parsons, the distribution of values within a system is conducted within the line of power distribution. Therefore, in any attempt to construct a system for the study of the political process, it is necessary to view such a distribution of values in accordance with the political system whose basis is the distribution of power. He separates the goal of the social system from the goals of the polity, where the goal of the former is "the facilitation of effective adaptive development of the society and of the societal conditions associated with it."³⁶

³⁵Ulmer, p. 126.

³⁶Ibid., p. 178.


The polity as a system has the goal of generating "power in the political sense." The separation of the goals of the two refers to Parsons' desire to keep the conception of the social process and includes the political within its framework. Therefore, the emphasis was put on the distinction between goals and not between the structure that each one takes in the society. What Parsons was trying to avoid was the simple separation of the political from the non-political in contrast to Easton who abstracted a mode of organization of the political process that excludes socio-economic institutions, yet not their effects. Parsons sought to present the political process within a system that stems from another, wider system, that is, the social system where the correlation to the economic system is clear.



The idea behind studying the American political

process, in Parsons' view, is that socio-economic factors cannot be ignored, in Parsons' formulation; his "political system" is more or less the direction in which those socio-economic factors deploy power and, on the basis of it, distribute its power. The first implication of Parsons' systematic formulation is that the economic system and the political system have the same flow aggregations; therefore, the basis of the upper diagram goes hand-in-hand with the flow of support and demand in the political system. In addition, Parsons' diagram is similar to Easton's diagram of the political process within a system in almost all stages of policy formation. But while the former follows an economic interpretation for the flow of support and demand, the latter insists on the abstraction of the political system from other existing systems in the society.

David Easton adapts the "primitive system of social life" to a model that sets boundaries for political interaction and helps in distinguishing them from other types of social action.



The units of this primitive model, as Easton himself refers to it, are political actions which, in themselves, determine the boundaries of the system by attempting to affect decisions or policy outcomes. Those actions enter the system in the forms of demands or supports and, through the process of conversion of those demands and supports, policies are formulated and decisions are made.

The difference that Easton sees in politics appears between the choice "between inarticulated sets of assumptions, unrelated concepts and poorly integrated generalizations as against explicit efforts to obtain greater theoretical self-awareness and tighter logical coherence."³⁷ This choice, for him, is necessary because either political scientists operate in freedom, transcending theoretical boundaries, and sacrifice coherence of their political vision or they choose to stay within the framework of the boundaries where their data obtain coherence and interconnectedness. Easton wrote:

Many partial theories of political allocation have been suggested although they are not normally perceived in quite this light. Theories of party politics, interest groups, legislative behavior, political leadership, administrative organization, coalitions, voting behaviors, and the like seek to

³⁷David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 471.

understand varying parts of the allocative processes. . . . Even though an overarching allocative theory has still to be proposed or formulated as a guide to the study of political processes, there can be little doubt that this kind of orientation has at least implicitly dominated the theoretical interest of most political research. "Who gets what, when and how" most simply and succinctly phrases this latent theoretical outlook.³⁸

This means that if the function of government is the "allocation of values," the behavioral political theory must be completed to encompass all the political practices in the society. Although the Lasswellean question has pointed to the cornerstone of politics, in the behavioral vision, Easton is still dissatisfied with the way the process of "value allocation" is treated. Lasswell's formula departs from the hypothesis that personality is the essence of politics and the elite is its framework. This formulation, for Easton, needs further elaboration in order to include the various political actors that an elitist conception of politics might not be able to. By this further elaboration, the distribution of values in the society can be clarified on the basis of its broadest grounds since the concept of political system includes all relevant concepts that relate to the outcome of the system, either in the form of policies or decisions. From this point emanates Easton's conservative thesis of "persistence of system through change." It is when the overall frame of the

³⁸Ibid., p. 474.

political process is known that the processes of systems maintenance can be undertaken; that is, with a picture of all parts and interactions in the system, a process of adjustment is always in operation since the system, through its legal channels, can solve political problems and contribute to social stability and control. On this ground, Easton believes that the continuing adjustment of maldistributions of value in the system will always direct the changes in a positive way, on the side of its "persistence."

In concluding this chapter, it should be asserted that the ideals of the "scientific" method were insufficient to confront the objections raised by Margenau through which we saw some important aspects of the areas of human study that make the scope of these ideas either irrelevant or inadequate. It was seen, however, that the insistence of behavioral political scientists on these ideals revealed a negative aspect in their thought which might be connected to ideological beliefs or, in other words, to the fundamental assumptions of the positivistic paradigm from which behavioralism emanates.

Moreover, we found behavioral theorists adopted a conception of man, stated sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, as an implication of the "molecular man" concept. This concept represented an

inadequate understanding of the nature of man and his distinguished characteristics. But despite this, it was the concept employed in order to fit the procedural requirements of those ideals. The concept of the "molecular man," as in Rice's arguments, reflects a deep desire to find a theoretical concept of man whose ideals enable behavioral "scientists" to predict human behavior and thence control it. The first thing that behavioralism's insistence on the rejection of Margenau's arguments would signify is the fundamental belief in the implied assumptions of those ideals which go hand in hand with the desire to found a new understanding of the "political" relevant to its thought and political ambitions. This desire is manifested in the view of man as the molecule in the universe which is indistinguishable in "large numbers." By trying to emphasize man, this concept eliminated his essential characteristics for the sake of viewing him as a member in a herd whose future course can be predicted and, then, controlled.

It was seen that the three different interpretations of political behavioralism, in addition to the differences in paradigms, show the overlapping between two tendencies in their theoretical content; one is liberal, the other is conservative. The epistemological dimension fluctuates between the desire

to know the characteristics of the individual's behavior and fear that those distinguishing characteristics violate the canons of the "scientific" method. Whereas it is political, its dimension fluctuates between the desire to change the foundation of government for a wider political participation and the fear that the effects of this participation transcend the limits set for control. As a consequence, the thought of the movement showed the two tendencies and, thus, validated the different views of the three different paradigms (Straussianism, post-behavioralism, and radicalism) since each one emphasized aspects relevant to its view of behavioralism. Straussianism viewed it as a radical tendency and sought to change the traditional foundation of political knowledge and, hence, change the existing traditional value system. Post-behavioralism viewed the movement as an ideological commitment to the doctrines of liberalism as manifested in its liberal outlook on society as Corey has indicated. But in spite of this fluctuation, the liberal tendency prevails, especially in its political manifestation as seen in the treatment of some of its political concepts.

The treatment of those concepts reveals the following important points. First, there is a desire to change the theoretical foundation of government to respond to social changes which are viewed by Merriam as

a necessary step toward the liberation of political theory from traditionalism. It was seen that Merriam's conception of government is a pragmatic, instrumental conception in which the "political" was viewed as an instrument by which the majority raises its level of living and accomplishes social goals. This view resulted in a conception of the "political" whose scope and philosophy do not transcend the pragmatic limits imposed on it where knowledge of the "political" and its practices becomes an "administrative office" supervising the process of service and wealth distribution and politics becomes by it "politics-free." It should be noted, however, that the understanding of the political and the process of government requires a knowledge that goes far beyond merely regarding them as an instrument. They are attributes in a form of system that reflects itself in all the other social systems.

Second, the Lasswellean "psycho-political" approach and the emphasis on political personality is also related to the premises of a liberal vision of the individual and of his relation to government. This relation is manifest in the thrust toward individualism, that is, in the emphasis on the individual as the ultimate unit of analysis and the ultimate goal of political action. In Lasswell's thought, this relation reaches its peak where we find him adopting the Freudian

psycho-analysis as a major approach for the prediction and control of political behavior. In doing this, Lasswell reduced the political process to the individual, eliminating by this the chance to view the other important levels of this process that result from the social interaction and impact of the social structure. This reductionism is apparent in the view of politics on the basis of the Lasswellean question of "Who gets what?" which has limits that obstruct further elaboration of the political process and reduce it to its component factors. We find this reductionism also manifest in the study of the individual's personality as such on the basis of the formula of $P \} d \} r = P$ and within its dimensions. Lasswell's direction to political psychology was a decisive factor behind such reductionism of the "political" in which it (the political) became a manifestation of the individual's inner world.

And, if the behavioral premises represent the liberal tendencies in the twenties, thirties, and forties, the tendency of individualism became a characteristic of these tendencies. The emphasis on the liberal conception of "individualism" grew hand in hand with those factors that moved toward the liberalization of American political thought when it witnessed a crisis after the Second World War. The liberal reaction in

that crisis was an emphasis on individualism and on the role of the individual's participation in the political process which was, for them, a necessary condition to get out of such a crisis. The behavioral movement, in its constant search for "scientific" units for their "scientific" enterprise, came across this tendency and took its direction. That is why we have seen that the second stage in the development of the behavioral enterprise was characterized by political psychology as a "scientific" basis that matches the mentioned tendency.

Third, the levels of analysis of "group" and "system" represent a shift in the thought of the movement toward the use of political concepts. And if the former is used in many different literatures, the use of the latter reflects, to a considerable extent, the goal of control. Systems analysis in politics attempt to regard political phenomena as the structure through which other structures can be controlled to prevent an overall radical change of the system. The conception of the "political" as a system is connected, in Easton's mind, to the phenomenon of "persistence through change."

This phenomenon has two conflicting dimensions; one relates to the tendency toward change, while the other tends toward the conservation of the general

outline of the political system. The vision of politics on the basis of a "system" is a convenient solution, in Easton's thought, for the dilemma resulting from this conflict. In other words, the conflict between those two dimensions can be reduced or even eliminated when they emerge as practical solutions that change the structures of the society but without transcending its general foundation. This means that any proposal for political reform must not violate the general outline of the political system.

CHAPTER V

WHAT SHOULD THEORY BE NOW?

The previous chapter suggested theoretical and ontological linkages between the behavioral conception of a science of politics and political treatments and solutions for the political problems it confronted in practice. We mean here that we found two linkages between some elements of behavioral epistemology and its view of the "political." And as we saw at the end of the previous chapter, these linkages are manifest in some of the general characteristics that both of those dimensions share. It was seen that the new beliefs which adapted the new conceptions of government and of the individual were introduced to fit within both the framework of the "scientific" method and the range of its methodological issues. The treatment of measurement has shown this adaptive pattern to the extent to which man was assigned the position of the particle in the universe in order to meet the requirements of the statistical and mathematical quantitative techniques. This linkage is but one among many linkages like instrumentalism, operationism, and pragmatism.

Another form of linkage can be seen in the fact that the overall enterprise of "science,"--its

assumptions and conclusions about society and nature--were consistent with the goals of the behavioral political theory and of the liberal doctrines which flourished hand-in-hand with each other. These parallel developments reflect the objective, practical goal that those lines seek to obtain since the social and political forces which tried to change the traditional foundation of American government are almost the same forces which advocated the assumptions of "science" and used them to challenge the epistemology of this traditional foundation. We saw in Merriam, for example, the two dimensions coming together: a desire to change the foundation of government connected to the application of "science" to politics.

Demonstrating these linkages is very important for understanding the manner in which "orthodoxy" (dealt with in the second chapter) is manifest in the political and theoretical structure of the behavioral movement. We have seen that, in addition to the linkages of the theoretical frames of reference of personality, group, elite, and system, the overall behavioral conception of the "political" reflects itself explicitly in their theoretical formulations of science. Where the "political" is only a tool to stabilize the social system for the flow of many different ideas where the only so-called "scientific" ones, thus, prevail.

According to the behavioral theory, there are two levels in the theory of epistemology; first is the level of the multiplicity of the conception of reality at the political level which leads to a tolerance of the variety of opinions within the limits of the phenomenon of "persistence through change." Yet, when those limits have been exceeded, the other level intervenes for the imposition of new limits. What this means is that behavioral political theorists start by assuming the individual's liberty and later use their theory of epistemology to repress it. The ideals of the scientific method dealt with in the third chapter have become weapons behind which many orthodox commitments are hidden. In their defense of their political preferences, behavioral political theorists developed a conception of epistemology that commits itself to a set of orthodox procedure that control the process of political theorizing. The development of this weapon has been accomplished by the sacrifice of substantive knowledge. The defense of the political preference has been, either consciously or unconsciously, the basic priority in their confrontation with traditionalism in spite of their battle cry--"scienticism." The thrust was, therefore, toward a defense of political convictions rather than toward the development of "pure science." What the "pure science" turned out to be was

completely unpure orthodoxy that specified rules for the very human and sophisticated activity of "thinking." The preoccupation with the formulation of these rules, while politically badly needed, was accompanied by a turn away from the formulation of substantive political knowledge. Therefore, despite its presumption of "objectivity," the behavioral political theory was neither "objective" nor "substantive." Its objectivity was violated when it adopted one dominant approach in the philosophy of science (logical empiricism) and only accepted its positivist outcome.

Furthermore, one can say that its significance was lost when it turned attention from substantive knowledge and changed the direction of our theory of epistemology for the legitimization of certain political convictions. A good example of the above-mentioned tendency is the fact-value dichotomy that explicitly denotes ideological commitment. Such usage represents how the terminology and the procedures of the so-called "scientific method" were brought from the philosophy of science in order to fit in a place that they were not designed to fit. It is a basic error that almost repeats itself in any behavioral theorist that its epistemological assumptions were derived from the study of nature. While natural phenomenon can be dealt with, to a certain extent, and certain configurations, on the

basis of premises such as the value-fact dichotomy, those assumptions cannot bring about an adequate understanding of human phenomena which are to be understood by their own peculiar assumptions. Richard Ashcraft, an American political theorist, touches this question when he writes:

Why such an analytical distinction [fact-value] had to be made is a question which bears upon both the sociological origins of the significance attached to making such a distinction as well as upon the latter's practical social utility (i.e., as a means of providing a solution to political problems), seems never to have been addressed. The distinction was simply incorporated as part of the general epistemological justification offered on behalf of a particular model of science. However, if the adoption of a set of methodological rules, whether derived from a model of scientific behavior or from some other example of a social activity performed by another social group, had been viewed as a sociological problem to be investigated, the separation of facts from values would have appeared merely as part of a set of beliefs subscribed to by a specific social group for specific purposes. From this standpoint, such rules and beliefs could never have been mistaken for a more grandiose claim about the nature of "reality," "truth," or "meaning" as such.¹

The basic premise in Ashcraft's statement is the strong connection between the highly abstract theoretical formulation and the "sociological" factors that condition them. For Ashcraft, the connections are

¹Richard Ashcraft, "One Step Backward, Two Steps Forward: Reflections upon Contemporary Political Theory," in What Should Political Theory Be Now?, ed. John S. Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 518-9. (Emphasis added.)

manifest not only in the behavioral movement in social science but also in its philosophic orientation in natural science. This, however, suggests a return, with further epistemological elaboration, to the "sociology of knowledge" conception of the relation between epistemology and ontology. This conception of epistemology might be able to improve the defective epistemological direction imposed by behavioral science. This adjustment will be accomplished if political theorists refrain from posing questions of inquiry as if they have no ontological basis. A good example of this is the behavioral-instrumental conception of epistemology which is similar, in the epistemological position, to that of government, politics, group, and system. Such examples show why most of the theoretical generalizations of behavioral research are trivial and unable to show their ontological basis when addressing politics. The consequence of this instrumental conception is a profusion of concepts and procedures deficient in substantive knowledge.

This conceptual poverty, according to John Gunnell, has contributed to the "alienation" of political theory and to its present crisis. Gunnell outlines five dimensions in which this alienation has taken place. political theory is alienated from politics," "from the study of politics," "from itself,"

"from the very species of activity to which it aspires," and "from its projects."² The first dimension of the problem is a consequence of the shift in emphasis from the focus on political problems as such to the preoccupation with epistemological issues. This, however, leads to the second dimension, that is, instead of advancing theoretical formulations and practical solutions related to the aspects of political reality, political theorists were engaged in refining and adapting the models and methodology based on the assumptions of the philosophy of social science for the study of politics regardless of the peculiarity of its aspects. The third dimension of "alienation" manifests itself in the fact that the elements of political theory do not constitute "an integrated enterprise," but, instead, a segregated set of elements that derive their legitimacy from the philosophic background that supports them. This means that the theoretical frames of reference--"normative, empirical, formal, historical, critical"³--that have been employed in the study of politics are used to form elements that bear their significance from the philosophy of social science and

²John Gunnell, "In Search of the political Object: Beyond Methodology and Transcendentalism," in Nelson, pp. 26-27.

³Ibid.

its inherent logic and not from the careful study of the political phenomenon. The day-to-day political phenomena have been a minor preoccupation in such theoretical formulations. As a result, a fourth dimension emerged and manifested itself in the fact that the products of theory are not ideas about politics but rather ideas about the theory of politics derived from the philosophic concerns of the political theorists. "Finally, political theory is not only alienated from substantive study in general and lacking autonomy, but the projects to which it is beholden are themselves products of such alienated enterprises as philosophical epistemology."⁴

Although Gunnell's analysis doesn't give a complete picture of the crisis of political theory, the five dimensions he outlined can give a flavor or a taste, so to speak, of the condition of contemporary political theory and can suggest how its "alienation" can be comprehended. This "alienation," however, was preceded and accompanied by a continuing decline and "crisis" in political philosophy. In fact, one of the major epistemological factors leading to the widespread acceptance of behavioral political theory was this decline. The debate of the 1950s between the behavioral

⁴Ibid., p. 27.

approach and traditional political philosophy has been conducted in unbalanced grounds on which the "hunker-down"⁵ approach was unable to account for the existing problems. The "hunker-down" approach which confronts contemporary political problems by reference to the philosophic enterprises of major political philosophers (Socrates, the Classics, the Medievals, or the Moderns) is out of date, out of grounds, and out of history.⁶ While the behavioral "scientific" enterprise has absorbed the major principles of the contemporary theory of epistemology (such as quantification and the use of numbers), the "hunker-down" approach remained within the classical limits set up by the philosophers of the past whose philosophies evolved from the particularities of their societies and the historic stage through which they proceeded. Consequently, political philosophy

is sadly detached, not just from larger intellectual influences, but all too often from the politics around us, even as a subject matter. It is not removed from the politics of the past, of Hobbes, or Plato's day, to be sure. But our politics barely seems to exist. Perhaps it is an embarrassment to many theorists. What does exist is a sub-field

⁵In Robert Fowler's use, this name refers to those political philosophers who merely refer to the ideas of the grand philosophers without showing their applicability.

⁶See Robert B. Fowler, "Does Political Theory Have a Future?" in Nelson, p. 557.

which is increasingly arcane and hermetic in its interests and publications. One need not be reduced to "vulgar" utilitarianism to be uncomfortable about such corruption and fruitless insularity and abstractions. political theory need not be under the gun of relevance all the time, . . . but in this time of crisis in our history, it is legitimate to ask why this activity of humans proceeds so often, so far outside of history. It is also legitimate to ask if such abstract thinking produces theory good by standards other than assisting others. Is it good in itself? Can any theory be insightful, can it provide illumination when it is lost in itself and so far away from ordinary human experience?⁷

The concern of Ashcraft, Gunnell, Fowler and others whose writings revolve around "what political theory should be now" constitutes the new emerging effort to find the way out of this "alienation" and "crisis." These efforts are also not "out of history" since they maintain relations to the various aspects of American political thought. Moreover, these relations include a linkage to the behavioral movement through the mediation of the "post-behavioral" critics whose criticism paved the way for the emergence of a more "relevant," "coherent" image of politics. These critics formulated the middle grounds between behavioralism and the new theorists who look for an answer for the question of "what is to be done." In relation to the fact-value dichotomy, those critics believe that a "value-free" science is inconceivable but a

⁷Ibid., p. 555.

reconciliative relation between the two epistemological aspects of the dichotomy is conceivable. This conception shows the middle grounds from which the new theoretical tendencies evolved. The question, according to Alan Wolfe and Charles McCoy, is as follows:

Reconciling the philosophical and scientific approaches, then, is not only possible but inevitable. To begin, science that does not try to take values into account is bad science. Values are part of the political milieu, besides, the scientist himself has values with which he must come to terms, otherwise his analysis will be totally sterile.⁸

The conception of values as part of the social order and of the individual's personality is a middle ground between the behavioral view of values as a subjective preference and the view that values transcend not only subjective limits but also the spatio-temporal one. Values in the "post-behavioral" conception are part of the existing social reality; therefore they are always available in every piece of knowledge. Moreover, values are not only available but also are enhanced by the claims of the truth in a given piece of knowledge. Those grounds formulated by the critics made it possible to jump from a very narrow formula of facts and values on the part of behavioral to a wider conception of values that relates its content to history, ideology,

⁸Alan Wolfe and Charles A. McCoy, political Analysis: An Unorthodox Approach (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972), p. 12.

and the institutional arrangement.

What contemporary political theorists are urged to do is not to cut this linkage completely since "collecting data, devising more accurate measurement procedures, refining statistical techniques, or searching for generalizations . . . are essential to any scientific enterprise."⁹ They are, moreover, considered important auxiliary instruments for the conduct of research and the formulation of substantive theory. What theorists are urged to do is to redefine the "principles" upon which their political theory is built. The redefinition of these principles would bring new insights of what theory should be and how it can be related to human practice in any given political system. To undertake this process, it is necessary that political scientists bring some adjustment in the principles of liberal democratic theory and its manifestation in social sciences. The transformation of the behavioral conception of the political from an elitist conception to a conception that takes into account the widest dynamics of the political process is a step that makes such an adjustment possible. An adjustment of this conception is regarded, among

⁹William H. Panning, "What Does It Take to Have a Theory? Principles in Political Science," in Nelson p. 490.

contemporary political theorists, as a necessary step to modify the directions of political knowledge. Among the various attempt to contribute to such an adjustment is the rejection of the instrumental view of political theory as "metapolitical" and "metatheoretical" since these forms attempt to substitute "theories of knowledge for knowledge of theories."¹⁰ John Gunnell, an enthusiastic critic of the behavioral theory, is a leader in this regard. For him

there can be no metapolitical theory of political objects, because politics is a type, token, or configuration of a certain kind if phenomenon. It is a species or subclass of conventional objects. There can, for example, be no theory of political discourse but only a theory of speech and language which political discourse instances. There are political objects, but the fact that they are political is predictational. It is a property, an attribute, or quality attaching to certain instances of conventional objects, and thus there are no phenomena that are essentially or transcendently political. Politics is a historically and spatially delimited form of conventional action and institutions. Hence there are no generically political objects, except insofar as "politics" refers to various historically connected instances of this form or stipulates certain functional equivalents and family resemblances. There is no other basis for attributing universality to politics.¹¹

The recognition of the "political" as a form or an attribute of a "conventional" action was an important theoretical framework that restores some basic elements

¹⁰Gunnell, p. 25.

¹¹Ibid., p. 43. (Emphasis added.)

and characteristics of the political process. What this means is that "politics" has to be addressed as an attribute of events and of "instances" that have been produced by "conventional objects." An object is conventional when it is evolved from the interaction and interrelation among the various groups in the society. Politics, accordingly, is an attribute of those events and instances at the social level. Political theory, therefore, is conceived mainly with this attitude as long as there is a "prediction" of its existence as a given "conventional object." This means that a preconceived "agenda of inquiry" of politics is inconsistent with understanding politics as an attribute or a form of "conventional objects." The understanding of this attribute has to be obtained on the social grounds and cultural limits that condition such objects. Transcendental conception of the political attribute fails to regard the social factors and, moreover, attributes universality to a form of social action that is necessarily conditioned by such factors. Therefore, the attempt to improve certain procedures of analysis of politics is adequate for the formulation of "empirical" political theory only if it takes into account the different manifestations of the "political" and the different social realities that shape it. But this, however, means that the political theory that

contemporary theorists are looking for is the one concerned with such manifestations and not with such procedures. Here the conception of theory differs significantly from that of epistemology as embodied in the behavioral theory. Theory in this sense is the knowledge of a given political reality within the social limits of a given society. Theory is the knowledge that explains how and why political instances and events are likely to be in the form they appear. Such a theory cannot precede the knowledge of the manner in which social factors have conditioned the political attribute of a given social action. It becomes a theory only when such a knowledge is able to explain this and similar processes and hence the procedures used for the attainment of this knowledge is outside contemporary political theory and within the limits of epistemology.

The Way Out

The relation between theory and practice is a major problem for which human thought has provided several solutions. To say what is theory specifically never has been an easy matter whereas a significant portion of the human intellectual effort has dealt with it. It is perhaps healthier to our approach and more adequate not to engage directly in answering the question of "what should political theory be now."

In order to answer this question, political

theorists need not stipulate or impose preconditions for inquiry in the form of "agenda" but to specify the general characteristics of the most adequate theoretical understanding of politics within the "conventional" limits in which its instances occur. What political scientists are encouraged to do is redefine theory to make it possible for contemporary political theory to demonstrate the peculiarities of political instances without transcending their conditions and peculiarities. For this reformulation, four concepts have to be examined as major frameworks for the explanations of politics: interest, paradigm, ideology, and history.

Interest

The concept of "interest" as an element of political and social analysis was a product of the Age of Enlightenment. The turn away from metaphysics which started with Machiavelli and went on through the Age of Enlightenment helped to show some essential factors that shape social and political action. The term gained the attention of social philosophers with the momentum of the emergence of the modern capitalistic states in Europe, especially those which evolved as a result of the declining feudal system of that time. A too extensive use of the "interest" framework made the term so vague and expanded it to encompass almost all social factors that shape human behavior. The most obvious use

of the concept is the interpretation of Marxism of social change. While Marxist theory tried to evade the confusion accompanied with the use of the term, it fell into the error of one-sidedness. It is one-sided in viewing the economic factor as the only major aspect that determines the political and social process. Yet, it might be helpful in showing the general characteristic of a particular historical period through which a given society is proceeding. In the interpretation of the day-to-day political and social processes a more elaborate conception of "interest" is required in order to be able to account for the "perception" of the interest as an intermediary concept that deals with other factors such as socialization and culture. What this means is that the use of the concept of "perception" has brought the one-sided economic interpretation of social action into question and, moreover, made it necessary to know the other factors that might affect the perception of "interest."

The need to disclose the factors that affect the perception of the people of their interests has been among the challenges that the social science movement sought to confront. The social science research was designed to meet this need by looking at the forms of human behavior and classifying the factors in accordance with the priority of the degree of effect that those

factors have on those forms. The tools used to do this undertaking, to a large extent, have failed to produce concrete knowledge of the causes of social action. Although it was claimed that the procedures of data findings and processing do not have many problems, as such, the results of research and conclusions can hardly be accepted since they change in almost every repeated measurement.

What is to be emphasized here is that the interest frame of reference accompanied by the understanding of the way in which socialization affects the perception of interest could produce a coherent image of the process of choice making and, therefore, of behavior. The difficulty here stems from the determination of the relation between perception and interest--in other words, in the determination of what determines what, whether interest determines perception or vice versa. This problem is but a version or a form of the continuing dialectic over the relation of material existence and the human perception of it. For the theorists who believe in the subordination of the interests of man to his perception, the political process does not transcend the individual's behavior and, therefore, at this level when this process is viewed on the basis of individuals' interactions, there always exists the possibility of misunderstanding the

real interest because of some alteration due to the process of perception of interests. This, however, leads to the suggestion that individuals, out of social organization and out of an ordered consciousness of the social reality, risk having a conscience that misrepresents their real interests. At the individual level, thus, interest and perception interrelate in the determination of one's specification and the possibility of subordinating interests to perception is there. At this level, the concept, for some liberal thinkers, seems to be useless and unimportant since the individualistic conception of politics made the concept inadequate.¹² But, even if their objection is valid, the individualistic examination of the political process is but one among many conceptual approaches to politics. The concept of "interest" reaches the peak of its significance when it is employed in political theories that treat the political process as interaction of groups whose conscience represents a specified conception of interest. The leader in this regard was Arthur Bentley¹³ who conceived interests and

¹²See the argument developed by Truman in Chapter IV, above.

¹³See Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, ed. Peter Odegard (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), Chapter VII.

politically-oriented social interactions among the various groups of society as major elements for the understanding of the political process. The concept of "interest" is most relevant to the determination of the direction of group politics and the prediction of the direction of its political outcomes. Because of this relevance, the study of "interest groups" has become an established area of study in the discipline of politics. The cornerstone in group politics is the assumption that, at the group level, "perception" is formulated in accordance with the group interests. This means that the organization of the group allows the flow of the interest of the group in its composition and upon which formulates its goals, policies, and aspirations. This is possible because the basis on which political grouping is formulated is the platform of the declared interests that operate as the "umbrella" of the group. This, of course, doesn't mean that the process of socialization will not shape the perception of interests in the overall analysis. It means that only at the group level the perception of interests and the interests themselves are the same and are the essence of the group formulation.

Interest as an element of political analysis is not enough as such to account for the political process and the explanation of the behavior of its actors.

Another frame is needed, that is, namely, of "ideology."

Ideology

In behavioral literature, ideology has been conceived in many different ways but rarely addressed as a legitimate intellectual enterprise that might be helpful in understanding social reality. It was studied as a component of social reality but not as an effectively interpretative tool for such reality. Ideology, in its simplest sense, as in Macridis' definition, is "a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community." Similarly, a political ideology is "a set of ideas and beliefs" that people hold about their political regime and its institutions, and about their own position and role in it."¹⁴

Addressing ideology as merely "a set of ideas or attitudes" is a complication of the question of what ideology is rather than a specification of a definition that demonstrates its nature. The question becomes problematic whenever an attempt is made to draw a distinction between ideology, theory, philosophy, thought, culture, etc., and those similar attributes of

¹⁴Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983), p. 3.

social epistemology that constitute the superstructure of human society. Ideology is often distinguished from the mentioned attributes on the basis of two premises: action and error. According to Macridis, ideology is different from philosophy and theory in that it "urges people for action" while the two latter concepts are merely "contemplation" or "formulation of propositions." While this distinction holds true to some extent, it fails to recognize that the "urge to action" is but one characteristic of ideology and of thought in general. There is another basic characteristic that they all share and which Macridis seemed to touch when he stated that "there is a dialectic between ideas, as such, and social needs and both are needed in order to have an ideology." Therefore, the definition of ideology as stated above is unable to show its nature in relation to theory and philosophy since they all express themselves in ideas that relate in one way or another to social needs. The conception of ideology as the source of error in the knowledge of society has been a product of the behavioral positivist misconception of the difference between ideology and "scientific" knowledge. It was the behavioral concern to show the irrelevance of ideological systems for the demonstration of the elements that represent the "objective reality." A tradition has been established since the emergence of

the "Vienna Circle" that not only misuses the concept of ideology but, rather, fails to distinguish its essence from the other aspects of the human intellectual enterprise. Ideology was regarded in this tradition as merely an expression of value-judgments that have been irrationally adopted from the social environment with no "scientific" basis. Ideology, accordingly, doesn't have the "criteria of truth" which "scientific" knowledge strives to establish. Larrain outlines the argument of the positivist literature as follows:

In general, the positivist viewpoint accepts that the method of science is basically unitary, although there may be peculiarities between individual sciences. Thus, this conception does not regard social sciences as a particle or case more prone to ideology. Science in general antithetical to ideology: consequently, scientific knowledge of society is opposite to ideology in that it accounts for objective facts, is verifiable and studies its object through a particular method whose logic is public and companion to all sciences.¹⁵

Positivists used the same weapon with which they confronted traditional political philosophy, namely, the "scientific method" in order to demonstrate the irrelevance of ideology to their theoretical premises. This led to an orthodoxy of science that accepts truth only in accordance with the conditions of inquiry it stipulates and with constant disapproval of the findings

¹⁵Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979), p. 174.

of other approaches, viz. philosophy, because they are "value-laden" and ideologically oriented. It was seen in the second chapter that the behavioral literature in general has a strong orthodox commitment to the assumptions of the philosophy of science without bothering to examine them on social grounds. What has been done under the name of the "scientific method" is an emergence and elaboration of an elitist political thought under the strict procedures of the so-called scientific method. (The fourth chapter has shown the relation between the behavioral elements of epistemology and their political theory.)

The ideals of the scientific method were used in a manner that doesn't allow other approaches based on different assumptions to emerge by indicating their meaninglessness in an a priori manner. "Scientific" procedures, while opening a new era of intellectual processes of man, worked as a restrictive force when they imposed restrictions on the process of "human understanding." Science has made it necessary for knowledge to be "truthful" to follow the standards and procedures formulated with the employment of its procedures.

If, however, one can understand the characteristic relation between authoritative orthodoxy and ideology, it will be easy for one to see the extent

to which ideology relates to the most abstract human ideas. Both insist that their premises are the only valid ones while others are not. This is due to the fact that human textures of thought, from the very beginning of their formulation, are related to the individual's interests and the commitment to this latter aspect would lead to the acceptance of ideas related to it regardless of its rationality. Science, philosophy, and theory are all represented in such ideas and, in almost all stages of their formation, the ideological factors operate. It is the necessity of the belief in certain assumptions as "givens" that demonstrates the ideological element and signifies its role in shaping all human enterprises of thought. The idea of the "given" is characteristic of behavioral thought and is a significant implication of the doctrine of the "unity of science." Social objects were treated in the same manner that natural science has treated physical objects by merely adapting the method at its disposal regardless of the difference of the manifestations of their phenomena; that is, social objects can be treated in a neutral manner regardless of one's ideological commitment and value prejudgment. But while this "myth" is no longer accepted, the ideological components remain important in the formulation not only of traditional philosophy but also of the most neutral and objective

human thought including the very basis of "science."
The point to be emphasized here is that, in Larrain's
words,

ideology in itself is not a concept to be distinguished from science. Ideology could be scientific. If it is not scientific, this is not due to its being ideology but, rather, due to its being developed within the scope of certain specific class interests. Ideology is non-antithetical to science--it could also be a science.¹⁶

This, however, doesn't mean that the standards and procedures of the modern "scientific enterprise" are ideology as such, but that the premises upon which the "scientific" conception of reality is based derive their "persuasive" power from ideological beliefs that control the direction of the starting assumptions of this conception. Science, theory, philosophy can all be reframed within an ideological framework that shows their relation to the existing human needs and interests in a given social reality. If ideology in the broadest sense is considered on the basis of the relation between human ideas and the social realm from which they evolve, it can give an interpretation from the evolution of such concepts like philosophy, science, and theory. It is only if it is viewed in this broad sense that ideology can provide for this account.

Finally, it should be pointed out that, although

¹⁶Ibid., p. 172.

the "ideology" frame of reference is sufficient to account for the emergence of social thought, its motivating actors and conditions, theorists need another conceptual framework that elaborates the question further to include the demonstration of the dynamic process in which those most abstract theoretical enterprises are formulated in the "community of science." This concept is the concept of "paradigm."

Paradigm

The concept of paradigm is an important auxiliary concept that enables political theorists to explore the process and factors behind the crystalization of a given theoretical enterprise within the "community of practitioners." The concept is, however, sensitive to the basic elements of knowledge formation and epistemological change. It doesn't represent a departure from past epistemological premises. It is, rather, a conception of that past and an attempt to put it in its appropriate place in history. The idea of "paradigm" gained its significant position in the philosophy of science and social science in the hands of Thomas Kuhn. In his The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Kuhn introduced a theory of the history, development, and change of human knowledge. His treatments touched almost all aspects of social knowledge, including political theory whose

practitioners constantly attempted to employ the concept within the framework of their study. Kuhn's analysis of the change in the structure of human knowledge aided political theorists of the late sixties and seventies in obtaining an adequate understanding of the "behavioral revolution" and in viewing it on its historical terms. What the Kuhnian theory did to the thought of the sixties was to alter the receptivity of behavioral premises and, thus, to alter the ideas of the practitioners of political theory. In this regard, the concept of "paradigm" has contributed the most. It first demonstrated that the "behavioral revolution" is but a change in the traditional structure of political theory. It also showed that this change was a result of a process in which the academic circle played a significant role in the emergence and perpetuation of the behavioral paradigm. Moreover, a paradigmatic conception of the behavioral movement would disclose why behavioralists took for granted the premise of natural science.

The idea of "paradigm" is closely related to the "practitioners of science" or, in Kuhn's words, "the community of science." This form of community, in the description of Sheldon Wolin, is

based on an agreement which extends not only to the rules governing inquiry and to stipulations concerning what shall qualify as a scientific question and count as a scientific answer, but it

extends as well to the particular theory which is accepted as true by the members in their research and investigation.¹⁷

The community of scientists is, therefore, established on such an agreement on the basis of their practice. This practice, however, can never be separate from the theorist's own aspirations and his own ideological commitment. The basis of the theory of a particular community of scientists can therefore be related to ideological aspects that connect the basis of this agreement to the theorist's personal preferences. The behavioral movement is a good exemplar in this regard. According to George Carey, political behavioralists have used the American Political Science Association to extend their influence and gain more followers by appointing to high administrative positions scholars who share with them the "same paradigm." As a result of this, there emerged scholars of a widespread reputation who share the same elements necessary to constitute a coherent paradigm and, with the employment of the "process of education," the premises of their paradigm were transferred to wider intellectual grounds and into the curricula of some established academic institutions.

¹⁷Sheldon S. Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories," in Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, ed. Gary Gutting (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), pp. 166-7.

Therefore, according to Carey's description, the behavioral "scientific" paradigm maintains a strong ideological connection based on group interests.

The paradigmatic approach deals with facts of knowledge not in a static sense but in a dynamic one where it regards truth as an historic process to be understood distinct from static assumptions and metaphysical assertions. In other words, the meaning of a piece of knowledge is to be found within the very specific limitations imposed by the historical stage through which a human society proceeds; that is, the truth of theories is related to the specific social process and cannot transcend its boundaries to present a judgment of a different social process. A major assumption of the paradigmatic approach is manifest in the manner in which only the truths accepted by the paradigm itself are recognized truths since the paradigm specifies what is to be true and what is to be not, through the "expectations" of its followers. The paradigm of a given society or a group specifies such truths because it contains general agreement on pre-assumed principles. And, therefore, those principles introduce themselves to all aspects of the human intellectual enterprise and connect the most abstract ideas to the ideological interests of that society or group.

Drawing from Kuhn, Ian Barbour outlined four useful paradigmatic assumptions that theorists have to take notice of. They are "(1) Paradigms dominate normal science. (2) Scientific Revolutions are paradigm shifts. (3) Observations are paradigm-dependent. (4) Criteria are paradigm-dependent." Those four assumptions deal with the overall processes of knowledge formation, change, and relation to reality. The first assumption

maintains that every scientific community is dominated by a cluster of very broad conceptual and methodological presuppositions embodied in the "standard examples," through which students learn the prevailing theories of the field.¹⁸

This means that the basis of human intellectual knowledge is rooted in those "standard examples" which are static and unchangeable because they are held as beliefs. The paradigm conception shows here that even "normal science" itself shares a basis with an ideological commitment in its insistence on this static, unchangeable element of knowledge. As for the second assumption, change in the structure of knowledge and its direction in the form of revolution is more or less a "shift in paradigm." In the Kuhnean theory, the change in the scientific paradigm results from growing disagreements or, in Kuhn's words, "anomalies" which

¹⁸Ian Barbour, "Paradigms in Science and Religion," in Gutting, p. 223.

lead to a scientific crisis that threatens the very basis of the paradigm. Political theory, according to Wolin, takes a different course in its change. Political theory responds to the general crisis of the society and doesn't remain within the academic circle that circumscribes the "scientific" solutions of problems within a narrow scope limited to its community. Therefore, by trying to enslave political theory in scientific circles, it was attempted to alienate political theory and keep it within the narrow concepts of one particular paradigm.

The third assumption insists that "paradigms determine the way a scientist sees the world";¹⁹ that is, observations are "paradigm-dependent." Here, rejection of the "myth of the given" is implied. That there are things given as such is rejected and is replaced by a conception of reality that rejects the so-called neutral observation of it and asserts, instead, that observation reflects the angle and degree from which recognition of any given object in social reality is made. In other words, this means that observation of reality either in selecting its object, its dimensions, or characteristics of its significance is determined by the way in which the adopted paradigm

¹⁹Ibid., p. 225.

treats them.

As to the fourth assumption, each paradigm specifies its own "criteria for adequacy and relevance," "competing paradigms," wrote Barbour, "offer differing judgments as to what sorts of solutions are acceptable."²⁰ This means that a paradigm, when established, supplies the criteria for the attainment of its expected solutions. The specification of such criteria is inherent in the paradigm's assumptions. "There are no external standards on which to base a choice between paradigms, for standards are themselves products of paradigms."²¹

It should be pointed out that idea and use of the paradigmatic conception of social knowledge are based on a nihilistic notion which, to some extent, is manifest in the implied assumption that human knowledge is man-made and its direction is specified by the inner processes of the paradigm adopted; that is, each intellectual product is produced by a spatio-temporal condition that prevails in the form of a paradigm. At this level, transcendentalism as manifest in the forms--eternal beliefs and ultimate facts--becomes a paradigmatic matter and the legitimacy of each is derived from its related paradigms. The paradigm

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

concept here does away with both by paving the way for an historic trend to evade nihilism. This means that the view of human thought on a paradigmatic basis, although implying a nihilistic tendency manifest in its rejection of the "dual structure" of human thought, evades this tendency by the use of the idea of history as a source of the belief and value of man. This basis can help in finding a proper understanding of the dilemma of the relation of man and his knowledge. The dilemma, according to this paradigmatic vision, cannot be solved on the basis of the classical "dual vision" but on the basis of the many dimensions of the particular historical stage in which it evolves. In this view, the human phenomenon is historic in the sense that its past plays a significant role in its present course. From this point of departure, human values and beliefs as part of history play a role in every stage of change of any paradigm. The knowledge of those aspects requires the view of them as another dimension of reality. This use of the idea of history helps evade the nihilistic tendency in which both reality and its conception of a non-objective existence. The idea of history, as we will try to show in the following pages, can help us know additional aspects of the relation between grand political theories and the social framework that those theories aspire to represent.

History

The concept of history was a major product of seventeenth and eighteenth century thought. The use of the concept in the study of humanities has been and still is among the most controversial issues in past and contemporary theories of knowledge. Definitions of the concept vary from the mere "chronological ordering of things" to a coherent conception of reality. Speaking for themselves, Benedetto Croce: "All history is contemporary history"; J. B. Bury: "History is a science; no less and no more"; Jacob Burchhardt: "History is contemplation based upon sources"; G. J. Renier: "History is the story of the experiences of men living in civilized society"; Samuel Eliot Morison: "History is the story of man"; R. G. Collingwood: "All history is a history of thought"; Arnold Toynbee: "History is the search for light on the nature and destiny of man"; Sir John Seeley: "History is past politics"; and Leopold Von Ranke: "History is concerned with things as they really happened."²²

Despite the wide difference among these conceptions of the idea of history, they all emphasized

²²Mark M. Krug, History and the Social Sciences: New Approaches to the Teaching of Social Studies (Waltham: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1967), p. 3.

its comprehensiveness and its complete inclusion of the human situation. The concept is therefore able to deal with the various aspects of human society that contribute to its development and change. It does so by assuming that social thought or "norms" and the other various aspects of the superstructure of society are formulated within the limits of the historic epochs in which they occur. The epochal distinction, here, is not merely related to a distinction in time, but to those processes peculiar to the particular paradigm of society. The general assumptions of a paradigm of a society are historically oriented since those assumptions are formulated with a general view of the historic epoch in which a society or a group is proceeding.

If political theory is to be based on a comprehensive conception of the "political" as a general framework in which all political action can be understood, it should take into account the historic limits of social processes and relate the theory and practice of any given epoch to the factors which existed within its limits. The notion of "conventional objects" closely corresponds to this analysis where those objects are viewed as general and encompass all social practices and relate its social theory to the historical stage in which the society is proceeding. The explanation of

political events ought to show the context of the explained and show how it relates to the logic applied in this explanation. According to Gordon Leff, "historical propositions are always contextual."²³ This assertion rests on three major premises: first, "the contexts are never identical as we have amply observed"; second, "history is a body of knowledge, not a store of axioms or laws"; and third, "context gives meaning."²⁴

The first assumption of Leff's assertion refers to the fact that, although events of history can be explained in accordance with the context in which it is viewed, their contexts and the logic upon which they are constructed differ from each other following the differences in the elements of each context. This, however, means that the explanation of any social event, when occurring in any particular stage of history, depends, in the first place, on the components of the context embodied in a given proposition. The idea of history here doesn't only explain an event but also demonstrates the dynamics that affect and shape any particular explanatory knowledge of this event.

The suggestion that "contexts are never

²³Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory (University: University of Alabama Press, 1969), p. 78.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 78-79.

identical" departs from the point that, in historical analysis, contexts are different from each other because they occur in response to different factors and variables. Therefore, there is no reoccurrence in historic events and thus no identity either in their occurrence or in the context of their explanation. For example, in Leff's words, "to examine different sets of events of the same kind--such as a revolution or a battle--is to be concerned with different circumstances, which cannot be reduced to one another."²⁵

The above argument is related to the second premise that "history is no storage for axioms or laws." The explanation of social events and actions, if formulated with a view of the idea of history, can direct an adequate criticism to the scientific ideals of "generalization and the covering law-model." And, moreover, it can show that the premises of the deductive explanation are irrelevant to the changing dynamics of society--that "conventional objects" such as "revolutions" respond to various societal aspects such as level of education, level of political participation, and the mode of wealth distribution. These aspects and others explain why a particular revolution occurred in a particular social setting and why it didn't occur in a

²⁵Ibid., p. 78.

different one; but the formula of their relation is different from one setting to another.

The laws and generalizations in the historicist viewpoint are more or less a specific knowledge of a particular event or process with the limits of its epoch. In historic analysis, laws and generalizations lose their transcendental nature and become knowledge of a specific historical epoch. The so-called axioms and laws are no more than the context of explanation advanced for the understanding of social events within this epoch. If they transcend those limits they lose the conditions necessary for their meaningfulness. In social events the highly abstract, quantitatively stated relations can hardly say anything about reality since they transcend the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness. Social events have to be studied on their peculiar grounds.

As for the assumption that "contexts give meaning," it should be indicated that contexts of explanation specify the conditions under which a given attribute becomes meaningful. The components of a given context specify the goal of explanation and the directions it ought to take in order to be counted meaningful. The premises upon which an explanation is based, the criteria of meaningfulness and truthfulness, are sometimes sacrificed for the sake of the sustenance

of a meaning. It is the advantage of the idea of history that shows that meaning related to relevant historical processes is the most adequate criterion for knowledge and not its truthfulness. In this way the ideas of "ideology" and "paradigm" can be related to the idea of history since all of them appeal to convictions and knowledge that are not subject to true and false criteria.

The point to be made finally is that the researcher advises that the reader not hold his breath waiting for epistemological problems of politics to be solved by the use of the four concepts mentioned above. The questions related to these problems have been controversial in every stage of development of human civilization. From the review of these concepts, the researcher can suggest that political scientists refrain from treating political phenomena like natural phenomena and stop stipulating procedures of inquiry in the manner done in the study of the latter. The four suggestions, however, take into account the confusion resulting from this process. Therefore, they encompass the essential characteristics of "grand political theories" in their dealing with the "political" in the broadest sense in which it intervenes in all aspects of the human situation. These concepts are auxiliary ones.

The use of political concepts might be helpful in

adjusting the direction of our conception of political theory which was framed by political behavioralism within the philosophy of science. We have seen that the basic dilemma and its alienation of political theory resulted from the attempt to judge politics on the basis of methodological assumptions of the dominant approach in this philosophy.

It is necessary to point out that political analysis should be based on the peculiar assumptions of the concepts applicable to politics which, although they depend on empirical evidence in explaining their phenomena of study, do not make empirical procedures the only valid source of knowledge. In order to reach a general understanding of political reality, we need a comprehensive philosophic vision which connects, ontologically and theoretically, the available empirical evidence to the possible theoretical conclusions that can be made.

The researcher, however, does not claim here that the four concepts mentioned above are ideals that should be imitated, but regards their application a forward step toward the use of political concepts in studying politics.

ASSESSMENT

Our assessment can be classified into two categories. The first consists of the premises that can be inferred from the study of the various dimensions of political behavioralism. The second consists of some general conclusions that can be adequately drawn from the general context and framework of this study.

I. Political behavioralism is a good example of the continuous efforts to introduce the assumptions of the logical empirical approach which dominated the philosophy of natural science to the study of politics. It was seen that the thought of behavioral scientists tried to apply the concept of "science" to the study of government. Despite the many mistakes that resulted from this application, we find that political behavioralism contributed to the flourishing of the disciplined study of politics. As a result of the behavioral thrust, political scientists were obliged to reconsider the directions of political science and the nature of its theory. This reached its peak with the liberal-conservative debate of the fifties. In that period, the practice and philosophy of politics centered around the impact of the introduction of the concept of science to politics and around the

ideological ramifications associated with it.

The utilization of the assumptions of the philosophy of science by behavioral political theorists was a major factor behind the reconsideration of political philosophers of the validity of their enterprise. Political philosophy was then confronted by a stubborn "enemy" which dominated many aspects of contemporary social knowledge. The technological accomplishments in the natural and social sciences, in terms of methodology and the impact they had on the study of politics pushed political philosophers to elaborate their epistemological horizons to include those important aspects introduced by the modern enterprise of science. Through this impact political behavioralism became a dialectical factor in the development of political theory since the radical introduction of "science" into politics raised the objections of various political schools of thought. Hence, the response and ideological debate manifest in this objection were a necessary prelude to the development of the discipline.

In a study conducted in 1961, Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus demonstrated some aspects of the impact of political behavioralism on American political scientists. The numbers below indicate the stand of sampled political scientists on two of the statements

posed by the researchers. With regard to the relation of the study of political behavior to the mainstream of political science, we find that the majority are in disagreement. But this majority is not overwhelming since the difference between the disagreeing and agreeing subjects is not substantial. This shows the lack of consensus on the importance of behavioralism in politics and on its nature. Behavioral proponents, however, assert that the introduction of "science" to politics is, as such, an advancement in its study and is related to its pivotal issues. On the contrary, opponents see it as a departure from the substantive study of politics to the study of its epistemology.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Cannot Say	Dis- Agree	Strongly Dis- Agree
Much of the work being done in political behavioralism is only marginally related to political science	19.0	21.8	10.9	36.0	12.3
The really significant problems of political life cannot be successfully attacked by the behavioral approach	14.4	24.1	15.8	31.8	13.9

Source: Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 14-15.

The answers to the second statement also indicate a lack of consensus. The numbers indicate that the majority believed that behavioral theory can successfully attack the significant problems of politics. But this majority, still, contains a high proportion of disagreement.

(A) Political behavioral theory was developed in response to some social forces that pushed in the direction of epistemological change and political reform. The social forces of "industrialization, education, and feminism," according to behavioral thinkers, had a great impact not only on the philosophic foundation of government but also on the epistemology that established this philosophic foundation. This was manifest in the attempt of behavioral political scientists to present their theory in a comprehensive manner that made it become an ideological enterprise dealing with both the epistemological and political dimensions of politics. Because of this, the first chapter treated political behavioralism as a school of thought and tried to show its relevance to the peculiar characteristics of American political science. It was seen that political behavioralism gained momentum and popularity because, to a considerable extent, it remained within the general frame of American political

culture and never tried to transcend its boundaries. It was seen that it was diffused in the political and epistemological aspects of this culture.

The first chapter also showed that political "behavioralism" is not a transcendental form of "objective science" but rather a political, philosophical school of thought whose epistemological and political dimensions are related to the society in which they emerged and developed. It was seen that political behavioralism proceeded through three major stages of development. In each stage the movement kept the same basic assumptions but with relatively divergent conceptions of the political. The movement toward a science of politics was the initial epistemological factor that paved the way for the behavioral approach to develop in this stage. Merriam was unable to specify a limited conception of "science" and the way this concept can be utilized in the study of politics. Instead, he asserted certain assumptions that became basic in the thought of his followers. The most significant of these assumptions, which remained the cornerstone of this thought, is that the study of politics should emulate the style and method of developed natural sciences. Impressed by the development of those sciences and their technological utilities, Merriam attempted to furnish three "scientific" grounds upon which the study of

politics becomes "science." But because this process is not only difficult but seems impossible, Merriam left the concept of science "empty" and without a solid basis since what he conceived as a science of politics is merely an urge to utilize quantitative methods, interdisciplinary levels of analysis, and "systematic" political theory as basic elements of a science of politics. These elements, for Merriam, represent the required epistemological elements for a change in the direction of epistemology in a manner relevant to the changes caused by the emerging social forces of industrialism, education, and feminism.

The second and third stages of the development of political behavioralism, as was shown, took the same point of departure as the first stage. In both, the turn to political psychology (Lasswell) and the return to political theory (Easton) started from the assumption of Merriam's conception of science and sought to elaborate it in a manner that, for them, made the study of politics "scientific." Both Lasswell and Easton accepted the transition from the qualitative to the quantitative as desirable for knowledge to be scientific. They also both agreed that the study of society, in general, and of politics, in particular, should emulate natural sciences. The aspect in which they differed from each other is that, while Lasswell's

conception was influenced by the psychological tendency of the social sciences in the thirties, Easton's theory was the result of the political debate of the fifties.

The trend of political psychology was affected by two major forces in the thirties: the first was the flourishing of the doctrines of liberalism and especially the emphasis on individualism; second was positivism in social science that sought to furnish a concept of man relevant to statistical and mathematical analysis. The return to political theory, however, suggests a direct interest in the study of the "political" and a desire to incorporate behavioralism in the mainstream of political science.

(b) In the second chapter, we saw that political behavioralism, as a school of thought, adopted the philosophy of the dominant approach in the philosophy of science--logical empiricism--as a philosophic foundation for its cosmological and political outlook. Political behavioral theory was thus based on the assumptions of this approach which shaped it radically. The examples presented in the discussion of the points of contact between Joergensen and Kirkpatrick demonstrated the strong commitment of behavioral political theory to logical empiricism. But while this approach was crystalized mainly through the practices of natural sciences, the behavioral theory dealt with different

practices but, mistakenly, on the same grounds.

The idea of the "given," for example, is among the major misconceptions resulting from the application of this positivistic assumption to the study of political things. The logical empirical approach in natural science presupposed that there is a reality some aspects of which are "given" in the sense that they are known by human senses. In natural sciences, "sense theories" have a valid basis since basic components of natural phenomena can be clarified easily by the senses. This basis assumes that nature is "what we touch, smell, taste, or feel" limits some given aspects of natural phenomena directly known by the senses. But while natural sciences study this form of phenomena, politics is concerned with a completely different one.

It must be pointed out that there is no such given aspect in political reality. Politics is manifested in what Gunnell calls a "form of conventional objects" that can hardly be any such given aspect of it. Disagreement and difference are the essence of politics to the extent that there is no politics if there is no disagreement. What appears a given for one political scientist might appear a myth for another and the same follows in practice. Behavioral political theory was misled by the idea of the given and, as a result, took for granted the ideals of the scientific method in an

attempt to treat its conception of the "political."

And if the idea of the given is a good example of the way behavioral scientists were misled, their stand on the issues of value-free science, value-fact dichotomy, and theory was generally characterized by an orthodox commitment to the assumptions of logical empiricism in natural science. It was seen that most of the pioneering behavioral scientists asserted that political science must be value-free despite the fact that its impossibility is implied in their treatment of the relation of values to knowledge. The impossibility of establishing value-free political knowledge is not due to the approach used in their treatment, but in the fact that politics, by its very nature, is part of the individual's values and of the value system. The political is concerned with the most humanitarian aspects, that is, with man as a thinking creature.

In the treatment of the dichotomy between facts and values in social science, behavioral theory repeats the former error. While this theory claimed to be committed to the factual aspect of reality, its advocates were unable to show where the limits of political "facts" end and those of political "values" start. It was seen that the position of Easton and Eulau on this matter was inaccurate and somehow accompanied by confusion. They emphasized that values

should be separated from facts in the study of politics. Yet they failed to show how. While Eulau states the impossibility of dealing with the value-fact dichotomy explicitly, Easton resorts to "philosophic" clarification.

It was seen through the treatment of these issues that neither is a value-free science attainable nor is a fact-value dichotomy possible. The second chapter thus suggested that these issues can be understood on the basis of complementarity. Values and facts are part of the political reality with which we are concerned and their limits overlap to a great extent since the essence of politics is the overlapping and interrelatedness of our facts and values.

(C) Behavioral scientists claim that the ideals and procedures of the "scientific method" are necessary for the attainment of "objective" knowledge. Consequently, objectivity claimed to be a goal that must be accomplished in order to form a political theory that represents objective reality by eliminating human bias. The claim of objectivity was associated with every step in which the assumptions of logical empiricism are introduced to the study of politics. This doctrine was introduced in natural science on the basis that, in the study of its objects, the researcher has greater capacity to reduce his bias to a minimum--greater than

that of the social scientists. And if the natural scientist can specify the factors affecting his object of study within a neutral experimental apparatus, the political scientist can never do so since the very basis of any political "experimental apparatus" is political.

It was seen in the third chapter that the ideals of "scientific method" have not been adopted merely because of their "objectivity" but rather on the basis of their epistemological response to certain political convictions. In their very basis, those ideals were directed toward prediction and control. Both behavioral political theory and the assumptions of logical empiricism head in the same direction of these ideals. By this, behavioral political theorists adopted the epistemological goals of prediction and control and shaped their theories in accordance with them. Among many reasons, the ideals of the "scientific method" were introduced to meet these goals. The ideals of the "scientific" method were regarded components of the "experiment apparatus" where they became the "canons" or the "criteria" upon which the validity of theory is to be determined.

Most behavioral theorists disregarded some basic qualities that distinguish human action from the objects of natural science. Therefore, they thought that this experimental apparatus is applicable to both. The

pillars of behavioral epistemology were therefore, as was seen, certainty, measurement, universality, and system. It was seen, however, that those ideals were very limited in providing for adequate understanding. In the fourth chapter we demonstrated the areas in political behavioralism in which those ideals were inapplicable and inappropriate to account for human phenomena. Those ideals are better suited to the goals of prediction and control.

The assumptions of logical empiricism misled behavioral political theory. Instead of providing for a substantive political theory, behavioral scientists regarded theory as methodology, eliminating by this its vital human aspect. But this does not mean that political "behavioralism" is merely methodology since this school of thought has a political outlook molded to fit its methodology.

(D) The behavioral outlook of the nature and type of human behavior was molded in a manner and form to fit within the limits of the mentioned ideals and to satisfy their requirements. It was seen that the five major areas of political inquiry (discussed at the beginning of the fourth chapter) invalidate most of the assumptions of these ideals and, moreover, help us see that there was an ideological commitment to these assumptions. The ideological commitment manifest in the

goals sought to be accomplished by the application of those ideals to political theory: prediction and control. And because the goals were united we saw some qualities that both dimensions of the behavioral enterprise, political and epistemological, share with each other.

It was seen that there was a division in the conception of political behavioralism into the three conceptions mentioned in the fourth chapter (Straussianism, post-behavioralism, and radicalism). But despite those differences, they all agree that political behavioralism "represents a school of thought or an ideology either in the form of its assumptions, the natural of its analysis, or the type of theoretical outcomes." Merriam's "systematic" conception of government, appearing in his treatment in The New Aspects of Politics, was introduced in an ideological perspective on the nature of government and its ends.

The connection of science to the political conviction of behavioralism also appears clearly in Lasswell's concept of the "science of democracy." Lasswell's view of science clearly shows its ideological roots where the form of science required is that which advances a liberal democratic form of political theory. Having this in mind, Lasswell makes the assumption that individualism is the cornerstone of his understanding of

politics. By turning to psycho-political analysis, Lasswell reduces politics to the individual.

Consequently, his treatments of political phenomena were unable to treat vital aspects other than the individual.

(II.) The study of political behavioralism, like the study of all other schools of thought, enables us to make some general inferences which can lead us to a point at which this study can reveal certain theoretical generalities in the emergence and evolution of the various modes of political thought.

(A) Every learned discipline has to be framed and molded according to the peculiarities of its subject matter. Most of the defects of the political theory of the fifties and sixties resulted, to a considerable extent, from borrowing premises of other disciplines with less emphasis on their adaptation. The subject matter of politics differs significantly from that of natural science and its phenomena have their peculiar characteristics that distinguish it from those of other social sciences. There is no doubt that the interdisciplinary exchange of tools and data is helpful in gaining more insight into the "political." Yet political scientists must be cautious of the specific aspects of politics that demonstrates its "political" essence. They must be concerned with the study of man as mainly a "political animal" and on the basis of this

conception view politics as the basic and fundamental issue that shapes other levels of man's existence and not as an epiphenomenon subject to these levels.

By an over-emphasis on the interdisciplinary focus on politics, political behavioralism did not specify boundaries of politics, but rather confused those of political theory. This, however, contributed to greater alienation of political theory. The fifth chapter suggested a different path for political theory as a way out of its crisis. It was seen that the major deficit of political behavioralism, inherent in its very foundation, is that it studied politics on a non-political basis. Therefore, to reduce the effect of this shortcoming to its lowest level, Chapter V suggested a return to political concepts for the explanation and understanding of political phenomena.

As an example of their use in the study of politics, Chapter V introduced four political concepts: interest, ideology, paradigm, and history. By the reintroduction of these four concepts, the researcher did not aim at repetition, but sought to demonstrate the possibility of establishing political frameworks of analysis and correcting them to present a coherent picture that would help us in understanding political reality. The concept of interest, for example, can show us the relation between human perception of reality and

materialistic and psychological human needs. Despite the fact that the concept of "interest" was sometimes misused and sometimes over-emphasized, it can show us the way man, at the social level, determines his basic needs and the way to pursue them. This concept, then, is not deterministic since it assumes that man decides his social needs and the mechanism for their satisfaction.

But since one should not exaggerate the capacity of the concept of interest in political analysis, Chapter V suggested another concept--ideology. This concept is more comprehensive than that of interest. The conceptual framework of ideology and its boundaries shows how political thought in its various forms (scientific, philosophic, etc.) states from the belief of certain assumptions and advances its outlook on their basis. While ideology shows us a vital and important aspect of political knowledge, the idea of paradigm helps us explain the emergence of thought and its relation to its assumptions at its highest levels, at the level of what Kuhn calls the "community of scientists." This idea reveals the same attribute of ideological commitment to certain assumptions, but at the level of scientists or, in other words, at the academic level.

Chapter V also suggested the use of the idea of

history in political analysis. This, however, must not be understood as an urge to history. It is, rather, to be understood that the idea of history can help us solve some problematic aspects of political thought, especially those related to its origin and relevance to a particular stage of history. The idea of history, here, is regarded as a mirror that reflects the conditions and factors contributing to the emergence of different forms of human thought.

(B) Ideas and theoretical generalizations of politics never transcend the social boundaries in which they emerge. A theory of politics must depart from the peculiar qualities of the system it represents. Theory, then, belongs to and represents the special social conditions which pave the way for their emergence and thence shape their development. If political theorists seek to obtain an adequate understanding of political phenomena, they ought to conceive ideas as resemblances of the actual political aspects in the society; that is, political scientists should refrain from posing epistemological issues as major problems of political inquiry and concern themselves with the relevance of their theoretical outcomes to the solution of actual political problems. The fact that the study of politics can never be separated from the assumptions and goals set up for its study makes it legitimate for political

scientists to use their theories for epistemological purposes.

It was seen that both forms of transcendentalism (behavioralism and Straussianism) reflect ideological patterns despite the fact that their advocates deny it. The emphasis on "objective reality" and objective "truths" on the part of political behaviorists must not mislead us, since the obvious fact is that the fundamental assumptions of their enterprise reflects certain interests of a particular "community of practitioners" who, in turn, represent the ambitions and social goals of certain social forces. Yet, the "epistemological objectivity" of this community has become the goal of its theory and not substantive knowledge.

(C) The question of the relevance of political theories to political problems is a paradigmatic matter. By this we mean that the assumptions of any given paradigm of thought are themselves the same as its political theory. Political theory is therefore conditioned not by its methodology but by the assumptions of political reality of the paradigm to which it belongs. It was seen that the behavioral conception of a theory of politics was founded on the assumptions of a more elaborate paradigm--logical empiricism; that is, behavioral political theory was a

political extension of a paradigm of human thought of a general outlook of existence. The behavioral enterprise took for granted the assumptions of this outlook and advanced their political outlook in accordance with it.

(D) For the understanding of political phenomena, it is not enough to specify the "criteria" and procedures for its study. There must be other principles for the formation of political theory. The various social disciplines in which the ideals of the scientific method were utilized to the maximum like psychology, sociology, and especially economics, can never do away with a purely operational conception of theory since the very foundation of that science in a philosophy and their assumptions are established philosophic doctrines. No social scientist can start his technical examinations without saying a word about human nature and the relevance of his discipline to some aspects of it. This means that whatever the extent to which the concept of "science" is applied to the study of social phenomena, the understanding of these phenomena can never be adequately accomplished without philosophic reflection on some basic doctrines and concepts. This is process not only because these doctrines and concepts are necessary, but also because their specification is the first level of analysis and the point of departure of higher levels of conceptual

framework.

(E) The formation of a general theory of politics seems to be unattainable unless an adjustment is made for the transcendental conception of theory. The conception of a general theory of politics implies a transcendental level of generality, especially when it is considered to be applicable to different political systems. It was seen that generalizations that transcend their spatio-temporal limitation become invalid representations since they attempt to explain conditions differing from those original theories. A general theory of politics is, therefore, only valid when it states directly the political actions in the political system it explains. Thus, it is general only insofar as it can provide for a comprehensive understanding of the conduct of politics and the nature of its process within the social limits and becomes utopian if it tries to provide for different conditions.

APPENDIX
THE CASE OF KUWAIT

The definition of "science" in Zakareyya's approach ranges from "the organized type of thinking that can be used in the affairs of daily life"¹ to that precise form which regards "science" as the specific methods which combine precise observation, rational hypothesis, and empirical experimentation, and employ mathematics as a language for the expression of its laws.² And between those two extremes, one comes across some assertions that "science" existed in all stages of human history and does not differ from other forms of knowledge. And, of course, this confusion leads to an inability to draw a distinction between the doctrines of the scientific epistemological enterprise and those concepts and practices employed by thinkers and philosophers which utilized the procedures of observation and the examination of hypotheses on the basis of empirical facts. Therefore, we see that Zakareyya talks sometimes about science as accompanying

¹Foud Zakareyya, Attafkeer Al-Elmy [Scientific thinking] (Kuwait: The Kuwait National Council for Culture, Arts, and Literature, 1978), p. 5.

²Ibid., p. 57.

all stages of human thought and sometimes as a "late phenomenon." Thus, when Zakareyya perceives science to be defined by its general epistemological characteristics, he emphasizes the former nature, and when he perceives it as precise techniques and specialized tools, he perceives it in a positivistic manner: a manner that subordinates knowledge to a set of criteria and procedures that determine its validity.

Among those doctrines which show the pessimistic tendency of Zakareyya's thought is the doctrine of the "neutrality of science" since he asserts that "science is not an enemy of anything and not competitive to anything and the scientist does not threaten anybody and does not seek to control anyone."³ In this regard, he believes in the ultimate objective of the scientific enterprise and asserts that "science" is a way of "viewing things" and can be isolated from the values and aspirations of its user. This assertion and its various dimensions will be discussed at length in this dissertation, but it is necessary here to make two observations. The first is Zakareyya's implication that "science" per se is a "force" of powerful principles whose validity cannot be disputed like

the principle of the impossibility of establishing a

³Ibid., p. 11.

premise with its contradictory opposite at the same time, the principle that for every instance there is a cause, and the impossibility of establishing anything from anything.⁴

Here Zakareyya misses an important principle of the comprehension of the nature of "scientific knowledge." Although these premises seem easy and obvious, they are still controversial like any other philosophic principles or any paradigm of knowledge. He also misses the fact that those doctrines and others are connected to the beliefs and ideology of the individual social scientist or the "community of practitioners," and the fact that the determination of the desirability of a society to believe in these doctrines has no relation to its being a force per se but to the level of social and cultural development of the society. Consequently, he treats the assumptions of the scientific enterprise in isolation from the social forces of that period of time which were tending to change the fundamentals of the traditional paradigms of knowledge and which saw this change as an essential process going hand in hand with the changes in the balance of racial power. In other words, Zakareyya fails to see that "science" is not a power per se, but an intellectual outcome relevant to the ideological

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

character of a particular historical stage and, in accordance with it, relevant to political dynamics.

Connected to the above arguments is Zakareyya's assertion that science is basically "a systematic method or approach to view things and understand the world,"⁵ and from this point of departure, he emphasizes the neutrality of its very nature. This vision and the errors connected to it make a "weapon" out of the "scientific method" that can be used to determine the validity of theories. And if science, asserts Zakareyya, was used in a destructive manner, this was not due to its nature but to the people who believe in it. In this regard, he fails to recognize the difference between the intellectual and technological outcomes produced by scientific research and the scientific method as a way of viewing things. Therefore, we find him here asserting that the negative aspects of technology are not part of science, as if the scientific enterprise is isolated from people. This vision leads to a misunderstanding of the shaping forces of science and to a denial of its social basis and of the fact that "science," like any other form of social knowledge, involves a social basis and reflects all forms of social conflicts even if in a sophisticated and

⁵Ibid., p. 30.

abstract manner.

From these observations one can conclude that Zakareyya's assertion of the "neutrality of science" is incorrect. And at this point, it should be pointed out that when such assertions produce a new form of transcendentalism, they are harmful to the understanding of this enterprise since they imply a "power" for science to repress the other aspects of knowledge by invalidating them through its "canons." It seems that Zakareyya sees the difficulty of finding a precise definition, especially when it is applied to the study of society. He thus indicates the general characteristics of accumulation, system, causality, universality and certainty, precision, and abstraction in an attempt to distinguish its form. From these characteristics, he formulates his conception of science within the methodological issues of "logical empiricism." By resorting to these issues he threw the "ball" into the field of this school of thought. And if these issues need a long period of study and contemplation (this is what we will be dealing with in the second chapter through a treatment of the methodological issues of logical empiricism), it is necessary here to treat the philosophic assumptions attached to these issues in Zakareyya's thought.

According to him, the doctrine of "accumulation"

is connected to the idea of "progress." This means that the accumulation of knowledge and the development of theories imbue knowledge with a progressive attribute. "Accumulation," writes Zakareyya,

describes the manner in which science develops. . . . Scientific knowledge is like a building with a floor over another with one basic difference--the residents of this building always go to the floor above. That is, whenever a new floor is established, everyone goes to it and leaves the lower floors to be merely a foundation upon which the building rests.⁶

Before one starts to examine the meaning and validity of the above statements, it is essential to assert that the concept of "accumulation" is incorrectly applied to knowledge and its application indicates the lack of a paradigmatic conception and the absence of recognition of the idea of "history." Thus, change due to the passage of time in any epistemological paradigm is, for positivist thinkers, a process in which knowledge proceeds to a better state than before. Or, as Hannah Arendt once indicated, positivistic thinkers "attribute dignity to time."

With regard to Zakareyya's statement, one finds a misconception of the nature of theory formation that resulted from the absence of the sense of history and paradigm. The first statement implies that "scientific"

⁶Ibid., p. 18. (Emphasis added.)

theories complete each other since they are articulated in a manner in which each theoretical component depends on each other for its validity and each transition to a higher level of theory means the attainment of a higher level of validity. It seems, however, that the thesis that each theory completes its predecessor is contradictory to the assertion that the transition from one stage of knowledge to another is accomplished by the voluntary acceptance of the principles of the new stage.

The transition from one state of knowledge to another (or from one paradigm to another) results, theoretically, from the inability of the theory to account for new emerging complications and the process in which "lower floors are a foundation" and without which "theoretical outcome" is meaningless since they are the source of its validity. Zakareyya, however, uses the relation between Newton's physics and Einstein's physics as an example of the process of accumulation. Yet this example first of all shows that the difference between them results from the shift of emphasis on the principal elements of the paradigms to which they belong. He says:

Newton's physics was the last word in its field, and it expressed an ultimate truth. This belief prevailed for two centuries, then came Einstein's physics and Newton's physics and transcended it, and proved that what was an ultimate fact was merely a relative truth in one state among many theoretical

states but broader than them and more general.⁷ And if this example is, to some extent, acceptable, the inference of accumulative relations is definitely wrong where such a generalization does not regard the significant change in the foundation of physics advanced by Einstein. And as is obvious in his example, the radical change in the conception of "truth" is among the basic aspects of this change that shows the paradigmatic difference between the two theories of physics.

The doctrine of "accumulation" connected to the notion of "progress" is, according to Zakareyya, the significant aspect that distinguishes the "scientific" enterprise from other forms of knowledge. He states:

Philosophic knowledge was not accumulative meaning that every new enterprise appearing in philosophy did not start from where the others ended and was not inclusive of it, but criticizes what precedes it and makes out a new point of departure for itself.⁸

The process in which new philosophic trends emerge is not clear in Zakareyya's thought and lacks a paradigmatic orientation and a sense of history. He sees it as a completely new point of departure and perceives its development to be a result of the critique of what precedes it. Although this is true to some extent and also applicable to the scientific enterprise,

⁷Ibid., p. 19.

⁸Ibid., p. 18.

one can see that there were stages of philosophic thought in which classical Greek philosophy influenced Jewish, Christian, and Islamic logical thought; and these theological frameworks, in turn, responded, in the process of their formulation, to the modes of social relations in the societies from which they emerged. One also can notice that the various philosophic forms of thought have similar general characteristics that are available in the "scientific" form since they respond to the ideas which precede them and to historic conditions.

The starting points of different philosophic textures, as he indicates, are beginnings in new stages of social and epistemological change that were essential for the paradigms of either western or Arab Islamic society. Those starting points are therefore changes in the paradigm. It can be seen, however, that the impact of Aristotle's thought started to decrease with Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bacon until the paradigm was changed and replaced by modern conceptions of the Age of Enlightenment. To understand this, one does not see the doctrines of "accumulation" and "progress" as essential elements.

The second epistemological characteristic of "scientific thinking," according to Zakareyya, is "system." This characteristic is connected in his analysis to the idea of method, since the view of the

world as a system is, he asserts, a scientific device for its organization and the means to do this is to follow a "method." The emphasis on this latter aspect is

a basic characteristic of "science," to the extent that we can define science by it and say that science in its essence is a methodological knowledge and by this we distinguish it from other forms of knowledge that lack planning and organization.⁹

But when he treats the idea of "method" as the core of the enterprise, he fails to show how it operates and defines it in a vague manner that does not show its significance or the way it can be connected to the characteristic of system and thus fails to distinguish it from other modes of knowledge. Sometimes he defines it in a specified way that depends on a conscious plan and sometimes as the principle of following "methodological criteria."¹⁰ But it seems that at the end he advocates the positive conception which considers it a set of "criteria" since he delineates the "classical" steps which start with observation and hypothesis formation and end with empirical verification and deduction.

Still, a belief prevailed in the first half of this century in those steps as a new formulation of a

⁹Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 31.

new theory of knowledge. It was easy for the critics of positivism to see the overlapping of the scientific procedures and the philosoph approach, both classical and contemporary. Those procedures starting from observation through the formulation of hypotheses and determination of variables and the setting of their examination apparatus are basically a philosophic process in which the components of the subject of the study are subject to logical articulation to each other. The observation, for instance, starts with limiting a conception of the "object" of observation and its logical relevance to the tools of the observation and whether or not their tools can indeed show the different aspects of its object. The hypothesis step is also a rational one in which logical relations are formulated between available data and logical relations which can be predicted from the empirical process.

The relation between what is technical and what is rational is a basic element that should not be overlooked. Despite the attempts of the advocates of science to make their enterprise "pragmatic," "procedural," and "theory-free," it will remain an enterprise of thought and theory. From this point of departure, it is necessary to point out that what we call the "scientific method" is, in its basic orientation, a philosophic view of nature and society

that derives its validity from the philosophical assumptions of the tradition that started with Bacon and gained momentum in the Age of Enlightenment becoming at the beginning of this century a theoretical, philosophical enterprise with significant impact on our epistemology.

The third characteristic, according to Zakareyya, is causality where, for him, "the understanding of phenomena and its interpretation" cannot be accomplished unless the causes of such phenomena are disclosed. And despite the fact that the notion of causality is not clear and cannot embody many other forms of relations, Zakareyya insists that the notion of causality is becoming an essential element for understanding. For instance, he indicates that

science in this period of time looks for an alternative for the idea of causality in its traditional sense, in the aspect which it is not elaborate enough to express the relations between the phenomena in a precise expression.¹¹

But while he indicates this, we find him asserting that understanding is rooted in causality. The alternative which Zakareyya is looking for and which is connected to the process of understanding is not a precise definition of causality but a new vision that makes finding a meaning in social relations and of

¹¹ibid., p. 45.

social existence an essential element for understanding. The development of the various analytical approaches which deal with social phenomena in a setting of many factors makes the element of causality very limited in showing the actual relation between phenomena under study and those factors.

The fourth characteristic, according to him, is manifested in two doctrines related to each other: universality and certainty. For him, scientific truth can be transmitted to all people who have the intellectual capacity to understand and believe in it.

. . . It is public truth and generally transcends by that the individual's range of its exposure and the personal circumstances in which it emerged. And this attribute makes scientific truth "certain."¹²

Although he asserts repeatedly that what he calls "scientific truth" is relative, he sees in it some ultimate aspects. What he means in this regard is that the generalizations of natural sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology transcend the spatio-temporal limitations of their discoverer, if this assertion can be accepted in those sciences, one comes across a basic fact that the objects of study in social science are dynamic, living, changing, and subject to the various influences of other aspects of social processes.

¹²Ibid., p. 47.

Zakareyya's assertion that the "scientific truth" can be transmitted to all people who have the capacity to understand it makes the scientific enterprise an aristocratic establishing especially if one knows that those who have the "capacity to understand it" are those who believe in the assumptions of the epistemological issues of the positivistic "community of practitioners."

The fifth and last characteristic is manifest, according to Zakareyya, in the notions of exactness and abstraction which for him make scientific thinking different from other establishments of thought. For him, the only way to have these notions accepted is through "the use of the language of mathematics" since, for him,

whenever [science] reaches a precise stage, it becomes inevitable for it to use mathematical formulations in a broader range and, in contrast, science remains inexact when it expresses its issues in normal language.¹³

The assertion of the importance of mathematics and the language of numbers is another aspect revealing the impact of positivism rooted in Zakareyya's thought. The emphasis on quantitative language as a basis for exactness and abstraction led positivists to employ mathematics to their own ends since this school of thought viewed the transition from a qualitative mode of

¹³Ibid., p. 51.

analysis to a quantitative one as increasing the credibility of such an analysis. And this assertion is connected to the question of measurement and to the nature of the required knowledge. It definitely does not mean that quantitative language is able to disclose the actual relations correctly, especially in the study of social phenomena. That is, if measurement is an essential element for the precise determination of, say, heat and cold, it is not the only essential element for the understanding of social relations. It will be seen, however, in the third chapter of this work how measurement might be relevant to those sciences which can limit a quantitative "value" to its subject of study like physics and chemistry, while it fails to do so with social things in which qualitative analysis or analytical philosophy can determine the nature of relation. Through such a determination, knowledge can reach higher levels of abstraction. And if the "scientific" trend at Kuwait University suffers all these theoretical problems as seen in Zakareyya's work, one can assert that the so-called "science movement" suffers most of the same complications. It is necessary to assert at this point that one of the problems that this movement is facing is that its members were students either in western or Middle Eastern institutions when positivism was dominant in social

studies in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The role played by those scholars was a "translator's" role in which they transferred the elements of that approach, regardless of the peculiarities of their own societies. What has happened at Kuwait University (although this, of course, does not include everyone) is that academic work was connected to social prestige in the existing value system which regarded it as a significant social position. Therefore, the direction of the academic work has not been motivated by the desire to develop and apply it to society, but by the desire to use it for social prestige.¹⁴ Hence, most scholars, and especially in social science, did not bother to show their students the relations between the theories they taught and the reality in which those students live.

Those scholars analyze the questions of their subject in abstract models that do not reflect reality and are inappropriate to the realities of Kuwaiti society. This also applies to scholars in other fields like politics and sociology. The lack of analogical connections leads to a sizable gap between academic knowledge and reality and, therefore, a corresponding

¹⁴A good example of this is the turn away from publishing articles in specialized journals and a willingness to be satisfied with small articles in daily newspapers.

gap between society and the university. And while one cannot ignore other factors (political and social) which contributes to this dichotomy, one can assert that this model of scholarship was the tool by which those factors contributed to it.

And while this is the case at Kuwait University, it is difficult to find an epistemological originality which leads these scholars to make contributions toward solving the problems of Kuwaiti society. For instance, we find in Zakareyya's Scientific Thinking an extension and reflection of the writings of Morris Cohen, Ernest Nagel, Karl Popper, and B. Russell. And while Professor Zakareyya who was the initiator and "godfather" of this trend suffers from a great deal of confusion, others like Ahmad Bader, Tofik Farah, Faisal Al-Salem, and Kamal Al-Manoofi, who tried to advance the positivistic trend within political science were not at Zakareyya's level and did not possess his theoretical ability. The least that can be said about these scholars is that they view the "scientific enterprise" and "behavioral science" as if it is "hung in the air" and regard its theoretical products as able to solve all theoretical questions regardless of their ontological orientation.

For Ahmad Bader, this trend urges objective thinking to eliminate what he calls the superstitions and myths of traditional philosophy. For him,

scientific knowledge

depends on the basis of organized intentional observation of phenomena and on the basis of making the relevant hypothesis and verifying it by experimentation and data gathering and analysis. . . . Scientific knowledge does not stop at the partial details which man searches for, but the researcher tries to reach the general laws and theories which connect those details together and enable him to generalize and predict.¹⁵

Philosophic knowledge is the "contemplation of far causes, metaphysics of life and death of the creator of existence, his attributes, and the proof of his existence."¹⁶ This form of distinguishing between two overlapping forms of knowledge assumes philosophic analysis to be trivial and unimportant in the formulation of knowledge. Thus, Bader expands his book, year by year, by adding more procedures to conduct inquiry since scientific knowledge, for him, can be obtained merely by following the standards of the "scientific method." The process of theory and knowledge formulation is, for Bader, a purely technical process and is not related to understanding but to prediction and control. That is to say, the goal of the scientific enterprise, for him, is not the understanding of events and phenomenon about the standing on its

¹⁵Ahmad Bader, Osol Al-Bahth Al-Elmy Wa Manhejeh [The fundamentals of scientific inquiry and its methods] (Kuwait: Publication Agency, 1973), p. 17.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 18.

causes and the prediction of its course to control it in a pragmatic manner. He thus sees in philosophy only its metaphysical, contemplative aspect and ignores its rational, intellectual aspect which constitutes not only the foundation of scientific enterprise but all forms of human knowledge.

And if this is the goal of social science, then it is no wonder that most of its advocates (some of whom we criticize here) evade any involvement in "a theoretical discussion about the philosophy of science and theories, laws and concepts,"¹⁷ which makes such an enterprise fruitful and makes room for human creativity without restricting it by the technicality and procedure which those scholars delineate whenever they address the theory of epistemology.

What is amazing is that political researchers like Farah and Al-Salem dislike attempts to question the procedures of this scientific enterprise as if its assumptions are the "Holy Quran" and attempt to make the study of politics merely statistical packages, computerization, and quantification or, in other words, to separate it from its ontological relation in the

¹⁷Tofik Farah and Faisal Al-Salem, Toroq Al-Bahth Fe Alulom Al-Eitema'eyah [An introduction to the methods of research in social sciences] (Kuwait: University of Kuwait, 1978), Introduction.

Kuwaiti social reality. And if one does not deny the importance of such tools, we insist that the student of politics at Kuwait University must study politics in its most comprehensive and interrelated dimensions and explore its connection with the requirements of social change and development in Kuwaiti society. This means that academic work must be formulated in a manner that responds to the elements of required political development of this society. That is, instead of dealing with the technical issues, the study of politics must deal with the dual nature of governmental practices--the gap between the governed and the governor of the political awareness of this society--and with the system of political participation, that is, to deal with the questions of political thought and address them adequately in a manner so that they contribute to raising the level of political consciousness of students and citizens. What we urge scholars of politics at Kuwait University to do is make those and other relevant questions the pivot of the curriculum of the Department of Political Science instead of "qualifying students to conduct quantitative and empirical research"¹⁸ as its major goal.

The Department of Political Science has

¹⁸Ibid.

mistakenly adopted this goal and sponsored and encouraged two academic works that it thought will pave the way for its accomplishment. The first attempt was a textbook written by Farah and Al-Salem entitled An Introduction to Methods of Research of Social Science. In this book, the authors (as they usually do in their lectures) evade "theoretical discussions" and are satisfied to delineate again the research procedures which every student is exposed to in Bader's text (discussed in the preceding pages) which is required for the course on "Methods of Scientific Research." It would be more beneficial if Farah and Al-Salem tried to limit a conception of the "political" and the way these procedures can be applied to its study in order to find out the best way to address it.

But they did not do this. Instead, they began their work with a chapter that discusses in a naive manner their understanding of the "scientific" enterprise and its variation from other enterprises. According to the authors, knowledge "consists of both scientific and non-scientific aspects and the difference between the two is manifest in the difference in method and approach."¹⁹ If one asks what is the "scientific aspect," the answer is the following of "the standards

¹⁹Ibid., p. 13.

of the scientific method." And if one further inquires about those standards, one finds them to be conceived in a very limited and narrow framework that includes only those procedures of empirical research introduced by Bader. And even if one does not deny the importance of this kind of research, one would deny that this is what our theory of knowledge is all about. This is a limited and narrow conception of epistemology, due to the authors' inability to delineate epistemology as a thoughtful, theoretical enterprise that consists of methodological issues and procedures of contemporary empirical research.

But since the treatment of certain methodological questions is inescapable, the authors cast their philosophical positions regarding them within the framework of the goals of research. For them, the most important goal is the formulation of "scientific theories and general laws." And although they consider these issues to be among the most important goals of scientific thinking, they merely state them and remain silent.

The concepts of general theory and laws are not intuitive elements that can be left unaddressed. Theory and the conception of social laws are controversial and take different positions in different paradigms. The controversy starts from the question whether there can

be such things as theory and social laws and whether there is any fact or "truth" in social theories that transcends different social conditions, thus leading to different theoretical conceptions. These questions make it essential for any researcher to specify the philosophic assumptions and the conceptual framework from which he derives his understanding of theory. Therefore, it is not acceptable that Farah and Al-Salem say in one paragraph that theory and laws are goals of scientific inquiry and their validity depends on "replication."

For them, the validity of theories and laws depends on replication. And while a good number of positive-thinkers assert the principle of replication as a source of validity, the doctrine as such suffers many problems. And while it is acceptable in natural science, due to the nature of the object of their study which is applicable to experimentation and thus to replication, in the study of dynamic, changing social objects, the ability of this doctrine to maintain the validity of theories is questionable. Changes in the personality of the researcher lead to changes in the conceptual manner in which its assumptions and conceptual framework are structured, in addition to changing resulting from social change and the passage of time. These characteristics of social inquiry make the

doctrine of "replication" unrealistic for the validation of theories.

The text of Farah and Al-Salem ought to be introduced at lower levels of education because of its inability to "stand on its feet" when it confronts the difficult epistemological issues which should be treated at the university level. Therefore, it is unfortunate that the Department of Political Science at Kuwait University places its great hopes on such small attempts.

And while this attempt is poor in terms of its philosophical foundation, Kamal Al-Manoofi's work attempts to treat the philosophic assumptions of his conception of a science of politics and provides us with the materials necessary to critique it and disclose its theoretical shortcomings. In his textbook Introduction to the Approaches and Methods of Political Science, Al-Manoofi is greatly influenced by the school of thought under discussion since, as far as his text is concerned, he views "political behavioralism" as a "scientific" enterprise that seeks to place the study of politics on a "scientific" foundation. As a consequence of this vision, although his book is in line with those theories of behavioral writings, one feels it should be modified by the addition of some footnotes since most of the theoretical observations that he makes can be found

in other works and he does not acknowledge this.

The first thing that results from an application of Al-Manoofi's book is a continuation of the naive and simplistic trend in the Department of Political Science which treats substantive political issues as methodological and quantitative and thus substitutes methodological procedures for substantive political theory. He does this by turning away from politics emphasizing computers and statistics which students could better learn about from a more specialized reference source. The continuation of this trend reflects the desire of political scholars to distinguish themselves from practical politicians by emphasizing the "scientific method" which makes them distinguished celebrities but, at the same time, there are few substantive academic outcomes that benefit society.

An examination of Al-Manoofi's book also shows that a lack of realistic and correct understanding of political behavioralism was among the major reasons why the members of this trend believed in the possibility of making the study of politics a "neutral science" in the form of natural science by the re-employment of its methodology. The absence of a realistic understanding is due to their lack of the sense of history and the absence of the connection between the epistemological beliefs of this movement and its broader political,

partisan line or, in other words, the inability to see the connection between its abstract theoretical formulation and its ideological beliefs and interests.

According to Al-Manoofi, politics is "a science in addition to its being an intellectual and political activity."²⁰ Thus, politics, for him, may be studied as a science separately from the political connections and beliefs of the individual. This conception of science and of the scientific method does not transcend the narrow limits of the procedures introduced by Bader and emphasized by Farah and Al-Salem (discussed above).

Al-Manoofi asserts that

the study of politics has witnessed a "multi-dimensional" revolution imposed by the conflict between the capitalist and the socialist worlds, the independence of the third world countries, the emergence of the non-alignment movement, and the revolution of increasing expectations which made the issue of development a concern of the world, the astonishing development in the technology of communication, the development of electronic computers, and the openness to other social disciplines.²¹

What he calls a "revolution" is actually the thrust toward "scienticism" started in the 1920s which gained momentum in the 1950s. And whether one agrees or

²⁰Kamal Al-Manoofi, Mokadema Fe Manabei Wa Torug Al-Bahth Fe Elm Alsyasha [Introduction to the approaches and methods of political science] (Kuwait: Publication Agency, 1984), p. 11.

²¹Ibid., p. 14.

disagrees with the application of the term "revolution," we find him delineating all the factors that shaped the international system and altered the conception of world politics without treating those actual factors which led to the emergence of the "science of politics" movement in the United States. That is, he ignored those political and social factors that not only led to the emergence of the movement but also prepared the way for its widespread acceptance in academic institutions. By doing this, Al-Manoofi makes political behavioralism a response to changes at the international level, eliminating the chance to view it as a social movement that raised the slogan of "science" as a cover for its political convictions. According to him, this revolution involves three major aspects: (1) the transition from traditional approaches to behavioral approaches, (2) the emphasis on the dynamic aspects of the political phenomenon, and (3) the direction toward the formation of a general theory of politics.

The first aspect, for him, was accomplished when the study of politics followed "behavioral methodology hoping that it would become a 'true science'."²² And although what he means by "true science" is not clear, he asserts that it can be so by being a "value-free"

²²Ibid.

science and by articulating its steps and procedures to a "conceptual framework." In his attempt to show the meaning of true science, he falls into a contradiction by insisting on a "value-free" science and on the "conceptual framework"; he is trying to throw values out the door but allowing them to enter through the window. The assertion that a "true science" is a "value-free" science fails to understand the nature of social epistemology and ignores the fact that the "conceptual framework" is, as such, a priori and reflects the conception of the researcher and is the best tool for its examination. And if this is the nature of the conceptual framework, then the foundation of "pure" or "true" social science is impossible and undesirable. Yet, if these two concepts (value-free and conceptual framework) are the characteristics of the transition from the traditional approach to behavioralism, then this transition is a step backward and leads to an ignorance of the fundamentals of our theory of social knowledge. Hence, behavioral analysis is not a substitute for the "legalistic" or "institutional" approaches which he says are in decline.

A second aspect, says Al-Manoofi, is manifest in the "dynamic" attribute of the study of politics which accompanied the turn away from the static descriptive approach. How did social science do so? His answer is

that behavioral political science shifted its focus from "structure to process, that is, from a static make-up of analysis to a dynamic one and, hence, it was possible to study political change, conflict and violence."²³

But if the notion of "process" deals with one characteristic of interaction--that is, movement--the emphasis on "structure" must in one way or another deal with a view of its effect on the structure under consideration, since "structure" is an outcome of a certain process through which the basics of this structure are made. The behavioral interaction among individuals therefore gains more or different attributes as a consequence of changes in the structure of this interaction which adds a dynamic aspect to its study. Also, the conception of the "political" as a "process" is but one of the many concepts which can be utilized in the study of political change. Thus, to say that the transition from structure to process is a transition from a static state to a dynamic one is but another way of accounting for structural change. Also, the assertion that the use of the concept of "process" is a product of the scientific enterprise ignores the fact that those questions have been placed under thorough examination by many philosophical approaches.

²³Ibid., p. 26.

Regarding the direction toward the formation of a "general theory of politics," one can assert that Al-Manoofi is completely mistaken in his belief that the formation of such a theory depends on the possibilities of separating facts from "values." However, he makes such an assertion in his technical vision of theory in which theory, for him, is not

the logical outcome of a rational mind but a body of systematic knowledge that gives meaning to the empirical evidence, and describes and explains the relation between the facts of observation.²⁴

At this point, Al-Manoofi misinterprets the obvious point that to give meaning and explanation for relations is a logical process of a "rational mind" in which applied logic plays a significant role. To whatever extent technicality is valid in theory, it cannot do away with the rational process when it tries to establish one body for its "facts." It is a consequence of this technical vision of theory that the study of political theory shifted its focus from the substantive aspects of politics to engage in epistemological questions irrelevant to the understanding of its nature.

The most significant attribute characterizing contemporary political science is, according to Al-Manoofi, the place that the "scientific method"

²⁴Ibid., p. 27.

occupies in it and which makes it different from other forms of knowledge (sensual, rational, and beliefs). But despite his insistence on "methods," he fails to show the aspects by which its method distinguishes it. For him, "the scientific method combines experimentation, abstraction, and a touch of belief."²⁵ That is, it combines almost all the different forms from which he tries to distinguish it. First, it follows empirical procedures as a standard for the gathering of empirical data; second, it employs rational inference as an essential limit for abstraction; and, third, it uses a form of fundamentalism in which its assumptions are taken for granted as beliefs. In this form, the scientific enterprise cannot be considered an objective, abstract enterprise but, in contrast, a social trend of thought that reflects an ideological outlook of the society.

When Al-Manoofi tries to attribute a distinguished epistemological character to "scientific thinking," he makes it very close to the other forms. But he continues to deny this overlapping and insists on its discrete character. At this point, we can prove this overlapping for him by examining, even briefly, the three elements of "scientific knowledge" which he

²⁵Ibid., p. 28.

indicated: (1) it is empirical since it regards "reality" as the final test of any hypothesis, (2) it is abstract since it seeks to organize the facts in generalizations, and (3) it is systematic since it believes in the existence of a system that can be subject to observation in the world of reality.

No doubt each of these premises reflects the philosophical background which the researcher utilizes in his inquiry and which reflects the social and psychological factors that conditioned his outlook. One sees, for instance, that the process of empirical verification is undertaken within the limits set by the conceptual framework of the research problem. In the empirical examination of social phenomena, "experimentation" can only be conducted on the basis of this framework which operates as an "experimental apparatus" that, according to its setting, treats and explains the phenomenon. And since the conceptual framework derives its relations from the knowledge preceding it, it cannot do away with the rational logical process by which the researcher furnishes his hypothesis with the knowledge he already has about the phenomenon. Being of this nature, the conceptual framework becomes the channel through which ideological "beliefs," which Al-Manoofi accepts as an element, are injected into the research. In other words, it

translates the values of the researcher at every step of the research from the specification of the problem to the deductive process.

Regarding the thesis that "reality is the final test," one can assert that the meaning and specification of "reality" are controversial. The sense in which the term "reality" is used usually depends on the researcher's view of this reality and the term assumes far-reaching ramifications, especially when applied to social reality. What some view as social reality, others view as unrealistic since social existence and relations are not "givens" and thus the components and objects of its study are not "given" but are specified by the theoretical concepts that determine the view of such reality.

The second element of abstraction is also an intellectual, philosophic question rather than specified procedures. In this regard, one finds even the most enthusiastic positivist thinkers agree that the process of theory formation is a "process in which induction and deduction overlap." That is, the connection between the available data is also an intellectual theoretical process that cannot be limited within the framework of mathematical and statistical relations. The principal obstruction is a philosophical mode of thinking in that it makes a whole from the separated details on the basis

of the methodological issues in which the researcher believes and follows.

The element of "fundamentalism" in the scientific enterprise which Al-Manoofi accepts was introduced as intuition or ultimate truth. It was thus presented as a form of a certain belief. According to Al-Manoofi, the belief "indicates that what is behind the desire to reach a generalization of the existence of a system" is the systematic world. This belief is manifest in the theoretical assumptions of these "scientific" enterprises which were taken for granted without subjecting them to rational analysis. For instance, Al-Manoofi demonstrates this by asserting the existence of "system." And if he uses the term "system" to denote the term "society," it can be acceptable. But if he uses it to denote a form of organization of social existence, its applicability depends on the paradigm by which this existence is viewed. The attribute of "system" and the form it takes are assigned by the paradigm to arrange the interaction and interrelations within an organized form that conveniently facilitates the process of explanation. Its existence or lack thereof thus cannot be settled by belief.

The point that should be understood by the positivistic behavioralists at Kuwait University is that political theory can never be a transcendental form of

knowledge. It contains specific meanings of the specific political reality which it resembles. And this inevitably leads to a conception of political theory as a vision of a particular political setting on the basis of its social conditions. That is, theory should not be viewed as specific "procedures" which should be followed in the conduct of political inquiry but as an intellectual, dynamic, and live enterprise. It is intellectual since it is directed at connecting academic, intellectual processes to the society--to introduce political problems for debate and examination in the classrooms of the university. And it is dynamic since it does not stop at the limits of epistemological procedures and "the criteria of adequacy" but transcends them to more elaborate horizons that take into account values and problems. And it is live since it must not remain within academic limits but combines theoretical vision and political practice. Political theory is found not in an ivory tower, but in actual confrontation with the problems of the society and, being of this nature, is determined by the requirements of political development of the Kuwaiti society.

This work attempts to show the political "scientists" at Kuwait University that political behavioralism is one school of thought in the American society from which it emerged and has the ideological

and philosophic orientations of this society; therefore, its theoretical outcome does not transcend the limits of its culture. It also seeks to show that, as an extension of "science" in politics, it derived its paradigmatic assumptions of the philosophy of science from its dominant approach, logical empiricism, in order to defend its social stand and political convictions. It is hoped that this work will be helpful to Kuwaiti students of politics in seeing the "other face" of political behavioralism.

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